If US-China tensions were reduced in late October when the American and Chinese presidents finally met face-to-face in Busan, South Korea, more recent developments threaten to once again aggravate relations between Washington and Beijing.
November witnessed bitter recriminations between China and Japan, America’s foremost ally in the Asia-Pacific, over the fate of Taiwan, which is claimed by China as a breakaway province.
While many in Washington were likely relieved to see that the Taiwan issue was not broached at Busan, that proved premature. There’s another summit between the US and China planned for April in the Chinese capital, and Taiwan and other related security issues should be at the top of the agenda.
While some have interpreted the new US National Security Strategy as softer on China, Beijing is certain to brace at new language in the strategy that emphasizes Taiwan geostrategic importance and pledges to maintain US “military overmatch” in the Taiwan Strait.
Asia-Pacific security can be compared to an onion. Peeling back layer after layer inevitably reveals that Taiwan is the issue at the core. In fact, many economic tensions in the region, whether involving microchips or shipping, likewise relate back to Taiwan tensions.
But among the sundry mutations of the Taiwan question, none is more dangerous than the Japan angle. That is due to the two contrasting socio-historical images conjured up by Taiwan in Tokyo and especially in Beijing.
In Japan, there is strong sympathy for the island democracy that has maintained close cultural and commercial links derived from five decades of Japanese rule over Taiwan starting in 1895.
Beijing has a diametrically opposed conception, viewing Japan as the invader and interloper that prevents the realization of China’s final “great rejuvenation” through reunification. Even if no Taiwan issue existed, China-Japan relations would still be fraught because of Japan’s Second World War invasion of China and related atrocities.
No genuine historical reconciliation between the two nations has occurred, and for the Chinese, Taiwan has come to symbolize this very dark chapter in the China-Japan relationship.
In September 2025, China released a feature film depicting Unit 731, a Japanese research facility that conducted gruesome experiments on Chinese prisoners and developed biological weapons that killed hundreds of thousands of Chinese.
Trump got a glimpse of these acute tensions when he took two sequential phone calls in late November. First, Xi apparently phoned the White House—an unusual occurrence—to complain about Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent suggestion that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could provoke a Japanese military response.
Trump then apparently called Takaichi and “advised her not to provoke Beijing on the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty….” While it’s difficult to know if that account is accurate, it does suggest that Trump has the right instincts on the Taiwan issue.
The second Trump administration has taken a number of positive, corrective measures, including refusing a transit visit to the US by Taiwan’s leader Lai Ching-te, downgrading defense talks with Taiwan, canceling an arms aid package, and, perhaps most importantly, steering US policy back toward “strategic ambiguity” after it had begun to lean toward “strategic clarity” during the Biden administration.
Still, as I found out on a recent trip to Shanghai, many Chinese specialists are wondering whether Trump’s shifts on Taiwan are fundamental or merely tactical. The record arms sales package approved by Washington for Taiwan in December is sure to feed Beijing’s suspicions in that regard.
Such an arms build up, uncertain as it is in practically all respects, will not bring stability to the Taiwan Strait, unfortunately, and could even prompt the opposite result. If Trump wants to truly stabilize US-China relations for the coming century and preserve the “long peace” in the Asia-Pacific, more and bolder steps are required on the Taiwan issue.
Trump should order US troops posted to the island as military trainers to leave Taiwan. He should also lower the frequency of US Navy transits through the Taiwan Strait, and decrease the intensity of US military exercises in proximate areas.
In addition to giving genuine substantive impetus to America’s One China policy, Trump should consider new language that welcomes “peaceful unification” and “opposes Taiwan independence.”
Taking these simple steps will allow for a calming of security tensions across the board in the Asia-Pacific. Tokyo will get the message, follow Washington’s lead, and pursue a sincerely defensive military strategy.
That strategy might include favoring arms of a more defensive character, such as air defenses, as against those that might be deployed for offensive purposes like aircraft carriers. Such steps will help maintain a peaceful situation in the Taiwan Strait.
Tensions in the South China Sea would also likely abate if China was no longer concerned that the Philippines was being prepared as an American staging area for a Taiwan contingency.
Even the US-South Korean alliance would be positively impacted since Seoul would no longer be nagged by the question of its approach in a Taiwan scenario. Crucially, the developing nuclear arms race now accelerating between China and the US would mellow if the possibility of war was no longer imminent.
The Trump administration has put enormous efforts into delivering peace to Eastern Europe and the Middle East with only modest results so far. Yet a few straightforward measures could deliver an even more consequential peace in Asia between the world’s two contending superpowers.
Lyle Goldstein is director of the Asia Program at Defense Priorities.
