When Indonesia confirmed its US$9 billion purchase of 42 Chinese J-10C fighter jets last week, observers across Asia and the West did a double-take.
The Southeast Asian nation – already engaged in an extensive Rafale program with France, a pending Turkish KAAN order and long-standing US military ties – is now flying squarely between two geopolitical giants.
Yet for Jakarta, this apparent balancing act is less about playing rivals against each other and more about preserving its historic principle of “bebas aktif”—a foreign policy rooted in independence and strategic pragmatism.
The deal itself is significant. The J-10C acquisition marks Indonesia’s first large-scale purchase of Chinese fast jets and is part of a broader modernization effort known as Trisula Nusantara, or Nusantara Trident – a nationwide air defense shield.
Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin emphasized that the jets would soon be flying over Jakarta, while Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa confirmed the funds are firmly allocated in the 2026 defense budget.
This procurement comes alongside a flurry of other fighter jet acquisitions: 42 Rafales from France, 48 KAAN jets from Turkey and additional South Korean KAI T-50i trainers. Indonesia also remains a development partner in South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae program, albeit with a reduced financial commitment.
What stands out is Jakarta’s apparent resilience to foreign influence. Over the past year, French intelligence reported a wave of disinformation aimed at Indonesia’s Rafale deal, much of it traced to Chinese and Russian sources.
Viral TikTok videos falsely portrayed Pakistani J-10 pilots shooting down Indian Rafales, using manipulated footage recirculated in Indonesian-language posts. Despite these efforts, the Prabowo government proceeded with Rafale deliveries.
As one Indonesian army general said, Indonesia wants “the best platforms” regardless of origin—a philosophy that underpins its increasingly multipolar procurement.
This approach illuminates a paradox often missed by external observers: foreign influence can stir debate, but it rarely dictates Indonesian policy. Disinformation may create online chatter, but when it comes to actual contracts, the Ministry of Defense calls the shots.
The J-10 deal is a case in point. Even as rumors spread about second-hand Chinese J-10Bs being available at bargain prices, Indonesia’s military—the TNI—stayed in its operational lane, affirming that procurement decisions lie solely with the defense ministry. In short, Jakarta buys what it wants, not what foreign actors hype online.
Strategically, the combination of Rafales and J-10s is revealing. On one hand, Indonesia remains confident in Western systems, benefiting from proven platforms, interoperability with US and European partners, and sophisticated support networks.
On the other, it keeps channels open with Beijing, acquiring hardware that diversifies its fleet and signals an openness to Chinese technology. This dual-track strategy may frustrate allies seeking clear bloc alignment, but it reflects Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy, which prioritizes sovereignty, regional security and technological flexibility over ideological allegiance.
Critics may question whether this multipolar procurement strategy could lead to interoperability challenges or strain limited defense budgets. Certainly, coordinating logistics, maintenance and training across Rafale, KAAN and J-10 platforms will be no small task.
But Jakarta seems willing to bear the cost to avoid dependence on any single supplier, a lesson reinforced by decades of regional volatility, from rising tensions in the South China Sea to hard-shifting US-China relations.
Indonesia’s case also offers a cautionary tale. Attempts to manipulate defense procurement through online disinformation are ineffective when governments pursue multipolar engagement on their own terms.
If anything, the J-10 and Rafale deals underscore the resilience of a state that insists on strategic independence, adopting the best technology from East and West while maintaining diplomatic maneuvering room.
In short, Indonesia is quietly demonstrating that strategic autonomy is possible in an era of great power rivalry and pressure to take bloc sides. It buys Chinese jets, continues its Rafale program, explores Turkish and South Korean options, and yet maintains ties with the United States.
Foreign actors can spread disinformation, but at the end of the day, Indonesia buys what it chooses. This is “bebas aktif” in action—not a relic of the Cold War, but a living, pragmatic strategy fit for the 21st century.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is director of the China-Indonesia Desk at the Jakarta-based Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) independent research institute.
