Every few years, as the international order appears to fray at the edges, foreign policy intellectuals dust off their copies of Henry Kissinger’s works and wonder aloud: Can we recreate the Congress of Vienna? Could a grand diplomatic summit—bringing together today’s great powers—restore balance and stability to our turbulent world?
The short answer is no. But the reasons why tell us much about both the romantic myths surrounding the Congress of Vienna and the fundamentally different world we inhabit today.
First, let’s dispense with the rose-tinted view of the Congress of Vienna. Yes, the 1815 settlement ushered in a period of relative great power peace in Europe.
But this “Concert of Europe” wasn’t the product of enlightened statesmanship alone—it emerged from mutual exhaustion after 20 years of revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, a shared ideological commitment among monarchies to suppress liberal and nationalist movements, and a fortunate alignment of interests among the victorious powers.
The system worked because the major powers—Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and eventually France—shared fundamental assumptions about legitimacy, operated within a confined geographical space, and faced no external challengers to their collective hegemony. When these conditions eroded, so did the Concert.
Why Vienna can’t be replicated
Today’s international system bears little resemblance to post-Napoleonic Europe. Consider the obstacles:
Ideological heterogeneity: The Congress of Vienna succeeded partly because its participants shared monarchical values and a common interest in suppressing revolutionary change. Today’s great powers—the United States, China, Russia, India, and the European Union—operate on fundamentally different ideological premises.
American liberal internationalism, Chinese authoritarianism with “socialist characteristics,” Russian civilizational nationalism, and Indian strategic autonomy represent incompatible visions of domestic and international order. There is no shared ideology to suppress, and no common understanding of what constitutes legitimate governance.
Economic interdependence and decoupling: The Vienna system operated in an era of limited economic integration. Today, we face the paradox of deep interdependence coupled with growing strategic competition. China and the United States are simultaneously each other’s largest trading partners and primary security threats.
This creates incentives for both cooperation and conflict that the Vienna statesmen never confronted. The current push for “de-risking” and supply chain restructuring suggests we’re moving toward managed separation rather than stable coexistence.
Nuclear weapons and existential risks: The Congress of Vienna managed conventional military power through balance-of-power politics. Nuclear weapons fundamentally alter this calculus. Mutually assured destruction creates both stability (great powers won’t fight each other directly) and instability (miscalculation could be catastrophic). No 19th-century diplomat contemplated weapons that could end civilization, making any modern “concert” simultaneously less necessary (nuclear deterrence provides stability) and more urgent (the stakes are higher).
The tyranny of domestic politics: Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand could negotiate without worrying about Twitter mobs, 24-hour news cycles, or midterm elections. Modern leaders face domestic constituencies that often oppose the compromises necessary for great power accommodation.
Try selling the American public on a spheres-of-influence deal that acknowledges Russian dominance in parts of Eastern Europe or Chinese primacy in East Asia. Democratic accountability—a good thing in itself—makes Viennese-style horse-trading politically toxic.
The rise of non-state actors and transnational challenges: The Congress of Vienna dealt with states and states alone. Today’s challenges—climate change, pandemics, terrorism, migration, cyberwarfare—don’t respect borders and can’t be solved by great power cartels dividing territory. A new Vienna might stabilize great power relations while doing nothing about the forces most likely to disrupt international order.
If a global concert is implausible, might we see regional balance-of-power systems emerge?
Perhaps. We’re already witnessing something like this: an American-led order in the Western Hemisphere (however attenuated), a contested order in Europe with Russia pushing back against Western expansion, Chinese attempts to establish regional primacy in Asia, and continued multipolarity in the Middle East and Africa.
But these regional systems lack the communication and coordination mechanisms that made the Concert of Europe function—however imperfectly—for decades. We’re more likely to see competitive regional spheres than cooperative ones.
Risky Vienna nostalgia
The real danger of Congress of Vienna nostalgia is that it distracts from the hard work of managing great power competition in our actual circumstances. Pining for a Kissinger-esque grand bargain encourages magical thinking: if only we could get the right people in the right room, everything could be sorted out.
This ignores that stable international orders emerge from underlying power realities and shared interests, not clever diplomacy. The Congress of Vienna codified an existing balance of power; it didn’t create one from scratch.
Today’s distribution of power remains contested, with China rising, Russia declining but disruptive, America still powerful but overstretched, and Europe wealthy but strategically diffident.
This doesn’t mean the Vienna precedent is useless. The Congress offers several lessons:
First, successful settlements require acknowledging legitimate interests of all major powers, even former adversaries. The inclusion of France—the defeated power—in the post-Vienna order was crucial to its stability. Today, this suggests we cannot build a durable order by attempting to isolate or contain China or Russia indefinitely.
Second, flexibility and pragmatism matter more than rigid principles. The Vienna statesmen adjusted borders, created buffer states, and made compromises that would horrify modern human rights advocates.
While we cannot and should not abandon our values, we must recognize that insisting on universal acceptance of liberal norms as a precondition for stability is a recipe for perpetual conflict.
Third, communication channels and regular consultations help prevent misunderstandings from escalating into crises. The Concert powers met periodically to address emerging issues. We need similar mechanisms today, even if they won’t produce a grand settlement.
More modest approach
Rather than dreaming of a new Vienna, we should pursue more modest goals: crisis management mechanisms to prevent great power conflicts, functional cooperation on specific issues where interests align (nuclear nonproliferation, pandemic response, space governance), and regional arrangements that acknowledge spheres of influence without legitimizing aggression or territorial conquest.
This won’t produce the elegant architecture that appeals to strategic theorists. It will be messy, partial, and unsatisfying. But it’s achievable in ways that a grand concert is not.
The Congress of Vienna succeeded because it matched the diplomatic ambition to the historical moment. Our challenge is to do the same—not by recreating the past, but by honestly assessing our present constraints and possibilities.
That requires abandoning nostalgia for an imagined golden age of diplomacy and focusing instead on the unglamorous work of managing competition, preventing escalation, and finding limited areas of cooperation among powers that will remain rivals for the foreseeable future.
The world doesn’t need another Congress of Vienna. It needs statesmen who understand why we can’t have one—and who are willing to do the harder work that reality demands.
This article was originally published on Leon Hadar’s Global Zeitgeist and is republished with kind permission. Become a subscriber here.
