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The future of European defence in a data-driven battle zone

The future of European defence in a data-driven battle zone

Will Marshall is a former NASA scientist and the founder and CEO of Planet, the Californian tech company and leader in earth observation.

It’s too early to tell what the prospects of peace for Ukraine might look like, but we know for certain what a 21st-century battlefield looks like: dispersed, digital, and driven by information.

Under relentless pressure and outmatched by Russia in conventional terms – by as much as seven-to-one in some areas – Ukraine has had to innovate to survive. The result has been a tech-led revolution in military operations, particularly in the information domain through satellites, drones, and artificial intelligence.

For possibly the first time, a nation without a conventional navy has achieved maritime supremacy. Aided by multi-fusion data, Ukraine has been able to coordinate missile and sea drone attacks on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, destroying or damaging 24 Russian Navy vessels and forcing it to withdraw its major assets from its historic Sevastopol base.

European countries are taking note. In July, the European Commission proposed an allocation of €131 billion for defence and space programmes for its next seven-year budget, five times more than the previous budget.

This follows the proposed EU Space Act, which aims to strengthen Europe’s space resilience, enhancing cybersecurity for space infrastructure and promoting environmentally responsible innovation. Meanwhile, the focus on space within the UK’s Strategic Defence Review shows that other NATO partners are waking up to the importance of this crucial domain.

Europe’s industrial landscape provides a strong foundation for the rapid adoption of new technological advancements essential for success. However, as EU members assume more responsibility for their own security, the continent needs to quickly figure out how it can ramp up its military capabilities swiftly, effectively, and affordably.

A recent NATO acquisition of commercial satellite data and AI-powered tools shows that agility is possible. The data will help monitor Russian activities along its 2,435 km (1,513 mi) border. Yet what was most remarkable about this was something mundane: procurement speed. The idea started in March; by the NATO Summit in June, the alliance had access to data and intelligence from satellites in space.

These capabilities are not a substitute for conventional systems but allow militaries to respond faster. What’s more, they can be built up and deployed in months, not years – and for millions of euros, not billions. This is where the opportunity lies for Europe. It need not build a defence posture that mirrors Cold War-era systems. Instead, it has the opportunity to think in terms of outcomes: situational awareness, decision speed, precision, and survivability.

To take advantage of this, Europe needs to adapt its approach to defence investment and procurement, first by leaning into the technological advancements of commercial partners. Many of the technologies vital in Ukraine originated in the commercial sector and were rapidly adapted for military use.

Europe can embrace this model, recognising that its best capabilities in AI, software, and space often reside in commercial startups and scale-ups. Investments in space, drones, and AI provide critical situational awareness to understand surroundings and military movements to inform rapid decision-making. These are not peripheral enablers – they are central to gaining situational awareness.

By prioritising these technologies and providing early funding, they could deliver tangible effects rapidly and dramatically improve the use of conventional assets.

Importantly, Europe’s defence budgeting processes could be more flexible. Technology evolves quickly: What’s possible today wasn’t feasible a few months ago, and the same will be true next year. Whilst the increased budget towards defence in the European Commission’s Multiannual Financial Framework is welcome, a fixed seven-year programme with locked-in specifications will swiftly fall behind. Instead, Europe can develop procurement models that allow for continuous upgrades, rapid prototyping, and dynamic competition.

Finally, defence planning must shift from being requirements-driven to being capabilities-driven. Rather than specifying exactly how a drone should operate or what hardware a satellite must carry, leaders define the outcome they want, such as persistent surveillance or rapid detection of enemy movement. Thereafter, industry can compete to deliver the most effective solution. This approach encourages faster innovation and more cost-effective results.

Europe already has the industrial base to support this transformation. Its AI firms, aerospace manufacturers, and satellite operators are among the best in the world. What’s needed now is political will and strategic clarity. With these tools, Europe can maintain its own “eyes” on adversaries and intelligently allocate and deploy its conventional forces as they come online.

Satellites, drones, and AI won’t win wars alone. But without them, Europe risks being blind, slow, and behind the realities of modern warfare.

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