When President Prabowo Subianto landed in Sydney on November 12 for his first official overseas visit since taking office, the symbolism was clear. His choice to make Australia his inaugural state visit signaled early recognition of Canberra’s strategic importance to Jakarta and a desire to reshape one of the Indo-Pacific’s most complex and often fraught bilateral relationships.
The diplomatic visit was highlighted by a landmark security agreement that could reshape the regional balance of power. The pact provides a framework binding the two neighbors to regular consultations on national security issues and coordinated responses to emerging threats.
The deal, the result of long preparation and quiet diplomacy, reflects a new level of trust between the two countries, which historically have often been at odds.
Building on the 2006 Lombok Treaty, the agreement marks the deepest institutionalization of Indonesia-Australia defense cooperation in decades. It introduces mechanisms for joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and maritime-surveillance coordination, while reaffirming mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Unlike the earlier arrangement, which focused mainly on counterterrorism and capacity building, the new framework situates the relationship squarely within the broader architecture of Indo-Pacific stability.
For Prabowo, an ex-soldier who came to power promising both assertiveness and prudence, the timing is telling. The Indo-Pacific has become the epicenter of global strategic competition, and Indonesia’s position at its geographic and political core makes passivity impossible. His visit therefore served two purposes: signaling Indonesia’s willingness to play a larger regional role — and to do so on its own terms.
For both nations, the pact is more than a gesture; it is an investment in a shared future where maritime security, economic resilience, and strategic predictability matter more than ideological alignment.
Australia gains a partner anchoring its northern approaches and bolstering defense depth, while Indonesia gains access to Australia’s training, technology, and operational networks without being pulled into rigid alliance blocs.
Pragmatic hedging
Indonesia faces a dual challenge: modernizing its armed forces while safeguarding its longstanding doctrine of a “free and active” foreign policy. Its strategic culture prizes autonomy and resists being seen as part of any bloc.
This pact thus allows Jakarta to benefit from Australia’s various military strengths while preserving decision-making independence. In a region often pushed to choose between Washington and Beijing, this balancing act is essential.
Geographically, Indonesia’s vast archipelago spans key maritime chokepoints such as the Sunda, Lombok and Makassar straits, astride the arteries of Indo-Pacific trade. These waters carry much of the world’s container traffic and energy supplies, making their security central to Indonesia’s strategic posture.
Collaboration with Australia, another maritime power with overlapping sea-lane interests, enhances Jakarta’s ability to police its waters and respond to gray-zone challenges like illegal fishing, piracy, and resource disputes. It also sends a message to China, which has long looked for ways to hedge its so-called Malacca Strait dilemma, whereby the US and allies could conceivably seek to block its energy shipments in a conflict scenario.
Australia benefits in complementary ways. Canberra’s defense policy reflects growing anxiety over the Pacific’s shifting security environment and China’s expanding military reach. Closer ties with Indonesia help to stabilize Australia’s northern frontier and build political trust with Southeast Asia’s largest democracy.
This partnership also signals that Australia’s engagement with Asia is not limited to traditional Western allies, reinforcing Canberra’s credibility as a regional actor willing to cooperate on equal footing.
The pact helps Canberra reduce perceptions of overreliance on AUKUS. While Australia remains closely tied to the United States and United Kingdom, its partnership with Indonesia sends a subtler message: the Indo-Pacific order can evolve through flexible, inclusive cooperation. By engaging Indonesia as a peer, Australia anchors itself within a network of middle powers valuing consultation over confrontation.
For Jakarta, the pact is strategic repositioning. Indonesia advocates for an Indo-Pacific that is open, inclusive and grounded in cooperation rather than rivalry. Aligning with Australia through consultation-based mechanisms shows Jakarta can modernize its defense and build maritime partnerships without compromising its long-held principle of nonalignment.
New axis of stability
The pact’s implications extend far beyond bilateral ties. It consolidates a southern security axis linking Southeast Asia to the Pacific, creating a buffer of stability in a region fragmented by great-power competition. Small and middle states strive to maintain agency amid the tug-of-war between Washington and Beijing.
Anchoring cooperation in consultation rather than alliance, the Indonesia-Australia partnership offers a new model of nonaligned strategic collaboration. Regional order need not depend on bloc politics or containment; it can emerge from pragmatic alignments among sovereign equals. This approach resonates with other middle powers — including India, South Korea and Vietnam — that also seek autonomy without confrontation.
For the US and Japan, the pact is no doubt welcome. The pact strengthens the broader network of democratic and semi-aligned partners without escalating militarization. It supports goals of maintaining a stable balance of power while preserving Indonesia’s credibility as an independent actor rather than a client state.
For China, however, the symbolism is harder to ignore. Jakarta’s decision to deepen security cooperation with Canberra, even while maintaining robust economic ties with China, will likely be read as a hedging maneuver by Beijing.
It shows Indonesia’s intention to protect its interests against potential Chinese coercion, including in the contested North Natuna Sea. This nuanced repositioning gives Jakarta greater bargaining power with both superpowers, allowing it to navigate geopolitical currents with more confidence and flexibility.
The broader outcome may be the quiet emergence of an Indo-Pacific middle-power bloc — countries that uphold sovereignty, maintain open sea lanes and resist external pressure without rigid superpower alignment. The Indonesia-Australia partnership, grounded in mutual respect and maritime cooperation, could become the cornerstone of this new regional configuration.
If managed wisely, such alignments can stabilize rather than polarize, demonstrating that agency and balance remain possible in a multipolar world. Jakarta and Canberra’s approach reflects a subtle but growing realization among midsize nations that influence depends not on choosing sides but on building resilient networks of trust.
Prabowo’s first overseas trip was thus not merely ceremonial but highly strategic. It positioned Indonesia as a pivotal actor capable of shaping the regional order through quiet strength and measured engagement. For Australia, it reaffirmed the need to engage its Asian neighborhood not through fear or dependency but through genuine partnership.
As great-power rivalry intensifies, the real story of the Indo-Pacific may not be the clash of titans but the steady rise of confident middle powers that know when to cooperate, when to resist and how to stand firm without choosing sides.
Ronny P. Sasmita is a senior analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economics Action Institution.
