Trends from the Past: China’s Previous Military Parades
Seventy-six years since its birth, the People’s Republic of China has mounted 18 military parades, marking either National Day or Victory Day (see Table 1). The first, in 1949, was presided over by Mao Zedong at the founding of the new state.[1] Nearly 16,000 troops marched, displaying weapons captured from the Kuomintang alongside Soviet equipment—an early attempt to project both the Communist revolution’s triumph and the PLA’s strength. Mao never presided over another parade again; for the next five years, Zhu De, the PLA’s commander-in-chief, reviewed the parades. After the Ministry of National Defense was created in 1954, Defence Minister Peng Dehuai took over until his purge in 1959, when Lin Biao briefly assumed the role. Then, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution forced a decade-long suspension of military parades, as domestic turmoil eclipsed external projection. Even though China had adopted a rule in 1960 to hold small reviews every five years and major ones every ten, with each event celebrated through military displays, none could be held due to internal turmoil.[2]
Deng Xiaoping revived the tradition in 1984, using the parade to highlight the PLA’s modernisation after its poor performance in Vietnam and to support his pragmatic economic and foreign policies. That rhythm, however, faltered again in 1989, when the Tiananmen protests precluded a parade; it was not until 1999 that Jiang Zemin presided over a large display of 12,000 troops and forty-two categories of new weapons, a performance that reinforced his authority within the Central Military Commission.[3] His successor, Hu Jintao, held only one parade, in 2009, but persistent rumours of his weak control over the PLA, especially toward the end of his second term, cast doubt on the Party’s long-claimed supremacy over the gun.[4]
Therefore, since rising to the top of China’s political hierarchy, Xi Jinping has shown a sustained interest in the military’s internal affairs, demanding unqualified loyalty from his subordinates.[5] His tenure has also coincided with a remarkable expansion of China’s defence industry. Backed by state support and technology acquisition through both civilian and military channels, Chinese firms have delivered advanced platforms, equipping the PLA with increasingly sophisticated systems and enabling the emergence of the world’s largest navy and a rapidly expanding air force.[6]
Yet institutional turbulence has matched material progress. Xi has extended anti-corruption and disciplinary bodies deep into the PLA, removing commanders, political commissars, and even Central Military Commission members.[7] Careers, property, and patronage networks have been dismantled, leaving senior officers in a climate of uncertainty. A force once defined by secrecy has been compelled to confront corruption scandals in public, most recently through another round of purges.[8] Against this backdrop, parades that highlight China’s growing arsenal serve a dual purpose: projecting confidence abroad while reinforcing Xi’s contested authority at home.
Table 1: China’s 18 Military Parades (1949-2025)
Year
Reviewed By Leader
Troops Involved
Weapons/Equipment
Crucial Weapons Displayed
1949
Mao Zedong
16,000
100+ weapons (captured KMT arms), 17 aircraft
Mix of foreign-made arms, limited PLA hardware
1950–1954
PLA C-in-C Zhu De
10,000–15,000
Soviet weapons gradually added
T-34 tanks, Soviet aircraft
1955–1959
China’s Defence Ministers Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao
15,000+
Soviet models, Local Imitations
MiG fighters, artillery
1960–1983
None
No Parade
—
—
1984
Deng Xiaoping
10,000+
28 types (19 new), 117 aircraft
ICBMs, nuclear-capable missiles, SLBMs, SPH
1989
None
No Parade
–
Tiananmen Incident
1999
Jiang Zemin
12,000+
42 major weapon types (90% new, mostly domestic)
Type-99 MBT, missiles, PAP debut
2009
Hu Jintao
10,000 troops + Civilians
52 types – all domestic
UAVs, missiles, tanks
2015
Xi Jinping
12,000 troops, 500+ weapons
84% new
DF-21D ASBM, DF-26, HQ-9 SAM
2017
Xi Jinping
12,000 (at Zhurihe)
600+ pieces, 100 aircraft
J-20 stealth fighters, DF-31AG ICBMs
2019
Xi Jinping
15,000 troops, 580 weapons systems, 160 aircraft
DF-41 ICBM, DF-17 hypersonic glide missile
70th PRC anniversary; Xi as Chairman
2025
Xi Jinping
12000 troops
J-15DT, Nuclear Triad, CJ1000, YJ-15.17, 19,20 Cruise Missiles
80th Anniversary of World War II
Source: Authors’ own, using various open sources
The 2025 Military Parade
In 2015, Xi Jinping commemorated the 70th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan with a carefully orchestrated military parade on September 3, deliberately diverging from the conventional National Day celebrations on October 1. The parade aimed to highlight China’s contributions and sacrifices during the Second World War, an aspect that Beijing contends has been overlooked in Western historiography. By positioning itself as the “forgotten ally,” China emphasised both its critical role in the defeat of Japan and its wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union, thereby asserting a corrective historical narrative within global memory politics.[9]
A decade later, the 2025 commemoration at the 80th anniversary went further: it was designed less as a historical tribute than as a political message. The spectacle reinforced Xi’s narrative of ‘national rejuvenation’ while underscoring Beijing’s claim to a ‘strategic ace’ in deterrence and power projection.[10]
Unlike the ad-hoc unveilings of past years, the 2025 parade offered a deliberately integrated portrait of China’s military modernisation. It showcased strike capabilities, sea-control platforms, space and counter-space systems, and an expanding arsenal of asymmetric tools engineered to operate across maritime, aerial, cyber, and orbital domains. Several systems on display had previously been confined to closed-door trials or classified briefings, making their public appearance both a revelation and a warning.
The breadth of the arsenal reflected not only a maturing defence-industrial base but also the compounding effects of sustained budgetary growth (see Figure 1). The parade was thus less a theatrical exercise than a ledger: a visible accounting of the resources Beijing has poured into its armed forces and the platforms that spending has brought into the open.
Figure 1: China’s Increasing Defence Budgets
Source: SIPRI[11]
Key Weapons on Display: Nuclear Forces and the Triad
The most striking element of the 2025 parade was Beijing’s unambiguous projection of a functioning nuclear triad. For the first time, the PLA arrayed its land-, sea-, and air-based missiles in a single sequence, offering a carefully staged reminder of China’s growing strategic depth, as displayed below.
On the ground, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles—the DF-61, DF-5C, and DF-31, rolled past Tiananmen. The DF-61, long rumoured under the designations DF-45 or DF-51, represents a generational leap from the DF-41, boasting a range of over 15,000 kilometres and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) with at least ten warheads.[12] Its appearance confirmed what had been whispered in defence circles: China has decisively entered the era of next-generation mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
At sea, the Julang JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile signalled the consolidation of Beijing’s naval deterrent, while in the air, the newly revealed Jinglei JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile appeared with the PLA Air Force’s H-6N bomber.[13] The JL-1’s debut marked a quiet but consequential expansion of China’s nuclear reach into a third leg long dominated by the United States and Russia.[14]
Complementing these systems were the silo-based variant of the DF-31 and the liquid-fuelled DF-5C, reminders that China is diversifying not only its platforms but also its basing modes. The steady modernisation of the DF-5 series underscores Beijing’s determination to wring fresh strategic value from an ageing platform. By grafting new technologies onto a liquid-fuelled design first fielded in the Cold War, China has sought not merely to extend the missile’s shelf life but to preserve its relevance as a visible pillar of deterrence.[15]
Taken together, the sequencing of these missiles conveyed more than a display of hardware: it was a deliberate assertion of operational flexibility, survivability, and resilience. By placing each component of the triad one after another, Beijing underscored its intent to anchor deterrence in redundancy and to make sure that the message carried well beyond its borders.
DF-61 ICBM
This and all the succeeding photos are of missiles put on display during the September 2025 parade.
DF-5C Liquid-Fuelled ICBM
Julang JL-3 Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile
Jinglei JL-1 Air-launched Ballistic Missile
JL-1 ALBM
Source: Xinhua[16]
Ballistic, Cruise, and Hypersonic Missiles
A second critical dimension of the 2025 parade was its conspicuous focus on missile capabilities, spanning ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic categories. Foremost among these was the DF-26D, often described as the ‘Guam Killer’.[17] With a range of 3,000–4,000 kilometres, the system exemplifies China’s growing investment in intermediate-range strike assets designed to offset US and allied operational advantages. Its integration of an active radar seeker, advanced guidance architecture, and electronic warfare countermeasures threatens the efficacy of many regional air defence networks. Strategically, the DF-26D brings within range not only US bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, but also key facilities in the second island chain, thereby complicating American force-projection planning. Beyond its baseline strike role, the missile’s capacity to act as a launch vehicle for hypersonic glide systems further enhances its deterrent weight. Its combination of terminal guidance, in-flight correction mechanisms, and a payload capacity of approximately 1.5 tons renders it particularly threatening to carrier strike groups in a Taiwan crisis scenario.[18]
The parade also unveiled the DF-17 hypersonic missile, alongside an extensive suite of cruise missile systems: CJ-1000, YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-18, YJ-19, YJ-20, and YJ-21. Collectively, these systems underscore the diversification of China’s missile arsenal. Many incorporate manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles or boost-glide configurations and are optimised for conventional payloads, thereby expanding Beijing’s capacity for precision regional strikes against hardened or mobile targets. This emphasis on short- and intermediate-range missile development represents an evolution in China’s strategic posture. As Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, sustained investment in these systems over the past decade has produced a layered and increasingly sophisticated arsenal, reinforcing China’s capacity to impose costs and complicate adversary operational planning across multiple domains.
Figure 2: China’s Regional Missile Threat
Source: CSIS[19]
Figure 3: China’s Increasing IRBM Capabilities
Source: CSIS[20]
Much of the YJ-series arsenal traces its lineage to earlier Russian designs, including the Kh-55, Kh-31, and 3M-54 Club, which China initially acquired and subsequently reverse-engineered. Over the past two decades, Beijing has moved well beyond simple replication, employing iterative cycles of testing, adaptation, and indigenous innovation to refine performance parameters.
The outcome is a missile family of growing sophistication, designed to execute an expanding array of missions (see Figure 5). The YJ-17, equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle; the YJ-19, powered by scramjet propulsion; and the YJ-20, an aeroballistic system with manoeuvrable hypersonic capabilities, illustrate this progression, as shown below. What originated as a narrow set of anti-ship strike assets has since expanded into a diversified portfolio incorporating anti-surface, land-attack, and domain-specific variants. Collectively, these advances enhance the PLA’s ability not only to contest adversary naval presence but also to project coercive power across the near seas and into more distant maritime spaces.
YJ-series missiles
YJ-21 missile
CJ -1000 missile
Unmanned Systems, Intelligence, Autonomy and Counters
Unmanned aerial systems have become central to the PLA’s modernisation drive, with drones now embedded across its warfighting doctrine. Beijing’s investment dates back to the 1950s, when the PLA began experimenting with UAVs, and has since yielded a diverse portfolio, including loitering munitions, stealth drones, anti-radiation, and electronic warfare platforms. Operationally, its drone units cover everything from air-to-air attack and anti-submarine warfare to air defence suppression through swarms, illustrating China’s push for increasingly versatile and autonomous systems.[22]
As expected, drones and unmanned systems gave the parade much of its gravitas, with platforms of every size and function on display. Small quadcopter drones appeared alongside large fixed-wing combat UAVs. The display also included surface and subsurface unmanned vehicles, autonomous gun turrets, and robotic dogs, highlighting the PLA’s ambition to integrate autonomy across all combat domains. Collectively, these systems, particularly loyal wingman drones and unmanned underwater vehicles for mine clearance, signal a deliberate incorporation of intelligence, automation, and robotics into China’s evolving multi-domain warfare capabilities, reflecting a strategic trajectory toward ‘intelligentised warfare.’
The parade also highlighted China’s growing interest in counter-drone systems, unveiling three distinct categories.[23] The first relied on traditional artillery and missile batteries, designed to saturate the skies with firepower against cruise missiles or swarms of suicide drones. The second and third showcased directed-energy platforms: high-power lasers and microwave weapons. Microwave systems project a wide beam capable of disabling large swarms by frying their electronic components, while laser systems such as the LY1-1 are engineered for precision strikes against unmanned aircraft at longer ranges.[24]
Yet the promise of these ‘endless bullet’ weapons has been tempered by mixed results abroad. Saudi Arabia, a major Chinese arms customer, has complained that Beijing’s Skyshield laser platform proved ineffective in desert conditions, faltering under extreme heat and failing to repel drone attacks.[25] Such reports underscore both the ambition and the vulnerability of China’s emerging counter-drone portfolio: impressive on parade, but still untested in the unforgiving realities of sustained combat.
Unmanned Systems and their Counter-tech Laser, Microwave Systems
Multiple Varieties of UAVs
UUVs for mine clearance
Robotic Dogs
LY-1 Laser Counter-Drone System
Microwave Counter-Drone Systems
Conventional Capabilities
The parade underscored the breadth of China’s conventional modernisation. The PLA Air Force unveiled upgraded J-20 fighters alongside new strike and transport aircraft, while it is investing substantially in the development of sixth-generation fighters. Its ground forces rolled out modernised tanks, artillery, air-defence systems and support equipment. Every platform was domestically produced—a deliberate signal of China’s industrial self-reliance.
Operational effectiveness remains contested, particularly after the underwhelming performance of Chinese systems during the India–Pakistan clash of May 2025. Even so, Beijing has built a defence industry capable of fielding weapons that outwardly match the standards of advanced militaries. For the PLA, the logic is strategic as much as technological: great powers cannot depend on foreign suppliers whose pipelines can be throttled at will. China’s pursuit of autonomy, through indigenous development, adaptation, and acquisition by any means, reflects this imperative. The event operated less as a symbolic display than as an empirical proof of concept, underscoring Beijing’s growing ability to sustain its military modernisation through indigenous means.
The 2025 Parade: China’s Bold Messaging
Coalition of Autocrats
The optics of the parade were as consequential as the weapons on display. It brought together the leaders of Russia, China, and North Korea—three authoritarian states whose visible camaraderie was designed to broadcast strategic intent. For Moscow and Beijing, the message was that neither is isolated nor without partners. For Pyongyang, the benefits were still greater: Kim Jong Un underscored to his domestic audience that nuclear weapons remain the ultimate guarantor of regime survival, while securing defence-industrial ties with Russia enhances his leverage with China.
For Xi Jinping, however, the parade carried the broadest significance. Flanked by fellow autocrats, he presented China as the central node in an emerging authoritarian alignment, one capable of shaping both the regional balance and the international order. Earlier this year, Beijing’s position looked precarious amid renewed tariff pressure from Washington. Yet Chinese leaders now argue they have absorbed the shock, leveraging dominance over rare earths and other industrial inputs while deepening ties with critical markets, including India.[26] The parade thus functioned less as spectacle than as political theatre: a carefully staged assertion that China is not merely resilient under Western pressure but increasingly positioned to anchor an alternative bloc in global politics.
Strategic Deterrence and Technology in Warfighting
Strategic deterrence and technological innovation were the dominant themes of the parade. The display of China’s nuclear triad, coupled with an expanding arsenal of dual-capable delivery systems, conveyed an unambiguous message to external audiences. With a growing stockpile of warheads and a widening range of long- and intermediate-range missiles, Beijing signalled both enhanced deterrent capability and a willingness to contest challenges to what it defines as core interests.
Equally striking was the emphasis on technology as the driver of future warfighting. The PLA’s approach has been threefold. First, it has shed much of its legacy inventory, prioritising a smaller force of higher-quality systems over sheer numbers. Second, it has concentrated on developing advanced platforms, equipped with AI and autonomous features, through a mix of domestic innovation and external acquisition, reinforcing China’s push for defence-industrial independence. This strategy not only improves weapon quality but also strengthens China’s position as an arms exporter. Third, it has extended the life of older but functional systems by integrating new technologies, as demonstrated by the upgraded DF-5C ICBM. Such retrofitting buys time for China’s defence industry to focus on more cutting-edge projects while keeping existing platforms relevant on the battlefield.
Cross-Strait Dynamics and Regional Security
The parade’s display of advanced weapons offered a window into the evolving security order of the Indo-Pacific and the growing volatility of cross-strait dynamics. China’s increasingly diverse arsenal of long-range missiles is designed to delay or deter US intervention in a Taiwan or South China Sea crisis, forming part of a broader strategy to erode—and ultimately exclude—American military presence from the region. With the world’s largest navy and a rapidly expanding portfolio of drones and autonomous systems, Beijing now possesses tools that heighten the risk of inadvertent escalation, without robust mechanisms for crisis management or escalation control.
At the same time, Beijing has capitalised on the strategic uncertainty introduced by President Trump’s approach to alliances. Friction continues to mark US relations with Japan and South Korea, while ties with India have weakened. Taiwan, for its part, remains unsure of the reliability of American security guarantees. Amid fraying alliances and the disruption of US mercantilist policies, China has emerged as the chief beneficiary. Xi Jinping has sought to present Beijing simultaneously as a guarantor of regional economic stability and a resolute defender of core interests.[27] This dual posture deepens insecurity for Taiwan and neighbouring states while consolidating China’s strategic leverage.
Domestic Legitimacy, Civilian Control vs Validation
If external deterrence was one purpose of the parade, the other was domestic: to reaffirm the Party’s—and Xi Jinping’s—absolute control over the military. Xi has presided over the most extensive capability expansion in PLA history, yet his relationship with the armed forces remains marked by suspicion. Unlike Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, whose military credentials secured enduring loyalty, Xi governs as a civilian, lacking the same bond with the PLA’s senior ranks.
This insecurity has driven an expansive anti-corruption campaign that has cut deeply into the officer corps and defence-industrial leadership. Senior commanders, political commissars, CMC members, defence ministers, and even vice-chairmen of the CMC have been purged. The result is a pervasive climate of caution: officials prioritise security of position and patronage over initiative, wary that risk-taking could trigger investigation or arrest. Such dynamics may tighten political control, but they risk constraining operational effectiveness at precisely the moment Beijing seeks to project military confidence abroad.[28]
This reality complicates the very optics Beijing sought to project through the parade. Xi cannot personally command the battlefield; his ambitions for “reunification” and “rejuvenation” depend on a loyal officer corps whose reliability is, at present, deeply in question. Rising defence budgets and an expanding military-industrial complex all but guarantee further graft allegations and power struggles, barely contained beneath the surface. Against this backdrop, the domestic messaging of the spectacle appeared less an assertion of enduring confidence than an anxious search for validation.
Assessing India’s Developing Power vis-à-vis China
As two civilisational powers with overlapping ambitions, India and China have long defined each other’s security horizons, their relationship marked by alternating phases of competition, accommodation, and strategic unease. For now, Beijing’s military buildup remains oriented toward threats along its eastern and southeastern seaboard. Yet Chinese strategists remain alert to India’s growing national power and the vulnerabilities this creates along China’s southwestern frontier. The recurring skirmishes and standoffs on the Line of Actual Control serve less as tactical incidents than as calibrated probes, testing India’s readiness while sketching the parameters of a future modus vivendi in bilateral relations.
India, therefore, since the Galwan crisis of 2020, has sought to accelerate military modernisation, compelled by the recognition that it is now locked in a structural rivalry with China of unprecedented intensity. Yet this rivalry remains conditioned by a pronounced asymmetry in capabilities, one that continues to shape the regional balance of power and the credibility of deterrence. In the wake of Beijing’s recent parades showcasing advanced weaponry, a comparative assessment of the two militaries offers a sobering view of the Indo-Pacific security landscape.
The starkest expression of this disparity lies in defence expenditures. In the early 1990s, India and China maintained broadly comparable defence budgets. That parity dissolved with the turn of the century. Fuelled by rapid economic expansion, Beijing’s defence spending grew at a pace New Delhi could not match. By 2025, as Figure 4 reflects, the gap had widened into a gulf: China’s military budget reached US$249 billion, while India’s stood at US$78 billion—a sum that signals not balance but constraint.[29]
Figure 4: Annual Military Expenditure of India and China, SIPRI 1990-2024
Source: Generated from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database[30]
The Nuclear Triad
China’s recent parade underscored the scale of its nuclear modernisation. Beijing has completed a credible nuclear triad and is steadily expanding its arsenal.[31] The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimates that China now fields roughly 600 warheads, a number projected to exceed 1,000 by 2030.[32] Alongside this expansion, China is upgrading its legacy missile systems and developing new ones, including dual-capable platforms that can deliver either conventional or nuclear payloads, or threaten both simultaneously. Such ambiguity is designed to unsettle adversaries and complicate crisis decision-making.[33]
For New Delhi, the risks of miscalculation in a live confrontation are evident, given that its nuclear delivery systems remain under development. While the Mirage-2000 aircraft, alongside Agni and K-series missiles, continue to serve designated nuclear roles, the operational status of the Agni-V and Agni-1P missiles remains uncertain. By contrast, China’s nuclear delivery mechanisms are not only fully commissioned but also operationally mature, diversified, and resilient, as Table 2 illustrates.
Table 2: Indian vs. Chinese Nuclear Triads
China
India
Land
Air
Sea
Land
Air
Sea
DF-26 (IRBM)
H-6N
JL-2
Prithvi II
Mirage 2000H
Dhanush
DF-5A/B/C (ICBM)
H-20 (R&D)
JL-3
Agni I
Rafale (Planned)[a]
K-15 (Sagarika) SLBM
DF-27 (ICBM)
JL-1 (ALBM)
Agni II
K-4 SLBM
DF-31 (ICBM)
Agni III
K-5 (R&D)
DF-31A (ICBM)
Agni IV
DF-31 (ICBM)
Agni V (Pipeline)
DF-31AG (ICBM)
Agni VI (R&D)
DF-41 (ICBM)
Agni-P (Pipeline)
DF-61 (ICBM)
India, too, completed its own nuclear triad with the deployment of a sea-based deterrent (See Table 2).[34] Yet its position remains far more precarious. New Delhi’s nuclear posture must contend not only with Beijing’s rapidly growing arsenal but also with Pakistan’s. Managing this two-front challenge within the constraints of its declared No First Use (NFU) doctrine leaves India in what strategists call a ‘Goldilocks dilemma’: too little force risks vulnerability, too much risks destabilisation.[35]
Therefore, although India has succeeded in building a nuclear triad, its deterrent remains exposed to the possibility of a Chinese pre-emptive or decapitation strike. Unlike Beijing, New Delhi lacks strategic bombers, which offer both reach and stealth for high-risk nuclear missions. The deeper challenge, however, lies in India’s doctrine. Its no-first-use pledge has long anchored nuclear policy, but it now sits uneasily against the backdrop of China’s expanding arsenal and delivery systems.
Although China formally adheres to the NFU policy, its expanding warhead and missile inventory, coupled with evolving threat perceptions, could potentially reshape this doctrine. Notably, the existing NFU framework already anticipates multiple contingencies under which China might employ nuclear weapons pre-emptively. Therefore, India’s re-evaluation of its NFU posture will determine its ability to craft a more credible and sustainable deterrent.
Hypersonic Weapons
Both China and India are investing heavily in hypersonic systems, from cruise missiles to glide vehicles, recognising their potential to transform the strategic balance (see Table 3).[36] By compressing response times and overwhelming even the most advanced missile defences, these weapons add a new layer of complexity for policymakers in both New Delhi and Beijing.[37]
For India, the stakes are acute. Chinese research and development in hypersonic technologies, as well as weapon inductions, have moved far ahead of India, whose systems remain under development. Beijing’s hypersonic platforms could threaten not only New Delhi’s strategic arsenal but also its command-and-control networks in crisis. This prospect compels New Delhi to accelerate its own hypersonic programmes—not to mirror Beijing system for system, but to reinforce deterrence and constrain Chinese adventurism. The comparative progress of both states in this field is outlined below.
Table 3: List of Hypersonic Systems Developed by India and China
China
India
System
Characteristics
Status
System
Characteristics
Status
DF-ZF HGV
1600-2400 km
Deployed/Operational
Shaurya Hypersonic Missile
Speed: Mach 7.5 Range: 700-1000 km
Tested and deployed
DF-17 MRBM
1800-2500 km
Deployed/Operational
Brahmos II
Speed: Mach 7-Mach 8 Range: 600-1000 km
Underdevelopment
XINKONG-2
Mach 6
Underdevelopment
Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV)
Speed: Mach 6
Tested and Under Further Trials
CM-401 Hypersonic ASBM
Speed: Mach 4-6 Range: 9-180 miles
Underdevelopment
HGV-202 F
Altitude: 44-100 km Speed: Upper Hypersonic
Underdevelopment
Source: Authors’ compilation
Anti-Satellite Weapons
India confronts a pronounced asymmetry with China in outer space. While New Delhi’s civilian space programme dates back decades, its military applications only began to take shape in the early 2000s.[38] Beijing, by contrast, demonstrated anti-satellite (ASAT) capability as early as 2007. India sought to narrow that gap in March 2019, when it conducted its first ASAT test, becoming the fourth nation, after the US, Russia and China, to prove such a capability.
The test marked a milestone in India’s effort to reduce its vulnerability in space. Yet the broader balance remains tilted. China has further refined its ASAT capability, ventured into developing robotic armed co-orbital satellites to destroy adversary satellites, and adopted ground-based lasers to blind target satellites.[39] China’s more advanced and integrated space assets continue to give Beijing the strategic upper hand, leaving India to play catch-up in a domain that will shape future deterrence as much as land, sea or air (see Table 4).
Table 4: India and China – ASAT Capabilities
China
India
Capabilities
Parameters
Capabilities
Parameters
Dong-Neng-3/ DN-2/SC-19
ASAT weapon and midcourse ballistic missile defence interceptor capable against ICBMs
Prithvi Delivery Vehicle Mark-II (PDV MK-II)
intercepted an Indian satellite in low Earth orbit at an altitude of 283 km.
Source: Authors’ compilation
Drones
Compared to Chinese progress in drone development and inductions, India, by contrast, is a latecomer. Its first indigenous UAV project, Nishant, dates back only to the 1990s, and its military integration of drones has been slower. Recent crises, particularly along the border with Pakistan, have exposed New Delhi to the full scope of Chinese capabilities. Drawing on both these lessons and battlefield innovations from Ukraine, India is now working to fold UAVs into its command structure, expanding their role from surveillance to active warfighting and building concepts of operation around dedicated drone units.
Table 5: UAVs Capabilities in India and China
China
India
System
Capabilities and Characteristics
System
Capabilities and Characteristics
CASIC Wing Loong II (GJ-2) – MALE UCAV
Combat and ISR based missions. Deployed in WTC
MQ-9B Reaper (Pipeline)
Combat and Surveillance roles. Range: 1900 kms Payload: 1400 kg
CASC Rainbow CH-4B
Combat and ISR based missions; Deployed in WTC
IAI Heron Mk II
Surveillance Payload: 490 kg Range: 250 km (line of sight); 1000 km (beyond line of sight)
CASC Rainbow CH-5
Combat and ISR based missions
IAI Harop
Loitering Munition SEAD based operations. Range: 1000 kms Payload: 23 kg
GAIC WZ-7 “Soaring Dragon”
High-altitude reconnaissance Range: 7000 km
TAPAS-BH-201 (Rustom-2) (R&D)
ISR based missions. Operating altitude of 30000 ft, endurance of 24 hrs with EO and SAR payloads Range: 250 kms Payload: up to a maximum of 350 kgs Under trial
AV500W Unmanned Helicopter
Deployed in WTC It can carry four small laser-guided air-to-surface missiles to accurately strike enemy personnel and light vehicles.
V-Bat (S) (On Offer)
Attack drone for Indian Air Force OEM – Shield AI, USA Deal under evaluation process
TB-001
Reconnaissance and attack capabilities Deployment in Taiwan’s Air Identification Zone
Air-launched anti-radiation combat (R&D)
Status about conception and development not clear
BZK005
Long-range reconnaissance and ELINT missions Payload: 370 kg
Ghatak UCAV (R&D)
Payload: 1300 kg approx. Under development
KVD002
Switch UAV
High-altitude and All-Terrain ISR Missions
Garpiya-3 (G3)
In collaboration with Russian arms company Almaz-Antey
Nagastra-1R
Kamikaze drone Range: 30 km
Anti-radiation ASN-301
near-copy of the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Harpy system Range: 288 kms approx.
Searcher Mk II
Payload: 120 kg Range: 300 km
GJ-11
Stealth UAV Payload: 2000 kg Range: 1500 km
Source: Authors’ compilation using various sources
The Question of Operational Credibility
China’s military parade projected an image of technological sophistication, unveiling advanced weapon systems and the newly created information support and cyberspace arms. Beneath the spectacle, however, the operational credibility of these platforms remains doubtful. In Operation Sindoor, Chinese radars, drones, electronic warfare units, and air defence assets failed to perform, while its laser weapons, touted as cutting-edge, have proven equally unreliable, as demonstrated in Saudi Arabia. Displays of refinement thus mask systemic flaws: weapons that cannot fulfil their core function reduce the PLA’s modernisation to theatre.
Endemic corruption compounds these deficiencies. The recent purge of officials linked to procurement reveals how graft continues to permeate the PLA, undermining both capability and trust. Xi Jinping’s intensified anti-graft campaign may eliminate rivals, but it also heightens institutional insecurity. If economic pressures mount and relations with Washington deteriorate, the regime’s dependence on loyalty within the PLA will deepen, amplifying the fragility behind China’s projection of strength.
Conclusion
The PLA’s 2025 parade was not simply a martial spectacle but a calculated exercise in deterrence, inventory disclosure, and domestic validation. By parading an expanded portfolio of naval, air, unmanned, directed-energy, and dual-capable missile systems, Beijing signalled both its capacity to escalate and its intent to narrow the threshold for conflict in the Indo-Pacific. In a region already lacking robust mechanisms for risk reduction, such signalling sharpens the dilemmas facing China’s neighbours: whether to accommodate Beijing’s rise, reinforce their own deterrence postures, or pursue fragile hedging strategies. The immediate aftermath of the parade reflects a dual imperative, shoring up national resilience while preserving economic and security cooperation with China.
For India, these dilemmas are acute. Strategic autonomy and multi-alignment demand a balance between capability augmentation and external engagement. Confidence-building measures with Beijing may temper volatility but expecting trust as their foundation is misplaced; CBMs are instruments to manage hostility, not dissolve it. India’s material capabilities remain limited relative to China’s, yet the gap is neither fixed nor immutable. Sustained economic growth and targeted military modernisation will enhance New Delhi’s prospects of shaping the regional order to its advantage. In a fluid multipolar landscape, India’s ability to manage China, through deterrence, selective cooperation, and calibrated risk-taking, will be central to both its national strategy and the wider Indo-Pacific balance.
The article appeared in orfonline
