As the US-China rivalry spirals, it is spilling over into new domains, particularly those involving rare earth minerals, regional supply chains, and emerging technologies. Countries with fragile political systems but high geoeconomic value are increasingly turning into theaters of this strategic competition.
Myanmar, India’s gateway to Southeast Asia, which is situated at the trijunction of India, China, and Southeast Asia, is the latest addition to this contestation.
Despite its ongoing civil war between Tatmadaw – the military junta – and an array of armed rebel groups, Myanmar’s immense critical mineral reserves are drawing international attention.
Its northern frontier holds the world’s third-largest rare earth deposits, including dysprosium, a mineral indispensable for precision-guided weapons, electric vehicles and advanced electronics. Control over these resources is not only commercially advantageous but also critical for long-term technological and military capabilities.
China has historically enjoyed overwhelming dominance over Myanmar’s critical mineral resource extraction, processing and supply networks, accounting for about two-thirds of China’s imports after 2017.
Following the 2021 Myanmar coup, Beijing expanded its hold further as Western disengagement and sanctions deepened Myanmar’s dependence on Chinese capital and logistical networks.
In its quest to manipulate regional geoeconomics and push domestic industries, China grabbed over 80 per cent of Myanmar’s critical mineral exports, transferring unprocessed minerals to domestic units, benefiting from Myanmar’s weak environmental and economic regulatory framework.
While Myanmar’s resources are especially concentrated in the northern regions, China’s engagement with major ethnic factions during Myanmar’s upheaval gave it leverage over any ground the US had gained.
China’s resource extraction from Myanmar peaked by 2024, when it imported more critical minerals than it produced domestically, illustrating how central Myanmar had become to Beijing’s industrial and defense ecosystems.
However, the recent military advancements that ethnic rebel groups, notably the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), made in their battle with the junta have disrupted such an arrangement.
KIA’s suspension of operations involving Chinese firms created a vacuum in the country’s strategic minerals sector. This disruption has weakened China’s exclusive access and opened limited but essential space for other international actors seeking to diversify supply chains away from China.
The US, under President Trump, is recalibrating its Myanmar strategy to pursue a geoeconomic advantage, albeit with greater ambiguity toward the junta’s political legitimacy than under the Biden administration. The tactical logic is clear: Even marginal US access to Myanmar’s critical minerals would be a blow to China’s near monopoly.
Washington is experimenting with a hybrid approach that includes, but is not confined to:
- maintaining tariffs to retain leverage,
- rolling back some sanctions on select junta officials to create diplomatic openings, and
- expanding intelligence presence through a newly opened Chiang Mai consulate in northern Thailand.
Nevertheless, the United States’ engagement for geoeconomic leverage must not come at the expense of the military junta’s democratic credentials in Naypyidaw. Yet the feasibility of deeper US engagement remains constrained by structural realities.
The junta’s long-standing strategic dependence on China, the geographically isolated location of northern mineral deposits, and the absence of secure transport routes to the sea are all factors that limit the prospects for sustainable American involvement.
Any American attempt to work around these constraints is likely to be slow, high-risk and vulnerable to reversal as the ongoing battlefield dynamics in these regions shift.
These structural constraints on China and the US open a strategic window for India and potentially for its Quad partners including the US. India’s interests align with its broader technological ambitions and its desire to reduce its dependence on Chinese rare-earth imports.
India’s increasing interest in gaining leverage in this domain has culminated in the National Critical Mineral Mission 2025, one of whose main pillars has been to explore and acquire foreign mineral assets through both public sector undertakings and private firms. Another critical pillar of this initiative has been the establishment of dedicated mineral processing zones with advanced research and development capabilities.
A significant stride has already been made by Khanij Bidesh India Ltd. (KABIL), which has begun exploration studies in Argentina and Australia.
India’s exploratory engagements with Myanmar – through the Geological Survey of India (GSI), the Ministry of Mines, and firms eyeing the Kachin state – reflect its cautiously expanding interests. Consultative talks on these matters have been underway between the Geological Survey of India (GSI) and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Conservation of Myanmar regarding possible collaborations in the critical mining sector.
The Indian Ministry of Mines also approached the public and private mining firms to explore mining and transport activities in the northern Kachin state of Myanmar. Domestic capacity-building for processing critical minerals is another key priority for the administration, with Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) exploring possible collaborations with Japan and South Korea to commercialize the production of rare-earth magnets.
These developments would add to India’s strategic capabilities in the critical minerals domain and leverage potential engagement with partner countries, such as the US.
The quest to achieve dedicated processing units, such as the Morigaon semiconductor plant in Assam, would create a proximal demand for locally extracted minerals to support its high-volume, high-technology production targets.
India’s Quad partners, particularly Australia and Japan, have realized the potential of using northeast India as an alternative to Myanmar for critical mineral processing. For both these countries, as is the cases for India, engagement with Myanmar since the 2021 coup has been limited and indirect.
While Australia has been involved in support institutions such as Myanmar’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Japan has confined itself to infrastructure development, which is believed to be an essential means of economic assistance to relieve the region’s vulnerabilities.
Quad’s Critical Mineral Initiative is a key mechanism in this domain, aiming to diversify and secure critical mineral supply chains. Although no formalized engagement has yet been established, Quad partners have both the intention and the capability to reduce their dependence on China through initiatives in northeastern India.
The primary factor that would set these alternative actors apart from the American and Chinese approaches in Myanmar’s critical mineral quest is their advocacy for a sustainable, community-driven program that adheres to environmental, social, and governance norms.
Rather than competing for direct access to Myanmar, Quad members could collaborate through India’s processing hubs to create a resilient, sustainable, and politically viable regional rare-earth supply chain.
Any sustainable alternative to the existing situation would emerge only with stable support grounded in Myanmar’s proximity. This proximity offers an unrealized advantage for India that it must not overlook. With strategic patience, regional cooperation, and a commitment to responsible development, India, along with its Quad partners, could eventually reshape Myanmar’s role in the architecture of the rare earth supply chain in the Indo-Pacific.
Rahul Mishra is an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and a senior research fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Centre of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance at Thammasat University. He is also the book series editor of the Palgrave Series in Indo-Pacific Studies. Follow him on X @rahulmishr_
Shashank Khandwe is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He can be reached at khandweshashank@gmail.com
