In the wake of US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, Russia may be poised to supply Tehran with high-end fighter jets that could tilt the Middle East’s airpower balance.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that leaked internal documents from Russia’s state defense conglomerate Rostec and its subsidiary Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies (KRET) revealed a massive US$6.5 billion arms deal for Iran to acquire 48 Su-35 multirole fighter jets from Russia — potentially Moscow’s largest export since its invasion of Ukraine.
The leaks, allegedly obtained by Ukrainian hackers, included over 300 Rostec files showing customer code “364” linked to Iran and specifying delivery between 2026 and 2028. Each jet is to be equipped with Khibiny-M electronic-warfare pods and Irbis-E radar, with assembly possibly occurring at Iran’s Shahid Babayi Air Base near Isfahan under local supervision.
The deal reportedly stems from barter arrangements involving Iranian drones and oil since 2022 and follows January 2025 statements by an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander confirming a finalized Su-35 contract.
This leak follows Russia’s delivery of lower-end MiG-29 jets to Iran last month, giving Tehran a short-term airpower boost while it awaits the arrival of the more advanced Su-35s. The Su-35s would replace Iran’s aging pre-1979 Revolution F-14s and F-4s, create two modern squadrons and establish its first quasi-domestic fighter assembly line.
But could the fighter deal transform Iran’s crumbling air force into a credible deterrent—or merely expose the limits of Russia’s capacity and commitment?
Russia’s airpower boost to Iran comes at a time when Tehran’s air defenses were found wanting against combined US and Israeli airpower. As Paul Iddon notes in a June 2025 Forbes article, Iran’s decades of neglect of its air force were laid bare during Israel’s strikes on the former’s territory that month.
Iddon mentions that Israel’s air attacks seemed unstoppable, saying that despite Israeli F-16s with small-diameter bombs coming just 80 kilometers away from Tehran, Iran managed to scramble just one MiG-29 to intercept the attackers.
The situation was no better with Iran’s handful of geriatric F-14s, long considered the high-end of Iran’s air force. Israel destroyed two Iranian F-14s on the ground during its June 2025 strikes on Iran.
More tellingly, Iran was unable to stop the US B-2 stealth bombers from dropping Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bombs on its underground nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
Assessing the aftermath of the US strikes, David Albright and others mention in a June 2025 article for the Institute for Science and International Security that the US and Israel effectively destroyed Iran’s centrifuge enrichment capability.
Likewise, Joseph Rodgers and others say in an August 2025 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that Iran is unlikely to rebuild its nuclear program on the scale it was before, without help from China, Russia, North Korea or some other party.
But could a relatively small number of Su-35s alter the military balance for Iran? Military Watch states in a June 2025 article that the Su-35 might surpass Israel’s older F-15s and F-16s, which have not been upgraded to a 4+ generation standard.
Highlighting the technology gap between the Su-35 and F-16, Defense Security Asia reported in March 2025 that Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat mentioned that the Su-35 outmatches older-model F-16s supplied to Ukraine.
Ihnat noted that Ukraine’s F-16s are not modern enough to compete with Su-35s in one-on-one fights, lacking the avionics and weapons to go head-on with the latter’s heavy armament of 12 air-to-air missiles and exceptional maneuverability.
Furthermore, Military Watch notes that Israeli F-35s penetrate Iranian airspace with a limited payload of two air-to-air missiles and gravity bombs stored internally to maintain stealth, which makes it under-armed compared to the Su-35.
It also says that the Su-35 has three complementary radars – the primary electro-mechanical Irbis-E radar and wing-mounted N036B-1-01 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, with the OLS-35 infrared search and track (IRST) system to increase its capacity to detect stealth aircraft and support ground defenses.
Military Watch also states that if Iran equips procured Su-35s with the R-37M long-range air-to-air missile, it could pose a threat to Israeli tanker aircraft – crucial for supporting Israeli strikes within the latter’s territory – without needing to engage the former’s fighters.
However, the Su-35 is not invincible, as heavy combat losses in Ukraine have shown. Steve Balestrieri mentions in an August 2025 article for The National Security Journal (TNSJ) that Russia has sustained eight confirmed losses, with Ukraine claiming up to 25, severe losses for the former’s relatively small fleet of approximately 114 aircraft. Balestrieri ascribes these losses to Ukrainian air defenses, friendly fire, accidents and possible encounters with F-16s.
But sustaining such exports may be harder than announcing them. In a June 2025 report for the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Christina Harward and other writers note that while Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) intends to increase production of Sukhoi aircraft by 30% in 2030, it could only produce one aircraft in one to two months.
Harward and others also point out that UAC’s planned layoff of 1,500 managerial employees in Moscow may hint at Russia’s effort to deprioritize aircraft production in favor of more attritable assets, such as drones.
They also add that sanctions and labor shortages would continue to slow Russia’s aircraft production, even as it attempts to expand its physical production facilities.
Furthermore, Hamidreza Azizi, in a June 2025 article for the Middle East Council for Global Affairs (ME Council), says that Russia’s approach to military cooperation with Iran is selective – avoiding deeper entanglement that could jeopardize its position in regional matters.
Azizi says that Russia is reluctant to get itself involved in Iran’s regional conflicts, particularly against Israel, and that its careful balancing of relations with Iran’s rivals, i.e., the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), indicates strategic restraint on its part.
Given those constraints, whether Russia’s Su-35s will restore Iran’s flagging air force or are just another mirage of power will depend on how far the former is willing and to keep its promises.
