Polish Judge Dariusz Lubowski last week denied extradition to Germany of a suspect in the Nord Stream attack. Besides ruling that there was a lack of evidence against the Ukrainian diver, the judge said that
- this act of sabotage occurred in the context of a “just, defensive war;”
- Germany doesn’t have jurisdiction over the international waters in which it occurred; and
- the Ukrainian state would be responsible if it – and not the conspirators who carried it out – really orchestrated the 2022 attack.
That enraged Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto, despite the fact his country has no direct stake in this.
The Hungarian minister then wrote on X: “Scandalous: according to Poland, if you don’t like an infrastructure in Europe, you can blow it up. With this, they gave advance permission for terrorist attacks in Europe. Poland has not only released but is celebrating a terrorist – this is what European rule of law has come to.”
These are compelling points and show that Hungary cares about the principles involved in this case. It also has indirect stakes in all of this that casual observers might not be aware of and which will now be explained.
Many probably forgot, given how much has gone on over the past three and a half years, but Hungary receives a significant share of its oil from Russia’s Druzhba pipeline that transits through Ukraine. Szijjarto previously accused Kyiv of attacking this critical infrastructure as implied punishment for Budapest’s pragmatic approach towards the conflict, and his government even sanctioned the commander involved, Robert “Magyar” Brovdi. Lubowski’s ruling, however, challenges the legitimacy of Hungary’s policy.
The precedent of declaring Ukraine’s fight against Russia to be a “just, defensive war” could be exploited by judges across the EU to absolve Kyiv of responsibility for undermining Hungary’s energy security.
They could also argue that Hungary has no jurisdiction over Russia, where the Druzhba pipeline was bombed, just the way Lubowski argued that Germany has no jurisdiction over the international waters in which Nord Stream was bombed.
Any such move, even if only symbolic, would further isolate Hungary within the EU.
In practice, some members might welcome “Magyar” despite Hungary banning him from entering the EU, while others might promise Ukraine that it can continue undermining its energy security without fear of punishment from the EU.
Poland might lead the way after Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski tweeted to Szijjarto that “I hope your brave compatriot, Major Magyar, finally succeeds in knocking out the oil pipeline that feeds Putin’s war machine.” It thus won’t be surprising if “Magyar” soon visits Warsaw.
Just as the Nord Stream bombing was an attack against NATO and EU member Germany, so too have the Druzhba bombings been attacks against NATO and EU member Hungary.
If Germany can’t advance its interests vis-à-vis Nord Stream despite hosting more US military troops than any NATO member and being the EU’s de facto leader, then comparatively less-important Hungary stands no chance of advancing its own vis-à-vis Druzhba. The same goes for Slovakia and non-NATO and non-EU member Serbia.
Poland’s ruling on the Nord Stream suspect therefore enraged Hungary because the precedent that was established could soon be weaponized against it. Another significant point is that this amounts to one NATO and EU member legally justifying an attack against another. The implications are far-reaching and could further divide both blocs.
Poland’s gradual revival of its lost Great Power status is thus shaking up the European order and creating even more uncertainty in a continent that’s already bedeviled by it.
