Haiti is scheduled to have its first presidential elections since 2016 on November 15. However, the socioeconomic and security catastrophe unfolding in the country means that holding an election appears increasingly unfeasible.
The Haitian Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), a group of nine representatives from various sectors of Haitian society that currently governs Haiti, has long promised democratic elections to help reverse the deteriorating situation on the ground.
However, political instability continues to plague Haiti. Its last president, Jovenel Moïse, was murdered in 2021 and a gang coalition called Viv Ansanm currently controls approximately 90% of the capital Port-au-Prince. Experts say conditions on the ground are therefore not conducive to holding elections.
Harold Isaac, a Haitian-Canadian freelance reporter, told Latin America Reports that the notion of holding elections in Haiti under the current circumstances is fanciful.
He points to severe insecurity as the main reason that Haitians probably won’t hold elections in November. “You have guy[s] walking by with … machine gun[s] … [who] could kill you at a moment’s notice, so how are you going to be choosing wisely or choosing freely [in an election under those circumstances] … there’s no way,” he said.
Viv Ansanm and Haiti’s elections
Viv Ansanm, whose name in Haitian-Creole means “Living Together,” is a coalition of once-warring gangs which formed in 2024. It’s led by former Haitian police officer Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier, the main adversary of the fledgling Haitian State.
The coalition’s power has steadily expanded; their numerous foot soldiers attack police stations, healthcare facilities and prisons with relative impunity and they even forced the closure of Haiti’s main international airport in November last year.
Viv Ansanm’s power is contrasted by the extreme weakness of the fledgling Haitian government.
A map of Port-au-Prince that shows the extent of Viv Ansanm’s control of the Haitian capital as of August 2025
Image Source: Global Initiative via X
There is a near-complete absence of state control in Haiti. The government controls a mere fraction of Port-au-Prince, has neither a functioning president nor parliament, and is unable to provide its citizens with basic necessities: most hospitals are out of service, prison breaks have occurred, makeshift refugee camps are scattered around Port-au-Prince and fears of famine abound.
Furthermore, the Haitian economy is floundering. More than 60% of Haitians earn less than $1 a day and 30% reportedly live in extreme poverty. Roughly 50% of Haitians face food insecurity and 40% lack access to clean drinking water.
The improvement of Haitian living standards is hindered by the intractable nature of the conflict with the gangs. As such, Viv Ansanm’s political legitimacy is likely to be a central issue of any foreseeable elections. Reuters reported that “political analysts have warned that rushed elections could further empower the armed gangs and Viv Ansanm has already announced itself as a political party.”
Viv Ansanm has indeed attempted to change its image as a criminal coalition and style itself, instead, as the militarized wing of a nascent political party. In January 2025 Chérizier declared the group’s intention to seek political recognition. Their heavy military presence means that they will likely remain a key player during the election period.
Furthermore, the coalition has developed some limited political acumen; they have gradually formed an anti-interventionist political philosophy that could represent the basis for a political manifesto. The coalition opposes all foreign intervention, and its members claim to be revolutionaries who protect Haitians from a French-backed American oligarchy hell-bent on promoting its interests in Haiti through foreign intervention.
This, according to Chérizier, explains American and French objection to Viv Ansanm’s inclusion in Haiti’s political future. (The coalition did not exist at the time of Haiti’s last election period).
Much of the international community and various Haitian organizations support the continued designation of Viv Ansanm as a criminal group and reject their potential inclusion in future peace negotiations or elections.
In July, the UN’s Haiti sanctions committee added “the Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif gangs to its list of sanctioned entities.” The UN sanctions could reduce the likelihood of the gangs’ inclusion in any internationally-mediated future negotiations.
Nonetheless, other domestic and international leaders have argued that political recognition of Viv Ansanm, given their current power, is pragmatic. The leader of the Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK), Liné Balthazar, has defended the idea of potentially including Viv Ansanm in future political negotiations and elections. Specifically, Balthazar stressed the need for a pragmatic approach to the gangs, arguing that “all of the international organizations involved in humanitarian aid in Haiti, when they want access to Cité Soleil or Croix-des-Bouquets [gang-controlled areas] … interact [with Viv Ansanm] to give humanitarian aid in those areas.” Leaders from CARICOM, an intergovernmental organization of Caribbean nations, have also hinted at negotiation with Viv Ansanm.
Chérizier has suggested that he would be open to future peace talks and potentially contesting elections. However, he has stated that the willingness of the gang coalition to negotiate is conditional on the absence of foreign fighters on Haitian soil. Chérizier “warned that a foreign peacekeeping force would be treated as enemy fighters and meet armed resistance by Viv Ansanm.”
The leader of Viv Ansanm, Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier
Image Source: HaitiInfoProj via X
Haitians skeptical of foreign interference
Foreign intervention, too, is likely to define any future Haitian elections.
The international community has attempted to assist the Haitian state in combatting the gangs and stabilizing the nation. A UN-approved, but UN-independent, Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), spearheaded by Kenya and funded by the U.S., was assembled in 2024 for this purpose.
However, many civilians expressed wariness toward the foreign MSS; the country’s bloody history of intervention left the population skeptical. The U.S. consistently intervened in Haitian politics in the 20th Century, restoring ousted presidents to power, propping up anti-Communist leadership and even occupying the nation. A controversial UN stabilization mission comprising primarily Brazilian troops also operated in Haiti between 2004 and 2017. These failed interventions cast a long shadow and are perceived to have undermined Haitian sovereignty.
The MSS mandate ended in October 2025 and the mission looks set to be replaced by a US-backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF) made up of 5,550 police and soldiers whose powers would allow them to detain suspected gang members. However, the details of the GSF, such as the origin of its soldiers, its funding, its rules of engagement and its long-term exit strategy remain unclear.
Members of the Kenyan National Police Service board a plane in preparation for their deployment to Haiti in January 2025
Image Source: National Police Service-Kenya via X
Distrust in domestic institutions
On the other hand, domestic institutions and organizations are viewed with equal – if not greater – suspicion. In 2024, over 5,600 Haitians died due to gang violence and more than 250 were executed by the Haitian police, who have been accused of committing human rights abuses. As a result, over a million Haitians have been internally displaced by the violence.
Distrust in political organizations, whether revolutionary or governmental, is widespread as many believe that the authorities covertly negotiate with the gangs to enrich themselves at the population’s expense.
The TPC is the latest governing organization that must contend with this institutional distrust. The council began its governance of Haiti after previous Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry was effectively forced into exile as Haitian gangs prevented his re-entry onto the island.
CARICOM determined membership of the TPC and bestowed upon it a mandate to organize elections and maintain security in the Caribbean nation until said elections were held. That mandate ends on February 7, 2026, when the council is expected to hand over power to the victor of the elections.
However, distrust in the TPC and their foreign backers appears insurmountable.
Isaac explained, “Nobody … [wants] elections because there is this underlying [sense] … that people have completely lost faith in institutions.”
In the eyes of Haitians, those institutions “have always failed [them],” and are “highly corrupt,” said Isaac.
The current electoral landscape
Isaac also argues that the political infrastructure needed to hold an election simply does not exist in Haiti. He said there is no “political life” in Haiti as most Haitian political parties have been reduced to “remnants” of their former selves.
The big winner in the country’s last election in 2016 was the Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK). Since then, its leader, President Moïse, was assassinated and the current leader, Balthazar, was a suspect.
Fanmi Lavalas (FL) is among “the last remaining, seemingly functioning” Haitian political parties,” according to the journalist. But Isaac said the populist social democratic party has morphed into a mere “cult of personality around [Haiti’s first democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand] Aristide.”
Other traditionally significant Haitian political parties like the Struggling People’s Organization (OPL) and the Rally of Progressive National Democrats (RDNP), seem to have all but disappeared from the political map.
The commemoration of the second anniversary of the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse (pictured) in 2023.
Image Source: EPA Images via X
Safety is key
Of course, the dysfunction of Haiti’s political parties is the least of the country’s woes. Security remains the number one issue blocking elections.
“[Haiti] is not facing … regular criminality … [Haiti is facing] an insurrectional dynamic, you have whole systems … that are dependent on that criminality today, you have whole neighborhoods … [which] are complicit willingly or unwillingly … in that criminality,” said Isaac.
These criminals, the journalist argues, have “no incentive to change their ways” because the previous system failed them. He said young kids in the gangs make “about $100 dollars a week.”
“They are making more money than they had ever dreamed of making by being criminals,” he noted. The UN estimates that up to 50% of all armed group members in Haiti are children.
In contrast, Haiti struggles to pay its police officers. The result of this distinction is the proliferation of financially-empowered gangs with a vested interest in maintaining the current status quo.
Not all of Haiti, however, is under gang control. Cap-Haïtien on the northern coast is largely free of gang violence. A sort of “hybrid election,” Isaac said, has been considered “in the remaining part of the country that is functioning” while the political establishment “would figure [something] … out for the rest [of the country].”
The journalist dismisses the plan, citing that a lack of perceived legitimacy for elections would exist in gang-controlled areas that didn’t get to vote.
“Highly dense areas are where the majority of Haitians [live],” he said. If a hybrid election were held, it would cement the notion that “someone who lives in a gang-controlled area has no rights, or has no vote, or has no legitimate claim to decide the fate of the country.”
Taken as a whole, the lack of security, trust in institutions, the effective collapse of political parties and the absence of political infrastructure make it very unlikely that Haiti will hold elections on November 15.
Featured Image: The damaged Haitian National Palace, the official residence of the president of Haiti, after the 2010 earthquake. 15 years on, significant portions of the building remain unrepaired.
Image Credit: United Nations Development Programme via Flickr
License: Creative Commons Licenses
