Even as China’s domestic wind and solar capacity booms, Chinese investors still face serious obstacles to invest in wind and solar projects abroad. They will require stronger policy support for implementation and insurance.
In our work in Beijing, we have for years spoken to Chinese investors, enterprises and banks who express keen interest in wind and solar but are faced with a lack of effective financial mechanisms and limited risk coverage.
Chinese investors looking at overseas wind and solar projects face limited financing structures, inflexible insurance guarantees, lengthy approval processes and a fragmented regulatory system not aligned with international technical standards. All this inhibits investments.
The 10+10 GW targets would involve the whole industry chain for wind and photovoltaic. The industrial strategy behind this agreement has of course received a lot of attention. But while much attention has gone to the strategic “offloading” function of such agreements for China’s clean-tech industries, this particular agreement’s inclusion of “technology transfer” and “experience exchange” stands out.
This is an area that will be of strategic interest for member countries. Indeed, the member countries’ response statements give greater emphasis to these elements. If effective technology transfer and experience exchange occurs between China and partners in the Global South, it could significantly support local-industry development from the ground up. Ultimately, it could benefit regional energy structures and advance the energy transition both locally and globally.
Ruchita Shah
Energy analyst, Asia, at Ember
India’s participation in the SCO summit reflects a willingness to engage in energy cooperation, as China seeks to shape the forum into a platform for green-technology collaboration. For New Delhi, this engagement could indeed help streamline trade and knowledge sharing on green technologies.
But it will remain cautious in order to protect its domestic supply-chain reforms. It will continue pursuing diversification to prevent falling into new dependencies. And it will emphasise ensuring that cooperation creates value within India through technology transfer, finance and joint research and development, rather than simply expanding import flows.
Chinese solar photovoltaic modules have been crucial in driving India’s installed solar capacity up to its current 120 GW. Meanwhile, domestic manufacturing of solar panels has expanded rapidly from 2.3 GW in 2014 to 100 GW by 2025. But India still depends on China both for solar cells, which are the building blocks of solar panels, and for battery components. Though a Production Linked Incentive scheme has been launched to support domestic battery-manufacturing capacity.
Meanwhile, India’s growing fossil-fuel imports need to be seen in the context of its broader energy transition. As the world’s fastest-growing major economy, it needs to balance rising development-driven energy demand with supply security. Oil demand will continue to rise in the medium term, even as electrification gathers pace.
There is no official climate target linked to reducing oil consumption. Instead, India’s climate commitments focus on expanding renewable energy, reducing emissions intensity and reaching net zero by 2070. Higher oil imports today do not contradict its climate targets, as they are framed around reshaping the power mix and improving efficiency, largely by reducing reliance on coal.
India’s influence in energy and climate discussions extends beyond its reliance on imports. Renewables already make up half of its installed power capacity and it is targeting 365 GW of solar and 140 GW of wind by 2032. Electrification in transport, agriculture and domestic energy use is accelerating.
At the same time, policies such as the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers and the Production Linked Incentive schemes for solar, batteries and green hydrogen are trying to localise supply chains and reduce import dependence.
Over the years, India has built a supportive policy environment for the energy transition. Competitive renewable auctions have consistently delivered some of the world’s lowest tariffs, helping shape international price benchmarks and procurement models in other emerging economies.
India also co-founded and leads the International Solar Alliance, now joined by over 120 countries, highlighting its role in shaping global clean-energy governance. Its advocacy in multilateral forums emphasises equitable, sustainable transitions for emerging economies. The SCO’s 2025 declaration also recognised India’s global vision of “One Earth, One Family, One Future,” reaffirming its leadership in promoting inclusive and sustainable development.
Omais Abdur Rehman
Senior associate at Renewables First, and lead coordinator at Pakistan Renewable Energy Coalition
This year’s SCO summit drew unprecedented attention due to shifting global dynamics.
The US has imposed heavy tariffs on China and India, and it is putting pressure on Russia to end the conflict in Ukraine, and pressure on India not to buy oil from Russia. SCO member states therefore began signalling interest in a parallel global system. China especially has felt the need for an alternative. This was also the first summit with both heads of state of India and Pakistan present since the recent military conflict between the countries.
India, frustrated by external interference, including Trump’s claims of mediation on Pakistan-India tensions, appeared to recalibrate its posture, hinting at openness to Chinese infrastructure support. China seized the moment, hosting the largest SCO summit to date, with 24 heads of state, and outlining expansive ambitions for the bloc beyond symbolic diplomacy.
Climate cooperation emerged as a key theme. China proposed a new SCO development bank, and pledged CNY 2 billion in grants and CNY 10 billion in loans. Russia backed the multilateral approach, reinforcing a shared stance against hegemonism. However, despite the urgency, especially with Pakistan and India facing severe climate disasters, the summit lacked concrete mechanisms for joint climate action or immediate relief.
For Pakistan, the summit signals a potential pivot. The approval of the SCO Development Strategy 2035 and of the proposed SCO development bank offers alternatives to International Monetary Fund and World Bank financing.
Aligning with SCO’s broader development goals, Chinese and Pakistani leaders emphasised opening up new opportunities under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for industrial, agricultural, energy and digital cooperation. Pakistan’s prime minister officially announced the launch of CPEC 2.0.
Further, the Second Pakistan-China B2B Investment Conference saw focus on not just electric vehicles, petrochemicals and iron and steel, but also health and agriculture.
Pakistan is likely to deepen its engagement with China to advance its energy transition through decreased reliance on fossil-fuel assets. It is time for China to move towards the phase out and early retirement of coal in Pakistan as well as other countries. The SCO can help China to focus on these goals.
Amid the strained relationship between India and Pakistan, climate resilience presents a rare opportunity for collaboration. The present floods in both countries have yet again proven this is not an option but a necessity.
The continued India-Pakistan tensions, along with the failure to present a joint climate-action plan at the summit, remain critical challenges. But the SCO provided a platform for both countries to discuss possible transboundary collaboration.
This article was originally published on Dialogue Earth under a Creative Commons licence.
