Having once promised to halt America’s “endless wars,” Donald Trump now finds himself deliberating whether to start another one in Venezuela. A number of rationales have been floated to support this prospective military intervention, including stopping “narco-terrorism” and spreading democracy.
Another related justification is that “great power competition” means the US must be more aggressive in curtailing China’s rapidly growing influence in Latin America. And while it’s true that Beijing’s ties with Latin American nations have been expanding, a US military intervention against Venezuela would likely backfire by energizing China’s growing influence there.
A 2024 survey in The Economist laid bare the stark changes underway in America’s backyard thanks to Beijing’s commercial prowess and flourishing trade relationships. The Economist noted that trade between China and Latin America had increased spectacularly from $18 billion in 2002 to $450 billion in 2022. The report also mentioned that Chinese ambassadors in Latin America speak good Spanish and Portuguese and have expanded their diplomatic staffs.
The article quotes then-Senator Marco Rubio complaining that the US “can’t afford to let the Chinese Communist Party expand its influence and absorb Latin America and the Caribbean into its private political-economic bloc,” while noting that the regional response has “generally been a shrug of the shoulders.”
Now serving as both secretary of state and national security adviser, Rubio seems intent on countering China’s efforts—perhaps starting in Venezuela.
It could not have made Rubio happy to see Latin American leaders gathering in Beijing back in May. Among them was the left-leaning Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who has long been working to coordinate on major issues with Beijing, including on the delicate matter of bringing peace to Ukraine.
Meanwhile, a newly completed, Chinese-built port in Chancay, Peru is poised to take China-Latin America trade to the next level as the region’s very first “smart port”, designed to reduce shipping and logistics costs while bringing jobs.
Chinese diplomats have been reasonably vocal in support of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and against American pressure. In September, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian stated that Latin America is “no one’s backyard” and that “bullying… will not work.”
In November, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning condemned Washington’s “excessive force” against boats in the Caribbean and insisted that “cooperation between China and Venezuela is the cooperation between two sovereign states, which does not target any third party….”
China’s bloggers have been rather less restrained in their rhetoric. One headline proclaimed that “China’s counterattack has been effective” and added, “The reality didn’t unfold exactly as the US envisioned. By 2025, the situation seemed to have changed, with China’s presence gradually shifting the balance of power in this protracted struggle….”
Another asserts that the Venezuela situation “serves as a model… demonstrating to other developing countries that they are not necessarily doomed to defeat under Western pressure.”
A recent Chinese military analysis of prospective US invasion scenarios for Venezuela went so far as to claim that an American air campaign would likely be ineffective “because the losses and difficulties caused by US airstrikes are tolerable,” citing the recent Iran strikes as evidence.
This Chinese report and many others highlight the role of Russia and its emergency dispatch of air defense weapons to Venezuela, along with “emergency repair technicians, along with new Russian-made air-launched weapons….” The assessment concludes: “Russia has made its stance clear to the US through concrete actions.”
In fact, China has been benefiting handsomely from the high frequency of US military interventions. While Washington became mired in a series of conflicts in the Middle East as part of its “Global War on Terror,” Beijing’s focus on trade ties and building infrastructure has seen its influence grow by leaps and bounds, not only in Asia but across the Middle East and Africa, as well as in Latin America.
US actions to support both Ukraine against Russia and particularly Israel in the Gaza war have only furthered this trend.
If the US takes military action against Venezuela, it faces the prospect of becoming mired in yet another “endless war,” which will surely fire up anti-American sentiment throughout the region. Washington must also calculate that Chinese companies will collect an additional windfall from these sentiments.
Already, Beijing’s firms have been doing well, but aggressive US foreign policy actions by Washington may convince Latin American consumers to steer even more toward Chinese goods and services.
Such a reckless US resort to force could even open the door to America’s worst nightmare, a possibility China might entertain following the Kremlin’s approach, a path Beijing has so far steadfastly avoided: that China could adopt a novel security role in Latin America.
In 2023, there were allegations that Beijing was setting up an intelligence presence in Cuba. Some years before that it seems that some Chinese strategists were already arguing for increasing Chinese “power projection capabilities” in the Atlantic in order to put “greater pressure on the US,” evidently a response to American pressure applied against China in its own backyard.
To be sure, a genuine Chinese military-security presence in Latin America may be hard to imagine at this juncture. Yet, the logic of militarized superpower rivalry is such that it cannot be ruled out. For now, that scenario remains thankfully unlikely, but an arrogant and foolhardy approach by the US could make this unwanted future a reality.
Lyle Goldstein is director of the Asia Program at Defense Priorities.
