South Korea is pitching its new anti-ship missile to the Philippines, potentially reshaping the South China Sea’s missile balance.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that South Korea’s Hanwha Group is seeking to sell its new Chunmoo Tactical Missile Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (CTM-ASBM) to the Philippines, part of a broader push to arm coastal and archipelagic nations amid mounting tensions with China.
The in-development missile, unveiled at the Asian Defense and Security Exhibition in Manila last year and slated for completion by 2028, can strike sea targets up to 160 kilometers away using an integrated seeker and can be launched in eight-round salvos from the K239 Chunmoo multiple-rocket system.
Hanwha’s sales drive aligns with the Philippines’ modernization plans to enhance long-range coastal defense, complementing its acquisition of India’s BrahMos supersonic missiles and potential purchases of US Mid-Range Capability (Typhon) launchers and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).
The move also coincides with China’s sanctions on several Hanwha shipbuilding subsidiaries, a retaliation for the firm’s cooperation with US investigations into Chinese dominance in global shipbuilding.
The timing underscores South Korea’s growing strategic alignment with the US’s Indo-Pacific defense posture and willingness to supply partners threatened by China’s maritime expansion.
This alignment is mirrored on the ground, where the Philippines is steadily transforming into a missile outpost anchoring allied defenses in the First Island Chain.
If the Philippines acquires South Korea’s CTM-ASBM, it could establish a force posture that complements earlier US missile deployments on its territory. Since September 2024, the US Typhon system has been indefinitely deployed in the Philippines, followed by the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) in June 2025.
While US and Philippine authorities have stated that both systems are deployed for training purposes, it appears more likely that this is merely a cover for pre-positioning in case of a Taiwan conflict.
South Korea’s CTM-ASBM could serve as the short-range coastal defense layer for the Philippines’ missile defenses, providing localized cover for the NMESIS system deployed in the Batanes Islands.
The Batanes Islands are a critical location near the Bashi Channel, a 140-kilometer-wide chokepoint China must pass through to blockade Taiwan or access the open waters of the Pacific. The US NMESIS system, with its 125-kilogram warhead and 180-kilometer range, could effectively cover the Bashi Channel, while being small and nimble enough to operate in the small Batanes Islands.
The Batanes Islands’ strategic value — amplified by US NMESIS deployments — could make them a prime target for China if it seeks to blockade Taiwan or deter US and allied intervention. In such a scenario, CTM-ASBM batteries in Northern Luzon could overlap Batanes coverage, deterring any small Chinese amphibious thrust meant to neutralize NMESIS or open a flanking route around Taiwan.
CTM-ASBM batteries in Northern Luzon could strengthen the deterrence already provided by the BrahMos’s 290-kilometer reach at Scarborough Shoal. Combined with ongoing US-led exercises near the shoal, this firepower may have dissuaded China from fully militarizing the feature it seized in 2012.
Should China militarize Scarborough Shoal, it would triangulate the South China Sea into a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) bastion that spans the Paracels and Spratly Islands, providing China with a nuclear backstop should its conventional forces in Taiwan fail, and to deter US and allied intervention.
A militarized Scarborough Shoal could also put Manila and Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in Luzon within drone, aircraft, and missile range, pressuring the Philippines to back down in supporting the US in Taiwan.
Backstopping NMESIS and BrahMos, the Typhon system provides conventional strategic-level deterrence, as it is capable of targeting China’s southern cities with long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles and provides air and missile defense with SM-6 interceptors.
However, the Philippines has significant pitfalls in relying on land-based missiles for localized deterrence. These missiles are typically employed by continental states that have a large landmass and substantial road, bridge, and rail infrastructure to keep these assets constantly mobile and concealed to complicate enemy targeting.
The Philippines, given its small-island archipelagic geography and poor infrastructure, may have limited deployment, support, and transit locations for large multi-vehicle assets, such as CTM-ASBM and BrahMos batteries. These locations can easily be identified by reconnaissance satellites, and the missiles can be destroyed via drone and missile strikes.
Furthermore, the Philippines may be acquiring long-range missiles as a partial substitute for its lack of long-range airpower. To some extent, these missiles can provide long-range strike capabilities typically delivered by multi-role fighters (MRFs) such as US F-16s and Swedish Gripens, which, since 2005, the Philippines has struggled to acquire due to funding constraints. While the Philippines operates a small fleet of FA-50 light fighters, these aircraft operate at just a fraction of a true MRF’s capability.
Although the Philippines’ land-based missiles could not match the range of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), they are at the high end of firepower for smaller, underfunded militaries, substituting for a lack of air-based force projection.
However, land-based missiles are inherently inflexible, as they can do little else but sit and wait for targets. They are not a substitute for MRFs that have flexibility, visibility, payload capacity, and mission persistence.
Land-based missiles may be of little deterrent value in addressing grey zone threats, such as the China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia, alongside incursions by combat aircraft such as strategic bombers and fighters.
Additionally, volatile Philippine domestic politics and unpredictable US foreign policy threaten to disrupt both countries’ efforts to contain China. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has relied heavily on the US to boost his security credentials amid a public that is very supportive of asserting the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea.
But amidst public outrage over massive flood control project corruption, a September 2025 Social Weather Station survey mentioned that public trust in Marcos Jr dipped to 43%, while his rival, Vice President Sara Duterte, known for her vitriolic opposition to Marcos Jr., and her accommodating stance towards China, dipped but stayed higher at 53%.
Duterte is seen as a strong contender for the Philippines’ 2028 Presidential Elections, and if she wins, she could scale down US military access in the Philippines, and push for the removal of US missile systems, in exchange for badly-needed economic investments from China.
Beyond domestic Philippine politics, an unpredictable US foreign policy under the Trump administration that may pursue retrenchment, focusing on the Western Hemisphere and homeland defense rather than containing China, could impact US security commitments to the Philippines.
If so, it could potentially weaken Manila’s security strategy through reduced US military funding (FMF) and deployments, including the removal of its Typhon and NMESIS systems from Philippine territory.
Whether Hanwha’s missile deal materializes or not, the Philippines’ emerging missile network will test how far an archipelagic state can project deterrence in a great-power showdown closing in on its shores.