When Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Sugiono landed in Pyongyang in October 2025, the first such visit in more than a decade, it raised eyebrows across Asia’s diplomatic circles.
In a world fractured by sanctions and rivalry, Jakarta’s decision to reopen dialogue with one of the world’s most isolated regimes wasn’t just a courtesy call. It was a quiet assertion of agency, a calculated attempt to redefine Indonesia’s strategic autonomy at a time when middle powers are being forced to choose sides.
Indonesia’s foreign policy has long been guided by the principle of “free and active” diplomacy, formulated during the Cold War to preserve independence in a bipolar world. Yet in today’s multipolar environment, that doctrine must be reimagined in practice, not just rhetoric.
Engaging Pyongyang, a state under heavy UN sanctions and global suspicion, pushes the boundaries of what “free and active” means. The move shows Jakarta’s determination to act as an independent diplomatic player, one that refuses to let external powers decide who it may or may not engage.
The outcome of Sugiono’s visit was modest on paper. He met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, renewed a memorandum of understanding on regular consultations, and discussed future cooperation in culture and education.
There were no major breakthroughs, no new economic initiatives and no talk of denuclearization. But the symbolism was powerful. Speaking directly with Pyongyang was, in itself, a statement: Indonesia would not be bound by inherited taboos or ideological lines drawn by others.
This kind of performative diplomacy, where the act of engagement carries more weight than its tangible results, is becoming a central feature of Indonesia’s international posture.
Under President Prabowo Subianto, Jakarta has been steadily expanding its portfolio of partnerships, deepening defense ties with the United States and Japan, widening economic relations with China, reopening dialogue with Russia and now extending a hand to Pyongyang.
Rather than inconsistency, this reflects a deliberate diversification strategy. Indonesia seeks to manage risk through redundancy, maintaining ties with all major players without becoming beholden to any.
Sugiono’s offer to facilitate North Korea’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) fits this pattern. The ARF remains one of the few regional platforms where North Korea, the United States, Japan and South Korea sit at the same table.
For Jakarta, acting as a bridge is both a diplomatic asset and a way to reinforce ASEAN’s relevance in Northeast Asia, an arena where Southeast Asia’s voice often fades. By reviving these channels, Indonesia signals that it is not merely reacting to external developments but actively shaping its regional environment.
Yet the risks are clear. Engagement with a heavily sanctioned state can easily be perceived as normalization. If Pyongyang fails to reciprocate by taking steps toward transparency or humanitarian openness, Indonesia may appear to be legitimizing a regime that continues to defy international norms.
Even subtle diplomatic gestures can create reputational costs, particularly with partners like Washington and Tokyo, which remain committed to strict enforcement of UN sanctions.
Still, for Jakarta, the potential benefits outweigh the risks. For a middle power, relevance no longer stems from military capacity alone but from the ability to keep multiple channels open when others close theirs. The ability to talk to everyone – friends, rivals, and outcasts alike – has become Indonesia’s diplomatic currency.
By engaging Pyongyang, Jakarta is not endorsing its policies but reinforcing its own sovereignty in foreign policy-making.
This is the logic of strategic autonomy as practiced by emerging middle powers across the Global South. They lack the leverage to dictate the global agenda, yet they wield enough legitimacy to mediate and reframe it.
Indonesia’s outreach to North Korea is less about results than about positioning, an effort to test how much space remains for independent diplomacy in an increasingly polarized world. Whether this gamble pays off will depend on what follows.
If the bilateral consultations become institutionalized, if Pyongyang resumes participation in ASEAN-led forums, or if even small humanitarian initiatives take root, Jakarta will have proven that symbolic diplomacy can open new doors. If none of that happens, the visit will still stand as a reminder that autonomy must be performed before it can be recognized.
In an era when diplomacy is too often reduced to alignment or containment, Indonesia’s approach is refreshingly defiant. Talking to Pyongyang doesn’t make Indonesia a sympathizer; it makes it a realist. By choosing engagement over avoidance, Jakarta reminds the region that diplomacy remains, at its core, the art of possibility.
Aniello Iannone is a lecturer in Southeast Asian Politics, Universitas Diponegoro (UNDIP), Indonesia
