China’s Fujian supercarrier has launched stealth jets into the sky in a dramatic show of force that signals the country’s intent to reset the balance of power at sea.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that China’s newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, launched and recovered its next generation of carrier-based aircraft — the J-35 stealth fighter, J-15T multirole jet and KJ-600 early warning plane — using advanced electromagnetic catapults (EMALS), according to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and state broadcaster CCTV.
The tests, conducted before the J-35’s appearance in China’s September Victory Day parade, marked the first time the stealth jet had flown from the vessel, underscoring a significant leap in Chinese carrier aviation capabilities.
The 80,000-ton Fujian, China’s first indigenously designed carrier and the world’s largest conventionally powered warship, was launched in 2022 and has since undergone multiple sea trials. It transited the Taiwan Strait this month, moving to the South China Sea for “scientific research and training,” escorted by two destroyers.
Once commissioned, the vessel is expected to be based in Sanya, Hainan province, extending China’s ability to project power across the First Island Chain and into the Western Pacific.
The Fujian represents a significant leap from China’s older ski ramp carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong. Fujian’s EMALS allow a higher tempo of sorties and can launch heavier aircraft — from fully armed stealth fighters to fixed-wing early warning planes — giving the carrier far more punch than China’s older ski-jump decks.
In addition, Fujian’s larger air wing – comprising 50 to 60 aircraft – enables it to avoid the offense-defense dilemma associated with smaller carriers, such as the Liaoning and Shandong, which have only 24 and 32 fighters, respectively.
Smaller carriers such as the latter may have to divide their aircraft between offense and defense, with committing more aircraft to an attack leaving the carrier vulnerable, while withholding aircraft for defense lessens attack power.
China’s rapid carrier buildup — from one in 2012 to three by 2025 and potentially six by 2035 — hints at a future rotation of forward deployment, training and maintenance. As a latecomer, China can skip much of the trial-and-error that burdened US development and instead build on proven designs and operational lessons.
Yet China’s carriers remain limited by conventional power and a lack of foreign bases, restricting their endurance and global reach — a gap China hopes to close with its under-construction nuclear-powered Type 004.
The US carrier fleet, now at 11 nuclear-powered carriers, has much larger air wings, with up to 90 aircraft in the case of the USS Gerald Ford. The US also has more than a century’s worth of experience in carrier design and operations, an experience China can’t match.
No US carrier has been sunk since World War II. Since then, they have only been deployed against adversaries unable to sink them. However, recent US Navy operations against the Houthis in Yemen may have pitted US carriers in high-tempo combat against a determined opponent that might be able to sink them.
While a conventional ballistic missile hit is unlikely to sink a US carrier, it would undoubtedly cause severe damage, take the carrier out of action and result in heavy casualties.
Such combat experience may be challenging to replicate on China’s part, with naval exercises going only so far in building proficiency in carrier operations. While US carriers face combat realities, China’s remain untested — fueling speculation about how it intends to wield its nascent carrier fleet. Plausible scenarios include assisting an invasion of Taiwan, gunboat diplomacy in the South China Sea and power projection in the Indian Ocean.
In a Taiwan contingency, China’s carriers would likely aim for localized air superiority under the protective umbrella of PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) missiles and layered shipborne defenses, rather than a Midway-style clash with superior US and allied fleets.
The PLA may employ a “missile umbrella” of DF-21D and DF-26B anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), alongside the DF-26D intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and drone swarms to deter US and allied intervention.
The same carriers could be the centerpieces of China’s South China Sea gunboat diplomacy. They could be used to respond to the US and allied exercises and freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea, providing a highly visible counter-statement to such activities.
They could also be used to intimidate and coerce weaker rival claimant states in the disputed body of water, as no Southeast Asian claimant state operates carriers, with their navies small, weak and underfunded relative to the PLAN.
In addition to that, China’s carriers – especially future nuclear-powered units –could extend their reach beyond the Pacific. China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean, mainly to address its longstanding Malacca Dilemma, has created the imperative for a sustained naval presence in the region.
This presence is marked by its military base in Djibouti, as well as port projects in Gwadar, Pakistan; Hambantota, Sri Lanka; and Kyaukphyu, Myanmar.
These bases and port facilities could support PLAN vessels securing China’s sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) that bypass the Malacca Strait. A nuclear-powered carrier would lessen dependence on these facilities and provide China with a more sustained presence in the region.
India is unlikely to cede its dominant role in the Indian Ocean. It may view China’s expanding presence — reinforced by partners Pakistan and Bangladesh — as a containment strategy, to which it responds with its “Necklace of Diamonds” encirclement plan.
Fujian’s debut shows China is no longer learning the carrier game — it’s making moves to be a key player. The real test is whether China can turn cutting-edge hardware into lasting power projection against rivals with bigger fleets and battle-forged expertise.
