General Xavier T. Brunson’s recent article, “The East-Up Map: Revealing Hidden Strategic Advantages in the Indo-Pacific” has quickly become a major point of discussion in South Korea.
In the article, the commander of all US forces on the peninsula argues that South Korea has long been trapped by what he calls the traditional “north-up” perspective.
Rotating the map so that east appears at the top disrupts the usual sense of distance and reveals what he describes as Korea’s “advantageous positioning” within the Indo-Pacific theater.
Brunson emphasizes that “For much of the past seven decades, United States Forces Korea (USFK) has been seen as a forward outpost – a trip-wire force.” With the east-up orientation, this framing collapses.
Korea appears not as a distant outpost but as a central hub already embedded inside the region’s defensive perimeter.
Brunson notes the geography with clarity: Camp Humphreys is “approximately 158 miles from Pyongyang, 612 miles from Beijing and approximately 500 miles from Vladivostok.”
By shifting the map, Brunson argues, the United States can also see the power of a strategic triangle linking South Korea, Japan and the Philippines.
He writes that these three allies together can generate a regionally integrated network that enhances situational awareness and coordinated responses across multiple domains.
The mixed reaction in South Korea
For those deeply concerned about South Korea’s security, this confirmation brings some relief.
It signals that the US does not see Korea as a dispensable forward post but as a core strategic node whose loss would fundamentally weaken the Indo-Pacific balance of power.
Yet the article also introduces new anxieties.
By presenting Korea as a hub within an emerging multilateral architecture, Brunson implicitly expands Korea’s role beyond deterring North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
The US appears to be positioning Seoul within a broader framework aimed at China and Russia, a shift that blends reassurance with unease for many Koreans.
The concern is that South Korea may be drawn into an unwanted regional contest with Beijing and Moscow while being encouraged to deepen military cooperation with Japan and the Philippines.
Such a shift comes at a time when South Koreans remain divided over how far the country’s obligations should extend beyond the peninsula.
A long-standing American vision for Asia
Brunson’s framing may feel new, but its intellectual roots reach back to the early Cold War.
In the early 1950’s, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s advisers explored a collective security pact for the Pacific that would accompany a Japanese peace treaty.
The occupation of Japan would end and it would regain sovereignty.
In the accompanying agreement, to be signed by Japan, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, Japan would be guaranteed protection from the Soviets, and Japan’s former enemies would be safeguarded against the resurgence of Japanese power.
State Department experts believed this pact might persuade Japan’s former adversaries to accept a liberal peace treaty.
The United States would be able to retain military facilities in Japan, and the treaty would not block limited Japanese rearmament. President Truman supported the proposal.
Acheson’s successor, John Foster Dulles, also endorsed it and considered it essential for bipartisan backing.
The purpose was to facilitate Japanese rearmament but to keep it under international control. Such an alliance, permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter, would internationalize Japanese forces, Dulles reasoned, and thereby “ease reconciliation with [Japan’s] present constitution.”
Seoul’s choices
If the United States is elevating South Korea’s strategic status, Seoul should respond with both opportunity-seeking and caution.
A realist reading suggests that Korea must leverage this shift to demand more explicit commitments from the US, especially regarding extended deterrence and nuclear threats.
If Korea is a core ally, it deserves a core voice in shaping the region’s defense posture.
At the same time, Seoul must assess the risks of being drawn deeper into an American confrontation with China and Russia.
Aligning too closely might limit Korea’s diplomatic room and complicate its economic relationships, while failing to prepare for expanded alliance expectations might leave South Korea vulnerable.
The challenge is to maintain national autonomy while strengthening the alliance.
This balance becomes even more critical if Washington envisions South Korea as part of a new multilateral defense network.
Seoul must ensure that any expanded role is matched by reliable commitments, predictable strategy and a shared understanding of Korea’s security priorities.
A cautious but necessary path forward
The east-up map reflects a recognition that stability in the Indo-Pacific depends on anchoring reliable partners at its core.
South Korea’s position is crucial not because it seeks greater influence but because its security, prosperity and democratic resilience are tied to the region’s broader balance.
Brunson’s argument is ultimately about maintaining peace.
By advancing cooperation with like-minded states, Seoul can help uphold a stable order that benefits the entire Indo-Pacific, not merely itself.
Hanjin Lew is a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs. Jio Lew contributed research for this article.
