When Brazil launched its Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF), hopes were high that China, the world’s second-largest economy, would step up as a key backer.
Instead, Beijing declined to contribute, citing the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” In plain terms, China argued that developed nations should lead on climate finance, while developing countries like itself focus on domestic emissions reduction.
This reasoning, rooted in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, is increasingly outdated. The global context has shifted dramatically since then—and so has China. While Beijing insists on its developing-country status, its emissions, economic might and technological leadership tell a more complex story.
China today accounts for nearly 30% of global CO₂ emissions—more than the United States, the European Union and India combined. It is both the largest polluter and the largest investor in renewables, building more solar capacity than the rest of the world combined.
Its emissions may have plateaued in recent months, but the country’s heavy reliance on coal and its approval of 243 gigawatts of new coal-fired capacity show that peak carbon remains elusive.
At the same time, China’s per capita income remains far below that of advanced economies, roughly one-sixth of the US level, giving Beijing grounds to claim it is still “developing.” Yet development is no longer measured by income alone.
In infrastructure, technology, industrial capacity and global influence, China is already among the most advanced nations on Earth. China can’t hide behind a decades-old classification to avoid shouldering fair responsibility for the planet.
The Climate Action Tracker rates China’s policies and targets as “highly insufficient,” warning that current commitments are aligned with a world warming by up to 4°C. Despite recent progress, including a record expansion of renewables and the world’s largest emissions trading system, Beijing’s long-term goal of reaching net zero by 2060 is still rated “poor” in scope and clarity.
Moreover, as global negotiations move toward setting a new post-2025 climate finance target, expectations for major economies like China to play a stronger role are growing louder, especially from vulnerable countries already paying the price for inaction.
Under the Baku-to-Belem roadmap, countries are working toward finalizing the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, expected to reach around US$300 billion annually from developed nations.
But for this new goal to carry real weight and legitimacy, China and other high-emitting emerging economies will eventually need to be part of the equation —not only as beneficiaries but also as contributors to global climate finance efforts.
To be clear, China is not absent from global climate finance. Research by the World Resources Institute shows that between 2013 and 2022, China provided roughly $45 billion in climate finance to other developing countries, about 6% of the total provided by developed nations. Much of this funding came through bilateral channels and export credits, often linked to infrastructure projects.
However, this support, while notable, is still far below China’s global economic and emissions footprint. Recent data from the Lowy Institute’s Aid Map shows that China now accounts for about 14% of total climate finance in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, though most of it is directed toward large hydropower and energy infrastructure projects with limited concessionality.
In Southeast Asia, a mere 9% of China’s climate finance comes as grants or concessional loans, whereas traditional partners provide over 60% in these more favorable forms.
China’s refusal to fund the Brazilian rainforest mechanism is therefore less about capacity and more about politics. By clinging to its “developing” label, China positions itself as the leader of the Global South and a counterweight to Western-dominated institutions. But climate change recognizes no geopolitical blocs, and the emissions destabilizing our planet come increasingly from China’s coal-heavy economy.
If China truly wishes to lead the developing world, it should do so by example, not by exception. Contributing to global funds like the TFFF would demonstrate that Beijing’s climate leadership extends beyond domestic action to global solidarity. It would also lend moral weight to its calls for developed countries to scale up their own finance commitments.
The question is no longer whether China is a developing country. The question is whether a nation responsible for nearly a third of global emissions—and one that has achieved unparalleled industrial success —can continue to use that status as an excuse to shirk responsibility.
Climate justice today demands a new equation: Those with the greatest emissions and the greatest means must contribute the most. China has achieved prosperity. Now it must match that prosperity with greater climate responsibility.
Jawad Khalid is a climate finance specialist focused on green innovation and climate-smart investments based in Islamabad, Pakistan.
