Five years after Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for the creation of an International Agency for Biological Security (IABS) at the United Nations General Assembly, Kazakhstan’s initiative has returned to the global non-proliferation debate as discussions on the future of biological security gain new momentum.
With the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Working Group preparing to finalise its recommendations this December, the idea of institutionalising biological security has re-emerged as a potential area for cooperation between Astana and Brussels.
Tokayev introduced the IABS concept amid the global turmoil of the COVID-19 pandemic, arguing that a multilateral mechanism was needed to prevent the weaponisation or misuse of biological materials.
The initiative has since featured prominently in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, discussed in Geneva and referenced in successive UN resolutions on strengthening and institutionalising the BTWC.
Domestically, the government consolidated its legal framework through the 2022 Law on Biological Safety, which set out rules for handling pathogens and confirmed that international obligations take precedence over national provisions.
By 2024, Kazakhstan had refined the IABS proposal in working papers submitted to the BTWC Working Group, outlining how a new body could integrate cooperation, verification, and scientific review mechanisms under the Convention.
The shift in terminology from ‘biosafety’ to ‘biosecurity’ signalled a broader approach that goes beyond public health to include strategic and security dimensions.
At a high-level seminar in Almaty marking the BTWC’s 50th anniversary, officials and experts from multiple regions highlighted the growing risks posed by rapid technological developments in biotechnology and the need for stronger international coordination.
Shared priorities
The European Union’s external policies already identify biological risks as a growing challenge. The EU Global Health Strategy calls for a “stronger international health architecture” to prevent and respond to biological threats, while the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence stresses the importance of anticipating risks linked to technological advances.
Both frameworks acknowledge the overlap between global health security and non-proliferation – a nexus the IABS proposal seeks to address. For the EU, Kazakhstan’s initiative aligns with its longstanding support for the BTWC.
Brussels has funded several projects to strengthen implementation of the Convention, including capacity-building programmes through the EU Centres of Excellence on CBRN Risk Mitigation. These initiatives assist partner countries in developing laboratory networks, biosafety standards, and cross-border response systems.
Astana’s vision of an international agency builds on these efforts by suggesting a platform to better coordinate existing mechanisms within a multilateral framework.
The EU and Kazakhstan also maintain a formal basis for dialogue under the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which encourages cooperation on disarmament and non-proliferation.
Within this framework, joint initiatives on biosafety training, data transparency, or early-warning mechanisms could translate shared priorities into concrete outcomes.
Pragmatism over symbolism
While there is broad support for reinforcing the BTWC, many member states remain cautious about endorsing a specific institutional model before the Working Group completes its work.
The EU and several partners, including the United States, Switzerland, and Singapore, have underlined the need for a balanced, inclusive approach based on technical feasibility rather than political declarations.
Recent Kazakh working papers reflect this understanding, proposing an incremental approach to building consensus.
Disarmament and security researcher Jean Pascal Zanders has noted that the IABS could serve as a platform for testing institutional solutions – a venue where scientists, policymakers, and civil society could explore mechanisms that might later underpin a formal organisation.
This approach is reminiscent of Canada’s contribution to the negotiations leading to the Chemical Weapons Convention, when technical studies on verification and compliance informed the eventual creation of the OPCW.
A potential opening for Europe
For the EU, engagement with Kazakhstan’s biosecurity proposal could contribute to broader objectives: advancing global health diplomacy, supporting the long-term resilience of the BTWC, and reinforcing Europe’s role in promoting multilateral governance amid increasing geopolitical fragmentation.
Practical cooperation may begin through policy dialogues, technical exchanges, or joint research projects, and potentially evolve into a more structured partnership connecting European expertise with emerging biosecurity initiatives in Central Asia.
Beyond regional dynamics, technological innovation in fields such as synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, and genetic engineering continues to blur the line between civilian and dual-use research. Establishing clear international norms and verification mechanisms is therefore becoming increasingly important.
If developed inclusively, the IABS could provide a framework to support transparency, capacity-building, and risk management at the intersection of health, science, and security.
Constructive engagement by all parties, including the EU, could help ensure that any future institutional model reflects principles of openness, accountability, and international cooperation – objectives central to both European and Kazakh foreign policy.
(BM)
