By Lívia Peres Milani
Public Policy and International Relations Institute (IPPRI-Unesp)
National Institute of Science and Technology for the Studies of the United States (INCT-INEU)
President Donald Trump meets with Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva during the ASEAN Summit at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
On November 11th, the US announced a withdraw of the additional 40% tariffs it had imposed on many goods of Brazilian origin, including coffee, fruit, and beef. The tariffs, initially imposed on July 30th, are one among multiple dimensions of the current bilateral crisis. Besides commerce, the crisis also has a political dimension, initiated by the recent US decision to invoke the Magnitsky Act – an instrument ostensibly used to sanction corruption and human rights violations – against Alexandre de Moraes, one of the Brazilian Justices responsible for the conviction of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro over his attempted coup d’état. While the recent White House decision does not necessarily represent an end of the crisis, it represents a pause of sorts, and so, a timely moment to assess the relationship.
The imposition of tariffs
The White House’s initial imposition of tariffs may at first glance make little sense, since it appears to disregard its economic interests. The US enjoys a trade surplus with Brazil, and there is not sufficient production in the US of many of the tariffed products to meet national demand. That is the case for coffee, fruit, and a variety of industrial supplies. However, to understand the source of the crisis, it is necessary to consider its non-commercial dimensions. These include i) the transnational articulation of far-right movements, ii) Big Tech’s economic interests, and iii) US geostrategic considerations.
Brazilian and US far-right currents are deeply connected. Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of the former president, has worked to promote the Brazilian radical right abroad. During his father’s trial, he took a leave from Congress to launch a pressure campaign in the US against the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) and the Lula government. With cooperation from sympathetic US leaders, he lobbied against the Lula administration, claiming that the trial was a “witch hunt,” his father was the victim of political persecution, and asking that the US government impose penalties on the Brazilian authorities responsible. This effort complicated Brazil’s relation with Foggy Bottom and the White House. Much of the language used by the White House to justify the new round of tariffs reflected this lobbying effort.
Another factor that explains US policy toward Brazil are the interests of Big Tech companies. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court took up a case relating to the responsibilities of social media platforms for user-posted content, ruling that social media platforms should be civilly liable if they failed to remove undemocratic, discriminatory, or crime-inciting content. In response, the US Computer and Communication Industry Association (CCIA) welcomed the imposition of sanctions against Moraes. They argued that the ruling in Brazil violated “free expression,” a strategy often used by Big Tech actors, in conjunction with far-right political leaders, to oppose the regulation of social media in Brazil and elsewhere.
Finally, larger geostrategic considerations are also in play. The current US administration seeks to reassert US regional and global hegemony. Brazil, for its part, wants to promote its Global South leadership, framed as part of a “multipolar world order.” Promoting the BRICS forum is an important component of Brazil’s approach. The new tariffs were announced a few days after the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, with the US president also threatening to impose tariffs on other countries that associate themselves with the BRICS+ group. This timing illustrates US opposition to the BRICS and pressure on Brazil to align with Western countries instead of its Global South partners.
Tariffs backfire and the future of US-Brazil relations
However, the Trump administration’s aggressive strategy against Brazil has not led to the expected results. Brazil’s government managed to control the domestic narrative, framing US tariffs as an attack on Brazilian sovereignty, a strategy supported by public opinion, as polls show. The US approach also became an incentive for Brazil to shore up its relations with Global South leaders. Following the tariffs, Lula reached out to the presidents of China and India to discuss the expansion of trade relations. The tariffs also proved unpopular in the US, and harmful for the White House, since they drove up the cost of coffee and other products.
These several factors explain Trump’s subsequent decision to change direction. He opened a dialogue with Brazil, first announced at the UN General Assembly, and then confirmed his goodwill in a bilateral meeting in Malaysia. High-level negotiations, and the unpopular inflationary trend in the US, led to the recent removal of tariffs from many Brazilian products. It also signals an end to this most recent period of bilateral crisis.
Nevertheless, there might still be consequences over the middle and long term. US sanctions communicate to the Brazilian government that, while a global power, the US is not a trustworthy partner, even when it comes to such non-strategic, everyday issues as the export of coffee and fruit. At the same time recent events have helped to cement the transnational partnerships of far-right leaders while also serving to illustrate how these relationships are impacting US government decision-making.
On the other hand, the recent US decision to alleviate the tariffs is a signal for both partners that the US-Brazil bilateral relationship is an important one. Even if this relationship is imbalanced, given the US’s economy and global influence, the recent tariff episode illustrates that the US cannot simply dictate policy to Brazil, and that the two countries’ economic interdependence can function as a structural constraint upon the political will of far-right political actors.
