China’s new amphibious assault ship – a drone-launching, catapult-powered hybrid that combines carrier punch with assault ship flexibility to project power like never before – is rewriting the rules of amphibious warfare.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China’s first Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan, is believed to have commenced electromagnetic catapult testing at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai.
If so, it marks a key step in the vessel’s development as the world’s first drone-centric warship equipped with an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS).
Satellite and social media imagery showed the ship’s catapult aligned toward the Yangtze River, suggesting outward launch capability. The Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration concurrently issued a no-entry maritime notice, citing daily “underwater activities.”
The warning may be indicative of sled tests—where a weighted carriage simulates aircraft launches to evaluate EMALS performance, with sleds ejected into the river and recovered afterward.
The Sichuan, launched in December 2024 and displacing over 40,000 tons, features a full-length flight deck and a catapult system matching the size of that on the Type 003 aircraft carrier Fujian. While optimized for uncrewed systems such as the GJ-11 stealth drone, the vessel can also accommodate manned aircraft.
The EMALS offers higher launch frequency and payload flexibility compared to traditional steam catapults, underscoring China’s ambition to modernize naval aviation and project power through next-generation amphibious capabilities.
Yasuhiro Kawakami mentions in a March 2025 article for the Sasakawa Peace Foundation that the Type 076 represents a leap in naval innovation, conceived as a “joint unmanned special warfare carrier” rather than a conventional troop transport.
Kawakami notes that the ship – equipped with EMALS, the first of its kind on any amphibious vessel—can launch heavier, longer-range aircraft and drones such as the GJ-11, WZ-7 and Caihong unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs).
He notes that the ship integrates air, surface and underwater unmanned vehicles with special operations forces, enabling self-contained covert missions including decapitation strikes and precision landings.
Furthermore, Matthew Funaiole and other writers mention in an August 2024 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the Type 076 amphibious assault ship marks a strategic leap in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) power projection.
They note the ship’s expansive flight deck and dual elevators optimize sortie rates, while a floodable well deck supports ship-to-shore operations. They also state that the ship’s scale and multifunctionality position it between a Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) ship and a full carrier, enabling joint command.
In a Taiwan scenario, the Type 076 would deploy drone swarms and special forces to paralyze command centers and disrupt defenses before a large-scale assault. Acting as a light carrier, it would disperse China’s naval aviation across multiple platforms, enhancing survivability and operational flexibility compared to supercarriers.
The Type 076’s hybrid role—combining drone carrier, amphibious transport, and air-support ship—bridges China’s carrier and landing ship gap, addressing its limited sealift capacity for a cross-strait invasion.
Setting the Type 076 into a larger operational and capability picture, the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2024 China Military Power Report mentions that the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) amphibious warfare component consists of eight Type 071 Yuzhao-class landing platform docks (LPDs) and at least three commissioned Type 075 Yushen-class LHAs, with a fourth Type 075 undergoing trials in 2024.
The report notes these large-deck assault ships can embark landing craft, armor, helicopters and marines for long-distance expeditionary missions. It adds that with the Type 076, these ships replace older landing craft, providing greater capacity, endurance and flexibility for regional or global amphibious operations.
Beyond a Taiwan contingency, Jennifer Rice mentions in a November 2024 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) that the PLAN’s large-deck amphibious warfare ships enable far-seas deployments for counterpiracy, humanitarian relief, joint training, and naval diplomacy missions.
Rice notes these vessels have participated in operations across the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Southeast Asia, providing lift, logistics and command functions for multilateral exercises and disaster relief. She adds that their endurance and range extend China’s power projection, reinforce overseas bases like Djibouti and advance its goal of a globally present, quick-reaction force capable of safeguarding its strategic and economic interests.
But even with those formidable capabilities, an amphibious assault to take Taiwan is a daunting military challenge. Highlighting these challenges, Lyle Goldstein argues in a December 2022 article for the peer-reviewed Asian Security journal that China would face profound challenges in using its amphibious warfare ships for a Taiwan invasion despite its buildup and doctrinal learning.
Goldstein points out that the PLA has not conducted a large-scale landing in over half a century, and its amphibious fleet would confront immense logistical and operational burdens in transporting, supplying, and protecting troops across the Taiwan Strait.
He also notes that China’s ships would be vulnerable to undersea threats, mines and air attack, while sustaining control of sea lanes would be difficult under enemy fire. He stresses that these vulnerabilities, combined with possible US and allied intervention, underscore the extraordinary risks of such an operation.
Also, China’s lack of foreign military bases for resupply and logistics may limit its capacity for regional and global power projection, with possible vulnerabilities being a compelling reason why China has not yet established such.
Citing Chinese military analysts, Howard Wang and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga state in a June 2024 RAND report that overseas bases would be highly vulnerable in wartime, making China reluctant to establish more of them, despite seeking access agreements in various locations such as Cambodia and the Solomon Islands.
Wang and Beauchamp-Mustafaga say that PLA researchers cite weak defenses, lack of hardened infrastructure, limited command structures and dependence on unreliable host nations as significant risks.
They note that bases such as that in Djibouti could be easy targets for enemy precision strikes and challenging to sustain due to fragile supply chains and insufficient military-civil integration.
They also point out that China’s overseas outposts also face environmental hazards, limited medical and logistical capacity, and uncertain local political stability—all factors that could make foreign bases into liabilities rather than assets during conflict.
Whether for storming beaches or shaping distant seas, the Type 076 signals that China’s subsequent battles won’t just be fought with ships and soldiers—but with swarms and circuits.
