This month, multiple media outlets reported that Taiwan unveiled its first missile jointly developed with a US defense firm, underscoring deepening military cooperation with America as China ramps up pressure on the self-governing island.
The government-owned National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) displayed a prototype of the land-mobile cruise missile, adapted from Anduril Industries’ Barracuda-500, at the Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition.
Capable of hitting sea and land targets, the missile is expected to cost about US$216,000 per unit, with mass production planned locally within 18 months, NCSIST president Li Shih-chiang said. Li stressed that Taiwan would build the entire supply chain on the island and sign agreements with US and Canadian companies during the three-day expo.
The announcement comes as Taiwan boosts defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2030, up from 3.3% next year. The spending will expand investments in drones, unmanned vessels and AI-enabled systems to counter China’s growing military activities near its shores.
China, which views Taiwan as a renegade province that must be incorporated with the mainland, condemned the US collaboration, with Defense Minister Dong Jun vowing in typical rhetoric to thwart “external interference” and warning that attempts to use Taiwan to contain China are “doomed to fail.”
Rena Sasaki, in a June 2025 article for the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), highlights Taiwan’s struggle to independently produce equipment, citing US transfer restrictions, Chinese diplomatic pressure on potential partners and domestic structural limits as reasons.
She notes that restrictions on US technology transfers—such as the US’s long-standing demand, mentioned by Tianran Xu in a 2021 Open Nuclear Network article, that Taiwan not develop ballistic missiles with ranges of over 300 kilometers—constrain Taiwan’s access to advanced technology.
Sasaki says these external and internal pressures, compounded by political divisions, tight budgets, limited markets and declining technical expertise, leave Taiwan’s defense industry vulnerable.
Ukraine and Taiwan face a similar situation in confronting the existential threat of annexation from a larger power. However, while Western assistance has so far kept Ukraine in the fight against Russia, Ukraine-style resupply in a conflict scenario wouldn’t be possible for Taiwan due to its vulnerability to a Chinese blockade.
Furthermore, US strategic ambiguity has so far kept China guessing about its intentions regarding Taiwan. While the US has no legal obligation to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, it is legally mandated to maintain the capabilities to do so.
While China has rapidly escalated its threats towards Taiwan, a US shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity through explicit security guarantees may embolden pro-independence politicians in Taiwan. Such a situation could lead China to believe that peaceful reunification may no longer be possible, prompting an invasion.
Indigenous co-production of weapons may offer a partial solution to these constraints, deterring a Chinese invasion, strengthening Taiwan’s indigenous defenses and maintaining US strategic ambiguity.
The initiative aligns with Taiwan’s broader efforts to expand its missile capabilities. Aside from its Barracuda-500-derived cruise missile, it has unveiled a stealthy, subsonic “carrier killer” cruise missile with a projected range of 600–1,000 kilometers, designed to deter Chinese carrier groups and complement existing but shorter-ranged Hsiung Feng and Harpoon systems.
At the same time, NCSIST has begun producing the Ching Tien supersonic cruise missile, upgrading it to achieve hypersonic speeds with ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometers, making it capable of striking deep into northern China. Taiwan has also tested the secretive Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missile, with a reported range of 1,200 kilometers, enabling a shift from coastal defense to offensive strikes.
Taiwan’s indigenous missile production capitalizes on its possible defensive advantages. Dan Grazier and others argue in a Stimson report this month that Taiwan’s geography—its short distance from China, mountainous terrain and maritime chokepoints—creates natural advantages for missile deployment.
Grazier and others note that elevated launch sites complicate Chinese targeting, while strait weather makes amphibious operations hazardous and leaves invading fleets exposed. Those threats are compounded by Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng II missiles, which can strike vessels in port, and its Yun Feng (Ching Tien) cruise missile, which extends deterrence 2,000 kilometers inland.
However, even those formidable defenses may already be compromised. Paul Huang mentions in an October 2024 Foreign Policy article that last May, just days after President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, Taiwan’s mobile missile units were exposed during Chinese military drills surrounding the island.
According to Huang, Beijing-based firm MicroMacro used open-source intelligence (OSINT)—satellite imagery and public data—to identify 12 locations of these critical anti-ship missile batteries. He notes this exposure occurred across Taiwan, where units had been hastily deployed to deter Chinese aggression.
Huang argues that Taiwan’s failure to adapt to modern surveillance left its defenses exposed, with China’s real-time tracking underscoring how open-source tools can now play a decisive role in warfare and erode deterrence.
Beyond these vulnerabilities, Kelly Grieco and Hunter Slingbaum argue in a Stimson article this month that Taiwan continues to squander its geographic advantages through strategic misalignment and outdated military thinking.
Grieco and Slingbaum note that Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to rely on legacy systems, including M1 Abrams tanks, submarines ill-suited for the Taiwan Strait and expensive fighter jets vulnerable to missile strikes on the ground, while de-emphasizing cost-effective assets such as mobile missile units and drones.
Additionally, they state that civil defense and reserve forces remain underprepared, with antiquated mobilization infrastructure and insufficient equipment, and that Taiwan’s political leaders often favor symbolic gestures over substantive reform.
They warn that without embracing its natural strengths and investing in survivable, dispersed capabilities, Taiwan risks rendering its defense strategy performative and dangerously hollow.
Taiwan’s growing missile arsenal signals its intent to raise the cost of invasion, but whether these weapons keep China at bay and buy time for US intervention — or collapse like a house of cards under pressure — is still unclear.
