by Yasir Masood
The Pakistan-India relationship—characterized by mutual distrust, the shared history of Partition, the enduring flashpoint of Kashmir, occasional skirmishes, four major wars, and nuclear weapons—defines the South Asian region. The May 2025 clash represented another instance in which the two countries disagreed publicly on events that transpired, blamed each other, and caused several re-assessments of escalation dynamics in the subcontinent.
Under its current leadership, India has maintained a stern, cynical stance toward Pakistan, plagued by a lack of critical communication. In the aftermath of the May 2025 conflict, the core question remains: will India and Pakistan seek productive cooperation, or push the stability of South Asia toward greater peril? Do diplomacy and dialogue stand a chance to supersede the inflammatory rhetoric of the day? This piece critically examines a core question in the context of the post-May 2025 period from Islamabad’s point of view: Will India’s current right-wing leadership respond positively to Pakistan’s overtures; or push the stability of South Asia and beyond towards peril? Will diplomacy stand a chance in these times when India continues to express scathing views about Pakistan’s international behavior?
From Pahalgam Attack to May Crisis
The recent face-off that nearly edged into a full-scale war following the Pahalgam terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir raised anxiety around the world. India claims that the attackers belonged to The Resistance Front (TRF), a Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba affiliate known for its anti-India views. According to Pakistani sources, India provided no publicly verifiable evidence and even rejected Pakistan’s calls for an independent inquiry classifying them as “deceptive tactics to divert attention.” New Delhi suspended the 1960 World Bank-brokered Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), and downgraded diplomatic ties. In response, Islamabad condemned the attack but denied involvement, calling India’s actions vis-à-vis the IWT and other punitive measures as “unilateral, unjust, politically motivated, extremely irresponsible, and devoid of legal merit.” Pakistan also condemned the IWT’s suspension as an “act of war,” exercised the right to “hold all bilateral agreements,” including the 1972 Simla Agreement, in abeyance, and offered to support a “credible investigation” into the Pahalgam attack.
“In the aftermath of the May 2025 conflict, the core question remains: will India and Pakistan seek productive cooperation, or push the stability of South Asia toward greater peril? Do diplomacy and dialogue stand a chance to supersede the inflammatory rhetoric of the day?”
On May 7, India launched Operation Sindoor across the border, prompting Pakistan’s Operation Bunyan Marsoos in response. The intense four-day standoff ended with a ceasefire allegedly brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump, who also offered to mediate over Kashmir. The conflict marked just the latest example of the two countries playing the mutual blame game with serious consequences.
Post-Conflict Narratives
In the aftermath of the May 2025 clash, media on both sides propagated divergent perspectives, and Islamabad and New Delhi adopted frosty diplomatic positions. In the post-conflict context, the narrative spun on both sides has become a dangerous weapon, exacerbating risk in a nuclear neighborhood with a volatile past. This disinformation cycle, often shaped to appease domestic pressure and influence international opinion, leads to doubts regarding diplomacy and dialogue.
The stern warning given by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a speech in Gujarat in late May was one example. He warned the Pakistani youth to live peacefully and eat their bread, or be ready to face Indian bullets, reiterating the ethos of Operation Sindoor. There were exchanges from both sides that highlighted the overlaying impact of terror on trade and talks, causing strained diplomatic ties. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has, however, clarified his intentions more recently, telling the British High Commissioner he seeks meaningful dialogue with India on Kashmir, terrorism, and IWT. But each country’s negative perceptions of the other fuel mutual distrust, complicating bilateral relations.
The epistemic community too struggles to align shared facts due to conflicting narratives. In interviews with this author, senior Pakistani diplomat Ambassador Ashraf Jehangir Qazi voiced his concerns about the current status quo stating, “Pakistan has always been ready for agenda-based dialogue, including core issues, yet India shows no interest even in confidence-building measures. Modi’s India has no long-term policy towards Pakistan.” Indian social activist Sudheendra Kulkarni urged restoring diplomatic ties and expanding trade and cultural exchanges, starting with cricket tours.
Both dismissed third-party involvement, though Qazi saw it serving India’s interests. Kulkarni welcomed neutral mediation but warned it might “breach the 1972 Simla Agreement.” From Islamabad’s point of view, it continues to point out the uneasy way forward due to New Delhi’s aggressive moves, including Articles 370/35A abrogation vis a vis Kashmir and the IWT suspension. In the past, Clinton’s role during the 1999 Kargil war was welcomed by India, but Trump’s mediation in May 2025 was not only glossed over but rather rejected, crediting military channels for the truce. Pakistan on the other hand, praised Trump’s “stellar statesmanship.”
It is important for India to keep an open mind to finally attain perpetual peace. Pakistan welcomes impartial help addressing Kashmir and terrorism and calls for resolving the dispute through the 1948 UN-mandated plebiscite in accordance with UNSC resolutions. Trump’s transactional style differs, but it can offer leverage if linked to security and economic incentives. A carefully framed external role can make a huge difference by ensuring that the American involvement respects bilateralism, is time-bound, and relies on quiet diplomacy with clear communication about substantive progress to and from both sides.
Climbing the Ladder of the 3Ds for Peace
In the current scenario, a practical path to peace lies in what this author has termed the 3D ladder of (reducing) Doubt and (encouraging) Diplomacy, and Dialogue, nudging both countries to take meaningful yet cautious steps toward a responsible neighborhood policy.
Reducing communication gaps and depoliticizing media coverage are the first steps to address doubts in such a complex inter-state relationship, aiding in the development of cordial ties. Diplomacy through frequent and sustained Track II channels, which do not get abandoned as bilateral tensions soar, would create space for normalcy and calm. That in turn will open more channels for dialogue to touch upon the crucial issues. Confidence-building measures through interpersonal and cross-cultural exchanges, such as bilateral cricket tours on each other’s soil, are vital to rebuilding trust. Finally, sustained dialogue at all levels from official prime ministerial visits, ambassadorial exchanges, to agenda-based negotiations on core issues like Kashmir, water sharing, terrorism, and trade, can lead to reciprocal accommodation and phased normalization, paving the way for lasting peace and cooperation.
“Reducing communication gaps and depoliticizing media coverage are the first steps to address doubts in such a complex inter-state relationship, aiding in the development of cordial ties.”
For starters, Pakistan can address India’s concerns about cross-border terrorism by strengthening enforcement against all banned militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and their leaders, enhancing surveillance, freezing assets of those found guilty, and prosecuting violators transparently. Islamabad could benefit from publicly sharing progress through joint mechanisms, like the India-Pakistan Judicial Committee, to build trust. Such steps could motivate India to investigate Pakistan’s grievances regarding alleged state involvement in Balochistan. These steps would clearly display Pakistan’s commitment to peace, and in turn can encourage India to reciprocate.
The potential for economic ties between Pakistan and India is another avenue that needs to be utilized much more. If India and China can sustain $127.7 billion in trade despite core disputes, there is hope for Islamabad and New Delhi too. Pakistan can propose restoring trade ties, including Most Favored Nation status. This could allow Pakistan to tap India’s consumer market for its rising textile and clothing exports, mangoes, rice, kinnows, surgical instruments and sports goods, helping reduce its current trade deficit with India. In return, India would gain access to a 240 million-strong market for pharmaceuticals, IT services, and chemicals, while cheaper land routes would make trade more efficient and help build trust. Moreover, India can consider reviving SAARC collaboration with Pakistan, alongside other bilateral and multilateral engagements, to advance regional prosperity.
That said, the prospects for an enduring peace will remain bleak if New Delhi continues to be inflexible in its approach to dialogue and engagement with Pakistan. From Islamabad’s point of view, the Modi government seems to be keeping the threat narrative alive for the sake of domestic appeal and image building, but doing so is likely to worsen ties and another military face-off could slip from confrontation to chaos, jeopardizing global security. A continued standoff may also hamper the subcontinent’s growth and prosperity and push it into a cycle of conflict and confrontation that neither country can afford. Thus, it is crucial for the Indian leadership to promote national interest over narrow nationalism and consider the 3D peace framework accompanied by meaningful steps from Pakistan. Only overcoming doubts through transparency, extending diplomacy through credible actors, and encouraging relevant dialogue can bring change in the region.
The article appeared in southasianvoices
