The war in Ukraine and the resulting Western sanctions have dramatically reshaped Moscow’s external priorities.
Facing isolation from European and American markets, Russia has pivoted decisively eastward, rediscovering strategic and economic opportunities with China and North Korea. What has emerged is not a formal alliance but a pragmatic network of survival — a triangle defined less by shared ideology than by mutual necessity and the constraints of sanctions.
Russia’s pivot to the East is not new, but the urgency imposed by sanctions has intensified it. China, Russia’s largest trading partner, provides both a reliable market and a critical supply of energy, technology and manufactured goods. In 2023, China–Russia trade hit a record US$240 billion.
Meanwhile, North Korea – long isolated and dependent on China – has found renewed value in a Russia willing to engage outside formal international frameworks, with an increasing share of its trade — arguably over 90% — flowing through Chinese channels.
For Russia, engagement with Pyongyang is largely pragmatic. Moscow seeks low-cost labor, logistical support and occasionally materiel or munitions —all of which North Korea can supply.
Pyongyang, in turn, gains access to food, fuel and a degree of diplomatic leverage. The result is a network of informal economic arrangements – sometimes referred to as a “gray trade corridor” – that enables both countries to circumvent certain key aspects of international sanctions.
Partnership forged in constraints
China’s role in this triangular network is crucial. Beijing benefits from discounted Russian energy and a more stable, predictable North Korea that serves as a buffer along its northeastern border.
Yet China remains cautious, wary of becoming too entangled in Moscow’s wartime economy or North Korea’s unpredictable behavior. Officially, China enforces UN sanctions on North Korea, but in practice, it permits limited cross-border trade in its northeastern provinces, particularly Jilin and Heilongjiang.
These flows help sustain both Russia and North Korea while minimizing Beijing’s exposure to secondary sanctions. By compartmentalizing trade and diplomacy, China preserves influence without committing fully to the triangle — a classic demonstration of realpolitik in both economic and strategic terms.
Across the Russian Far East and northern North Korea, informal networks are becoming increasingly important. Thousands of North Korean workers reportedly remain in Russia, particularly in sectors such as construction and logging.
Ports like Rajin have resumed limited operations for Russian coal and other commodities. Russia also supplies North Korea with oil and food in exchange for certain goods in a pragmatic barter system that skirts formal sanctions.
This emerging “shadow economy” is modest in scale compared to global trade volumes but carries significant strategic implications. It demonstrates how sanctioned states adapt in real time, improvising trade, labor and logistics solutions to sustain economic survival.
It also allows both Moscow and Pyongyang to maintain operational flexibility without directly provoking Beijing, which prefers to act as a steady but cautious intermediary.
Asymmetry and leverage
Despite signs of trilateral cooperation, the asymmetries are stark. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) is more than 25 times the size of Russia’s – and more than 600 times that of North Korea. Beijing remains deeply integrated into global financial systems, while Moscow and Pyongyang operate largely on the periphery.
Strategic intent diverges: Russia and North Korea prioritize short-term survival, while China aims for long-term leverage over its neighbors and broader regional stability.
These imbalances shape the triangle’s dynamics. Rather than a formal alliance, the network operates as a partnership of convenience. Its durability depends more on external constraints – primarily sanctions – than on any shared strategic vision or institutionalized coordination.
The rise of this pragmatic triangle carries several regional consequences. First, it weakens the effectiveness of UN sanctions by creating routes for goods, labor and energy to move despite official restrictions.
Second, it complicates the security environment for Japan and South Korea, which must navigate the dual challenges of Russian engagement and North Korean military activity.
Third, it underscores the fragmentation of regional economic governance, as parallel networks, sanctioned-adaptive trade and informal corridors may become increasingly normalized if sanctions persist.
Yet the triangle is also inherently fragile, with largely opportunistic transactions. Russia’s war economy is unsustainable in the long term, North Korea remains chronically resource-constrained and China’s tolerance for risk is finite.
The triangle endures because external pressures make it necessary — not because its members share a mutual and lasting strategic vision.
Survival over ideology
The Russia–China–North Korea triangle shows how sanctions and isolation drive unexpected economic and strategic adaptations. It is less an alliance and more a network of necessity – improvisational and asymmetrical.
In the short term, it serves clear purposes: Russia secures supply chains and labor, North Korea gains sustenance and leverage, and China maintains influence while protecting its borders.
However, the triangle’s future depends entirely on external conditions. If sanctions ease or conflict dynamics change, the pragmatic logic sustaining this network could quickly unravel.
In essence, the triangle underscores the resilience and adaptability of states under pressure —and the limits of coercive economic policy in shaping meaningful regional outcomes.
Dr Shamuratov Shovkat is a researcher in international trade and economics at Jiangxi Fenglin College of Economy and Trade in Nanchang, China.
