Earlier this month, the Lebanese government endorsed the army’s U.S.-backed plan to disarm Hezbollah, the Shia militia-cum-party. The Lebanese army is now due to begin implementing the plan this year in what officials are calling a “pivotal moment.”
The decision is indeed nothing short of historic. It would have been impossible, though, had Israel not decapitated Hezbollah in their latest war, and had the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad—a longstanding sponsor of Hezbollah and ally of Iran—not collapsed in December. But here we are, with Lebanon contemplating a monumental opportunity to regain its independence over matters of war and peace and rebuild its state institutions.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have said there is no turning back on this project, despite staunch opposition from Hezbollah. The group’s chief Naim Qassem implicitly threatened to use violence and Shia ministers loyal to the group and its ally Amal withdrew from the cabinet meeting in which the disarmament plan was approved.
The question now, which has dominated all public debate in Lebanon, is how the Lebanese army will actually disarm Hezbollah. Does the army have enough political support and military strength to fulfill this mission without risking civil strife?
In search of some answers, I sought out Gen. Rodolphe Haykal, the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), on my recent trip to the country. We met in his office in Yarzeh, southeast of Beirut, for a couple of hours and went over his military strategy in detail, as well as his various concerns.
Some critics say that Haykal’s strategy carries risks. Others say that it is not sufficiently bold because the disarmament plan doesn’t have a clear or definitive timetable. Yet I find it to be strategically wise, tactically sound, and resource conscious.
The strategy sketches out three main scenarios, with a blueprint and timetable for each. The first assumes no cooperation and even armed resistance from Hezbollah. It also assumes no concessions from Israel, which continues to occupy five hilltops in southern Lebanon, and insists on a buffer zone within Lebanese territory as part of what its defense minister has billed as a “deterrence” strategy to protect northern communities from rocket fire.
The second follows a version of the status quo, with the Lebanese army dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani River as the group turns a blind eye and Israeli forces maintain their positions.
The third scenario is Hezbollah transitioning to a regular political party without guns, and Israel agreeing to the U.S.-backed plan and vacating Lebanese territory.
Almost no one in Lebanon thinks the third scenario is likely, because in Hezbollah’s mind, laying down its arms is tantamount to political suicide. The group has managed over the years to tie the issue of its weapons to its own identity and the very fate of the once-downtrodden Lebanese Shia community. Meanwhile, very few expect Israel to withdraw from the south given its reckless military conduct in the region of late.
Everyone in Lebanon fears the first scenario, and it is one that Lebanese leaders and Gen. Haykal will try the hardest to avoid. But for Hezbollah, a clash with the LAF is not a cost-free proposition.
The LAF can exact a considerable price on Hezbollah. The army has better capabilities today thanks to many years of U.S. military assistance and Hezbollah is severely weakened. But the bigger reason Hezbollah should want to avoid a clash with the LAF is that it would go against the wishes of the majority of Lebanese society, which backs the army and the new government. It would be a recipe for total isolation and exit from the government. There is already palpable anger at Hezbollah for dragging the country into a ruinous war that has killed thousands.
The second scenario is more likely but to be most effective, Gen. Haykal desperately needs more resources. Even in the ideal scenario of Hezbollah cooperating, Haykal assessed that the LAF could need anywhere from 12 to 16 months to fully disarm the group’s military infrastructure.
This is where, beyond political support, Haykal’s strategy requires a healthy boost in U.S. military assistance. The LAF has never had to defend both its southern border and manage its non-demarcated easter border with Syria while simultaneously ensuring civil peace.
Accompanied by U.S. Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus, the new CENTCOM commander Admiral Bradley Cooper has met with Haykal to go over the army’s strategy and needs. Topping the list is increased funding to deploy more Lebanese troops along both borders, intelligence and data analysis systems including unmanned aerial assets and artificial intelligence capabilities, tactical and reconnaissance vehicles, and helicopters. The Pentagon’s decision last week to approve $14.2 million in military aid is a positive step.
The more capable a force Haykal can deploy, the more the Lebanese people—and the U.S.—can be confident in the army’s capabilities.
For all the political complexities, the center of gravity of it all is a Lebanese army that must guarantee stability in a religiously diverse country. If the army physically cannot perform this mission, then the historic decision to pursue disarmament will be irrelevant.
At the same time, the Israeli dimension is critical. Washington must insist on Tel Aviv agreeing to the U.S. proposal-turned-Lebanese plan. Because, without that, Haykal’s job is 10 times harder. It is true that Hezbollah was once instrumental in forcing Israel to withdraw from South Lebanon in 2000. But its arguments for retaining its arms are both illegitimate and bogus—it has failed today to defend Lebanon and brought destruction to the country. Yet the longer Israel obstructs the Hezbollah disarmament plan, the less receptive most of Lebanon’s Shias will be to it.
One way or another, the future of Lebanon hangs in the balance.