For decades, Western policymakers and analysts operated under the comfortable assumption that the international order would remain fundamentally unipolar, with the United States and its allies setting the rules of the game.
That era is ending—not with dramatic fanfare, but through the steady accumulation of economic weight, diplomatic assertiveness, and institutional innovation emerging from the Global South.
The question is no longer whether the Global South matters. It’s whether Washington and its allies can adapt to a world where they no longer hold a monopoly on shaping international norms, trade architecture, and security arrangements.
BRICS and the push for multipolarity
The expansion of BRICS—now encompassing Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, with new members including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE—represents more than a symbolic challenge to Western hegemony. It reflects a fundamental dissatisfaction with an international system perceived as favoring Atlantic interests while marginalizing the concerns of the majority of humanity.
Critics dismiss BRICS as an incoherent grouping with divergent interests. They’re not entirely wrong. India and China maintain tense border relations. Brazil and Russia have vastly different economic models. Yet this misses the point. BRICS functions not as a unified bloc but as a platform for articulating an alternative vision—one where developing nations aren’t perpetual rule-takers but active participants in crafting global governance.
The establishment of the New Development Bank and the push for alternative payment systems outside the dollar-dominated SWIFT network aren’t merely technical adjustments. They’re strategic moves to create redundancy in global financial infrastructure, reducing vulnerability to Western sanctions and economic coercion.
When Russia was cut off from SWIFT following its invasion of Ukraine, every nation in the Global South took note of its own exposure.
Economic transformation: from periphery to engine
The economic center of gravity has been shifting southward and eastward for two decades, and this trend shows no signs of reversing. By purchasing power parity, emerging and developing economies now account for approximately 60% of global GDP. China alone has become the largest trading partner for more than 120 countries—far more than the United States.
This isn’t simply about cheap labor anymore. Countries like India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Mexico are moving up the value chain, developing sophisticated manufacturing capabilities, digital economies, and innovation ecosystems. The Global South is no longer just extracting resources and assembling products designed elsewhere; it’s increasingly designing, engineering, and branding its own goods and services for global markets.
Demographics reinforce this shift. While Western nations and even China face aging populations and potential labor shortages, much of the Global South—particularly in Africa and South Asia—has young, growing populations. By 2050, Africa alone will account for more than a quarter of the world’s population. This represents both economic potential and geopolitical influence.
The renewable energy transition further advantages resource-rich Southern nations. Control over lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, and other critical minerals provides leverage that oil and gas offered in the previous century. Countries like Chile, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Indonesia sit atop resources essential for batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines.
Smart industrial policy could transform these endowments into manufacturing and technology capabilities rather than simple extraction.
Challenging the Western-led order
The Global South’s growing assertiveness poses uncomfortable questions for the post-World War II institutional architecture. The United Nations Security Council’s permanent membership still reflects 1945’s power constellation, not 2025’s realities.
The International Monetary Fund and World Bank, despite reforms, remain dominated by Western voting shares and policy perspectives. Even the language of “international community” often means little more than the United States and its allies.
Southern nations increasingly operate through alternative frameworks. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides a security dialogue excluding Western powers. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank offers development financing without the governance conditions imposed by Western institutions. Regional arrangements like ASEAN, the African Union, and Mercosur handle issues that might once have been escalated to global forums dominated by Western powers.
This isn’t necessarily about hostility toward the West. It’s about pragmatism and hedging. Why should emerging economies remain dependent on institutions where they have limited voice, when they can create parallel structures more responsive to their interests? Why accept a “rules-based international order” when those rules were written without their input and are selectively enforced?
The Ukraine conflict crystallized this perspective. While Western nations portrayed the war as a clear-cut case of aggression demanding unified condemnation and sanctions, much of the Global South refused to choose sides. Countries from India to South Africa to Brazil maintained relationships with both Russia and the West, prioritizing their own interests over ideological alignment.
This wasn’t moral relativism; it was realism. These nations see Western outrage over Ukraine’s sovereignty as selective, given prior interventions in Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere.
Technology and innovation dimension
Technology represents a crucial frontier in this rebalancing. For much of the digital age, innovation flowed from Silicon Valley, Seattle, and a few other Western hubs. That’s changing rapidly.
China’s technology sector, despite recent regulatory pressures and U.S. export controls, has achieved genuine innovation in areas like mobile payments, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and telecommunications infrastructure. Chinese companies aren’t just copying; they’re leapfrogging in specific domains. Huawei’s 5G technology, whatever one thinks of its security implications, was technically competitive with anything Western firms offered.
India’s digital infrastructure—from the Aadhaar identification system to the Unified Payments Interface—has created a model for inclusive digital economy development that other nations are studying and adapting.
Indian IT services firms have evolved from back-office operations to strategic partners in digital transformation. Indian startups increasingly innovate for Global South markets, creating solutions tailored to emerging economy conditions rather than adapting Western products.
Africa’s mobile money revolution, pioneered by services like M-Pesa in Kenya, addressed financial inclusion challenges differently than traditional banking models. Similar innovations in agtech, health tech, and education technology emerge from local contexts and solve local problems—sometimes more effectively than imported solutions.
This technological diffusion has geopolitical implications. When nations can choose between American, Chinese, European, or increasingly, homegrown technology platforms, they gain negotiating leverage and reduce dependency on any single power.
Regional power dynamics and strategic autonomy
Within the Global South itself, power dynamics are shifting and complex. Regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia increasingly assert independent foreign policies rather than automatically aligning with Western preferences.
Saudi Arabia’s decision to join BRICS and normalize relations with Iran (brokered by China) signals a hedging strategy. Turkey, despite NATO membership, pursues weapons purchases and diplomatic initiatives that frequently clash with American interests. Brazil under various administrations, has pushed back against US policy in Latin America while building ties across the South Atlantic to Africa.
These nations seek strategic autonomy—the ability to pursue their interests without permission from Washington or Brussels. They’re not necessarily anti-Western, but they’re post-Western in their orientation: willing to cooperate with the West when interests align, but equally willing to partner with China, Russia, or each other when that serves their purposes better.
This creates a more fluid, transactional international environment. The Cold War’s rigid bloc structure and even the unipolar moment’s hub-and-spoke alliances are giving way to overlapping partnerships, issue-specific coalitions, and multi-alignment strategies. For policymakers accustomed to “you’re either with us or against us” clarity, this ambiguity feels uncomfortable. But it’s the new normal.
Persistent challenges and internal contradictions
None of this suggests the Global South’s rise is inevitable or unproblematic. Significant challenges remain.
Many Southern economies still struggle with corruption, weak institutions, infrastructure deficits, and political instability. Debt burdens have increased, partly due to Chinese lending but also from Western creditors and bond markets. Climate change will hit tropical and subtropical regions hardest, threatening agricultural productivity and habitability.
Internal divisions within the Global South are substantial. India and China compete for influence across Asia and Africa. Middle Eastern powers pursue conflicting agendas. African nations have diverse interests that don’t automatically align. The concept of a unified “Global South” is partly aspirational, partly rhetorical—useful for certain negotiations but not reflective of genuine solidarity on all issues.
Moreover, military power remains concentrated in the West and China. Despite economic growth, most Southern nations lack the defense capabilities to challenge established powers kinetically. They rely on economic leverage, diplomatic maneuvering, and multilateral forums rather than hard power projection.
Implications for US policy
For American policymakers, the Global South’s ascent requires strategic adjustment, not panic.
First, the US must abandon the fantasy of restoring uncontested primacy. The question isn’t whether to accept a multipolar world—that’s already here—but how to navigate it effectively. Framing every Chinese infrastructure project or BRICS initiative as an existential threat leads to overreaction and alienates fence-sitters.
Second, the US. should recognize that many Southern nations aren’t choosing between America and China; they’re choosing not to choose. Forcing binary decisions pushes them away. A more sophisticated approach acknowledges their legitimate interests in maintaining multiple partnerships.
Third, Western institutions need genuine reform. Expanding the UN Security Council, increasing developing country voting shares in the IMF and World Bank, and creating space for Southern voices in setting international standards would reduce the appeal of alternative institutions. Cosmetic changes won’t suffice; meaningful power-sharing is required.
Fourth, economic engagement must offer competitive value propositions. The Belt and Road Initiative succeeded partly because it provided infrastructure financing when Western institutions didn’t. If the US and allies want to compete, they need to actually show up with attractive, feasible alternatives rather than simply criticizing Chinese terms.
Finally, selective multilateralism and coalition-building around specific issues may prove more effective than demanding comprehensive alignment. Climate cooperation, pandemic preparedness, technology standards, and maritime security might all benefit from flexible partnerships that don’t require ideological conformity.
Conclusion: adaptation, not resistance
The rise of the Global South doesn’t mean Western decline is inevitable or that liberal democratic values are obsolete. It means those values will be tested in competition with alternative models, and the West will need to persuade rather than dictate.
The international system is being remade, not by grand design but through countless incremental decisions by nations pursuing their interests in a more distributed power environment. Resistance to this transformation is futile and counterproductive. Adaptation, while maintaining core interests and values, offers a more promising path.
The question for the US and its allies isn’t whether to accept the Global South’s growing influence—that’s happening regardless. It’s whether to help shape this transition constructively or resist it destructively. The former requires humility, flexibility and recognition that the post-1945 order, however beneficial it may have been, is giving way to something different. The latter path leads to irrelevance.
For the Global South, the challenge is converting potential into sustainable influence: building effective institutions, solving development challenges, managing internal contradictions, and demonstrating that alternatives to Western models can deliver prosperity and stability. Talk is cheap; results will determine whether this moment represents a genuine power shift or merely a temporary disruption before established hierarchies reassert themselves.
The smart money, however, is on transformation. The economic fundamentals, demographic trends, and political momentum all point toward a more distributed international system. How smoothly or turbulently that transition unfolds depends on choices made in capitals across both North and South.
The Global South’s ascent is real. The only question is whether existing powers will facilitate a peaceful rebalancing or resist it until forced to accept changed realities. History suggests resistance is expensive and ultimately unsuccessful. Wisdom lies in adaptation.
This article was originally published on Leon Hadar’s Global Zeitgeist and is republished with kind permission. Become a subscriber here.
