In the global contest for critical raw materials, gallium has emerged as a test of industrial sovereignty. The lightweight metal, essential for semiconductors, LED lighting and defence technologies, is found in trace amounts in bauxite and zinc ores – yet almost all the world’s refined gallium is produced in China.
For years, Europe has relied on open markets and imported inputs to power its industries. But when China imposed export restrictions in 2023, global prices spiked and Europe suddenly confronted the risk of losing access to a metal it barely produces but desperately needs.
As China temporarily lifts its export ban on the United States – while maintaining licensing controls – Europe’s position remains precarious. Beijing continues to act as the gatekeeper of critical materials, able to tighten or relax access as a tool of economic diplomacy. For Europe, the move serves more as a warning than a reassurance.
Gallium on European soil
At the beginning of the year, Metlen announced one of Europe’s most consequential industrial projects in recent memory – a €295.5 million investment to expand alumina production and introduce gallium into industrial output.
Located at the “Aluminium of Greece” plant in Viotia, the project will increase alumina capacity to 1.265 million tonnes annually and produce around 50 tonnes of gallium per year, enough to meet Europe’s entire demand. It also involves new bauxite mines, modernised refining facilities and upgraded port and energy infrastructure.
In an interview with S&P Global, Dimitrios Stefanidis, Metlen’s chief executive director for Metallurgy, described the project as “a proactive step to mitigate supply chain risks and reinforce Europe’s strategic autonomy”.
He noted that Europe currently imports about 90 per cent of its gallium, and the new capacity “could enable full substitution of these imports, ensuring a stable and secure supply for European industries”.
Recognised as a Strategic Project under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and awarded the European Commission’s Sovereignty Seal, the investment could turn EU policy into industrial reality.
By establishing gallium recovery on European soil, it provides a blueprint for how strategic autonomy must take shape. It also places Greece, traditionally seen as a peripheral industrial player, at the centre of Europe’s critical minerals push.
Global race for control
Elsewhere, the race is intensifying.
In Australia, Alcoa is preparing to build a gallium facility co-financed by Washington and Canberra, expected to supply about 10 per cent of global demand. The US Export-Import Bank has issued billions in financing offers for critical minerals projects, underscoring how Washington views these materials as national security assets.
Meanwhile, China continues to consolidate its dominance.
A recent analysis by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that Beijing not only produces most of the world’s gallium but also controls the technology that makes extraction cheaper and more efficient. Proprietary resin-based refining processes remain largely inaccessible to Western competitors, allowing China to shape market conditions.
CSIS warned that “market forces alone will not break China’s dominance”, urging allied economies to invest directly in refining, recycling and stockpiling capacity. Gallium’s small market volume, the authors note, belies its “disproportionate strategic importance” – a view echoed in the CRMA.
Europe’s narrow window
Europe’s response has been cautious. While the CRMA sets ambitious production targets, most approved projects are still at an early stage. More significantly, the funding architecture underpinning the act has lagged behind its political ambition.
According to the European Parliamentary Research Service, the CRMA “does not create new EU funding” and instead depends on existing programmes not designed for high-risk extraction and processing.
The Jacques Delors Centre argues that current tools “fall short of the scale and speed needed” to unlock Europe’s resource potential. Industry assessments similarly warn that delays in mining and inadequate refining capacity are already undermining EU clean energy and autonomy objectives.
The funding gap is substantial. The head of EIT RawMaterials estimated that the EU must set aside more than €10 billion for exploration alone to meet its 2030 targets – far above what is currently available.
The temporary easing of China’s export ban for the US should not lull Europe into complacency. Access can still be restricted overnight, and prices remain volatile. To achieve its 2030 self-sufficiency goals, the EU will need dozens of operational projects spanning extraction, processing and recycling.
As Stefanidis emphasised, the aluminium and critical metals industries must “remain resilient in the face of market headwinds”. He sees Europe’s industrial strength depending on making sure those value chains are no longer dictated by external decisions.
As the US accelerates and China calibrates its dominance, Europe’s first gallium plant is both a breakthrough and a warning. The continent’s ability to turn strategic autonomy goals into tangible capacity will determine whether it leads the next industrial cycle – or watches it unfold elsewhere.
(BM)
