US President Donald Trump’s six-day tour of Asia, his longest foreign trip of his second term, was more than symbolic.
His attendance at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in South Korea and his first bilateral talks with Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, marked a defining moment for Washington to reaffirm its Indo-Pacific strategy amid intensifying great power rivalry.
The Indo-Pacific has entered a new era of turbulence. China’s maritime assertiveness, economic coercion, and technological competition are reshaping regional dynamics. For smaller Southeast Asian states, these shifts highlight ASEAN’s enduring claim to “centrality” as a diplomatic hub designed to give its members autonomy and insulation from great power pressure.
That centrality is exercised through ASEAN-led forums, including the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, which bring together the United States, China, Japan, India, and others. ASEAN members continue to hedge, engaging both Washington and Beijing, and even participating in both US and China-led naval exercises, underscoring their determination to avoid choosing sides in the deepening US-China rivalry.
ASEAN’s consensus-driven decision-making, however, limits its ability to respond collectively to Beijing’s coercive tactics. China’s water cannon-wielding maritime militias, economic blackmail, and debt-trap diplomacy have tested ASEAN unity. Internal divisions often exploited by Beijing make it difficult for the bloc to take united positions on timely issues, including the South China Sea and digital governance.
As Malaysia’s foreign minister recently warned, ASEAN’s neutrality is eroding as global powers compete for influence. Cambodia and Laos remain dependent on Beijing’s financial support, while Vietnam and the Philippines are drawing closer to Washington. These diverging interests complicate ASEAN’s ability to present a common front just as regional security risks intensify.
America’s crucial role
Trump’s trip reaffirmed that the US views ASEAN as an essential pillar of its Indo-Pacific approach, but one that must be complemented by broader coalitions. Washington’s policy should reinforce ASEAN’s diplomatic leadership while recognizing its limitations. ASEAN can lead dialogue and set norms, but it cannot supply the deterrent power needed to maintain regional stability.
That responsibility falls to America’s alliance network. Through AUKUS – with the United Kingdom and Australia and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – with Japan, India and Australia – Washington and its partners are strengthening collective capacity to deter aggression and preserve maritime security.
AUKUS should look for opportunities to work with ASEAN members on maritime domain awareness, cybersecurity and emerging technologies. Collaboration on these and other issues could bolster deterrence and capacity building while respecting ASEAN’s preference for inclusive, non-aligned action.
Trump’s meeting with newly elected Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi signaled a reinvigorated US-Japan alliance. Takaichi, dubbed Japan’s “Iron Lady,” has pledged to expand defense spending and take a firmer stance against China’s military activity in the East China Sea.
Together with Japan’s commitment, the expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, granting US forces access to nine bases, several near Taiwan and the South China Sea, reinforces a growing deterrence network across the Indo-Pacific. These developments, combined with AUKUS and Quad initiatives, reflect a US strategy to maintain peace through strength while keeping Southeast Asia free from coercion.
Singapore’s founding prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, called ASEAN “the lynchpin in Asia’s role in a globalized economic world.” That remains true. The ASEAN economies collectively generate around $4 trillion in GDP, making the bloc the world’s fifth largest. With nearly 700 million people, most under 30, it remains one of the world’s most dynamic growth centers.
The US already has deep economic stakes in the region. US goods exports to ASEAN reached US$125 billion, services exports $58 billion and investment totaled $74 billion in 2023, representing roughly one-third of all foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia. ASEAN is not just a growth story; it is integral to global supply chains, digital trade, and industrial resilience.
Balancing diplomacy and deterrence
ASEAN’s greatest strength lies in sustaining dialogue and preventing open conflict. Yet as the region confronts maritime incidents, cyber intrusions, and economic coercion, dialogue alone may not suffice. Washington must continue to support ASEAN’s diplomatic convening role while building coalitions capable of acting when ASEAN cannot.
Working through AUKUS, the Quad, and bilateral alliances enhances deterrence; ASEAN’s institutions, meanwhile, sustain the communication channels vital for crisis management and de-escalation.
Trump’s presence at the ASEAN and APEC summits was more than ceremonial – it was a signal that Southeast Asia remains central to America’s Indo-Pacific vision. As great power competition deepens, ASEAN’s centrality and US credibility will both face renewed tests.
The challenge for Washington now is to move beyond the photo-op and follow through with trade engagement, infrastructure investment and sustained diplomatic attention. Only then can America’s engagement in Southeast Asia be truly strategic, steady and enduring.
David A Merkel is visiting distinguished fellow at the College of Charleston and an Associate with LSE IDEAS. He served as US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and director on the National Security Council.
