Indonesia’s plan to buy Chinese J-10C Chengdu “Vigorous Dragon” multi-role fighters (MRFs) signals a seismic shift in Southeast Asia’s airpower balance—where the nation’s pursuit of strategic autonomy may blur the line between independence and alignment.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that Indonesia has confirmed plans to purchase 42 J-10C fighters in a deal worth nearly US$9 billion, signaling a shift in regional defense dynamics.
Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin announced that “they will be flying over Jakarta soon,” underscoring Indonesia’s push to modernize its air force under President Prabowo Subianto’s administration. Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa said funding had been approved, though he did not specify delivery dates.
The J-10C, developed by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, features advanced active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, and composite materials comparable to 4.5-generation Western fighters. If finalized, the purchase would make Indonesia the second foreign operator after Pakistan, which reportedly used J-10Cs in recent combat against India.
The acquisition fits Indonesia’s “Perisai Trisula Nusantara” (Nusantara Shield Trident) doctrine of building an integrated deterrent across its archipelagic expanse while diversifying suppliers beyond the US, Russia, and Europe.
This announcement comes as the latest addition to Indonesia’s hodgepodge of fighter jet acquisition plans. Previously, Indonesia signed a contract with Turkey to purchase 48 of the latter’s Kaan jet fighters, along with a separate one with France for 42 Rafale jets.
Apart from those deals, Indonesia remains a stakeholder in South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae jet program, although its involvement is troubled by payment issues and potential information leaks to North Korea. Indonesia is also in talks with the US for F-15EX jets after putting its plans to purchase Russia’s Su-35 on hold.
Looking at the feasibility of Indonesia’s acquisition plans, sanctions on Russia and its need to replace combat losses in Ukraine may stop the former’s plans to resume the purchase of Su-35s.
At the same time, the US F-15EX’s high costs may make it a hard sell. Indonesia’s stake in the KF-21 project seems shaky, as South Korea may turn to more financially capable partners such as Poland and the UAE for continued funding.
Turkey’s Kaan is barely out of the testing stage, and it may be looking at South Korea’s experience with Indonesia in its KF-21 project as a cautionary precedent. While France has yet to deliver Rafale jets to Indonesia, production is ongoing, with the first jets to be delivered in 2026.
However, the Rafale’s reputation took a heavy blow after the May 2025 Pakistan-India skirmishes over Kashmir, wherein India lost one of the prized jets against a J-10C – seeming proof that China’s weapons, long derided as cheap and inferior copies of Western equipment, are now competitive against the latter.
That mixed bag of factors – sanctions on Russia and its wartime urgencies, high costs of US gear, financial limitations, and the Rafale’s recent combat performance may have influenced Indonesia to consider China’s J-10C as the latest addition to its growing fighter aircraft shopping list.
At present, Indonesia operates an equally diverse fighter fleet consisting of US F-16s, Russian Su-27s and Su-30s, alongside South Korean FA-50s and British Hawk 200 light fighters.
That mix may reflect its dual-pronged approach to safeguarding sovereignty amid potential challenges from both China and the US. Having aircraft from different manufacturers allows Indonesia to maintain its response capability in case of incursions or sanctions from one party.
Deploying aircraft against their respective manufacturers and their allies wouldn’t make sense, as their weaknesses are already known, countermeasures could easily be fielded, and the withdrawal of technical support and spare parts could keep them grounded.
China’s ten-dash line overlaps with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Natuna Islands, with multiple incursions from the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the former’s fishing vessels prompting the latter to deploy warships as well as US-made F-16s in response. Indonesia could also employ other Western-made aircraft, such as the FA-50 (which is based on the F-16), Hawk 200, and the Rafale, to reinforce its position in the region.
However, Australia and the US pose a unique challenge to Indonesia. In a Taiwan contingency, Australian or US aircraft may have to pass through Indonesia’s airspace – potentially drawing the latter into a wider conflict.
For that reason, Indonesia is very unlikely to allow Australia or the US to use its airspace for transit or aerial refueling operations. Should Indonesia’s J-10C purchase push through, those jets could be deployed to secure the country’s eastern flank, along with Su-27s and Su-30s.
But maintaining a hodgepodge fighter fleet may have significant consequences. For one, interoperability between different subsystems may become an issue, as fighter jets from different manufacturers may not be able to communicate with each other due to differing technologies aboard them.
A diverse fighter fleet may have different sensors that might not be able to function with each other, being unable to cue each other’s weapons. Apart from that, varied identification friend-or-foe (IFF) systems may not be able to recognize each other, which could limit the types of aircraft that could be deployed in a specific operation or region, preventing mutual reinforcement.
Logistics and training could also be a challenge, as facilities, support, and training between these diverse aircraft may not be interchangeable. Having separate logistics, support, and training for each aircraft type may also increase costs for Indonesia, which is already struggling with its finances.
More tellingly, Indonesia’s planned purchase of China’s J-10Cs may signal a growing alignment with China, drawing concern from regional partners. Fighter jet sales do not stop at the delivery of aircraft – the client integrates itself into the manufacturer’s supply chain and training pipelines, with the latter able to use that as an avenue of influence.
China is known to package security and economic deals together to win greater influence. Alongside the sale of J-10C jets, China’s funding of Indonesia’s high-speed train network may give the former greater leverage over the latter’s foreign policy decisions.
These dependencies may reflect in Indonesia’s dealings with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), precluding the group from taking a strong stance on China in the South China Sea – a major setback that has impacted the bloc’s credibility.
Despite those complications, Indonesia’s diverse fighter acquisitions are in line with its independent foreign policy, which emphasizes non-alignment with any major power. Still, Indonesia’s J-10C deal could tilt its finely balanced neutrality — and reshape how Southeast Asia calibrates between the US and China.
