China’s thorium-fueled leap could power its Arctic and AI ambitions alike – fusing energy security, technological sovereignty and great power aspirations.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that China has unveiled a world-first thorium-fueled molten salt reactor (TMSR) to power a 14,000-container cargo ship, marking a potential revolution in nuclear maritime propulsion and energy security.
The Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics announced that its two megawatt experimental reactor in Gansu province achieved the first-ever thorium-to-uranium fuel conversion, proving the feasibility of using thorium — a safer, more abundant and non-proliferation-risk element — in molten salt systems.
Meanwhile, Jiangnan Shipbuilding’s Hu Keyi revealed that the upcoming thorium-powered ship will use a 200 megawatt reactor driving a supercritical CO₂ Brayton-cycle generator to produce 50 megawatts of electricity, enough for years of continuous operation without refueling.
The sealed, modular reactor operates at atmospheric pressure, eliminating explosion risk, and incorporates passive safety systems that prevent meltdowns by solidifying molten fuel in emergencies.
With conversion efficiencies of 45–50%, China’s thorium project could free it from dependence on imported uranium — over 80% of its supply — and leverage vast domestic thorium reserves in Inner Mongolia.
Planned in three stages through 2035, China’s thorium program aims to scale from experimental to 100 megawatt demonstration plants, cementing its lead in fourth-generation nuclear technology.
Beyond cargo ships and naval propulsion, China’s thorium reactor technology could power nuclear-powered icebreakers, essential for its growing interests in the Arctic region.
In a January 2018 white paper, China describes itself as a “near-Arctic” state while outlining its interests in the region. Notably, the paper mentions a “Polar Silk Road (PSR),” which extends the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the region.
The paper mentions that China aims to develop the northeast, Northwest and central Arctic shipping routes into a “blue economic passage” connecting Europe and China through the Arctic Ocean.
Pursuant to those interests, state mouthpiece China Military Online mentioned in a July 2018 article that China’s Arctic ambitions require a nuclear-powered icebreaker to fulfill – a class of ships only Russia operates. It states that a nuclear-powered icebreaker can smash through thick ice, travel to unexplored areas and operate independently.
Assessing the capabilities of nuclear-powered icebreakers, Captain Lawson Brigham states in a May 2022 Proceedings article that Russia’s Arktika-class nuclear-powered icebreakers are powered by two RITM-200 light-water reactors, enabling the 33,530 deadweight ton ships to break 9 feet of level sea ice at a continuous 1.5 to 2 knot speed.
While China may benefit from having similar ships, Monty Khanna mentions in a March 2025 report for the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) that its nuclear-powered icebreaker remains speculative.
While Khanna recalls a 2018 tender issued by a China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)-led consortium for technical consultancy on a “nuclear-powered icebreaker and comprehensive support ship demonstration project,” he stresses that no subsequent evidence confirms construction or deployment.
However, Khanna believes China’s nuclear-powered icebreaker project has been quietly shelved in favor of conventional heavy icebreakers. One possible reason could be that Russia refused to share critical technology with a possible competitor in the Arctic.
Nevertheless, Erhem Lamazhapov mentions in an October 2025 article in the peer-reviewed British Journal of Politics and International Relations that China’s nuclear-powered icebreaker project is driven by ambition as a status-seeking practice rather than a purely operational need.
Lamazhapov notes that China’s discourse elevates icebreakers as conspicuous consumption, signaling technological self-reliance and parity with great-power peers such as the US and Russia.
Aside from propelling ships, China’s thorium reactor technology could power its AI ambitions, leveraging the “quantity as a quality of its own” principle.
In August 2025, the Financial Times (FT) reported that China seeks to triple its total output of AI processors next year, with one fabrication plant producing Huawei AI processors scheduled to start production by the year-end, with two more plants due to be launched next year. FT notes that Huawei’s 910D, along with Cambricon’s 690, is the preferred hardware for its DeepSeek AI model.
The report states that the combined capacity from these three plants could exceed production at Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), which produces 7-nanometer chips, the most advanced mass-produced type in China. In contrast, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) is mass-producing 3-nanometer chips, with research into 2-nanometer chips underway.
Furthermore, Reuters reported this month that the Chinese government has issued guidelines that new data centers that have received state funds are required to use only domestically-made chips. Reuters says that the move underscores China’s efforts to eliminate foreign technology from critical infrastructure, amidst backdoor security risks and US export restrictions over Nvidia’s advanced chips.
China’s AI boom – having built more than 500 data centers in 2023 and 2024, as stated by Caiwen Chen in a March 2025 MIT Technology Review article and reaching 246 exaflops as of June 2024 – places it only second to the US, as reported by the South China Morning Post (SCMP) in August 2025. That massive growth may require an additional 30 gigawatts of electricity this year, as forecasted by Goldman Sachs.
China may be looking into nuclear power as a solution for its ever-increasing AI energy requirements. Data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows that in 2025, China had 57 nuclear power plants in operation, with 29 under construction – albeit producing only 4% of its total energy requirements – with fossil fuels generating more than half of China’s power output.
Still, by entrenching large-scale AI computing within its borders and tying it to abundant domestic nuclear energy with a closed fuel cycle, China reduces vulnerability to export controls and foreign sanctions. In the long run, even if China’s chips are a generation behind those of the US, the combination of many chips plus cheap energy can keep its AI capabilities competitive.
China’s thorium reactor program marks a calculated bid to secure long-term energy independence and technological resilience. By linking thorium-fueled power to its Arctic access and AI infrastructure, China aims to insulate critical systems from supply shocks, sanctions and energy bottlenecks.
The move reflects a pragmatic strategy to offset limits in advanced chipmaking and maritime reach through self-sustaining nuclear capacity. Yet whether thorium can reliably scale from laboratory success to commercial use remains uncertain, leaving China’s ambition to fuse energy, technology and strategy balanced between genuine innovation and politically driven aspiration.
