by Nazmus Sakib
In Bangladesh’s university dorms, the future is already knocking. The recent sweep of student-union elections by candidates aligned with Islami Chhatra Shibir (henceforth Shibir), the student wing of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, at Dhaka University and three other premier public institutions signals a seismic shift in the country’s political landscape.
These victories, in contests long considered bastions of secularism, are not mere campus skirmishes. They mark a historic milestone: for the first time since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, Shibir has swept control of the Dhaka University student’s union, capturing 23 of 28 posts, including leadership positions. Comparable dominance unfolded at Jahangirnagar University, where Shibir’s panel claimed 20 of 25 seats, and at Chittagong University, securing 24 of 26 posts after a 44-year absence from leadership. Even at Rajshahi University, the group won 20 of 23 positions, underscoring an Islamist surge that has redefined student politics across the nation.
However, it would be wrong to read these results as simply a win for Islamists and they are unlikely to mirror national election outcomes. Shibir’s triumph indicates a vote for effective change and a desire for Bangladeshi agency by the country’s youngest voters, not a yearning for a religious awakening. To understand Bangladesh’s future political direction, policymakers in Dhaka, as also New Delhi, Washington, and beyond, should not only see who won, but why they did and glean the right lessons on how to engage Bangladeshi youth.
Signal from Campuses: Dignity over Doctrine
To understand this moment, rewind to July 2024, when a student-led uprising over civil service quotas metastasized into a broader revolt against 16 years of creeping authoritarianism under Sheikh Hasina. By August 5, Hasina had resigned and fled and, within a couple of days, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus stepped in as chief adviser to run an interim administration and steer Bangladesh toward competitive elections by 2026.
“Shibir’s triumph indicates a vote for effective change and a desire for Bangladeshi agency by the country’s youngest voters, not a yearning for a religious awakening.”
The transition has been chaotic but genuine, and the student-union elections were a high-voltage political test. However, these electoral landslides do not seem to signal a rush to theocracy. They reflect a deeper current: a vote for sovereignty and dignity by urban, educated youth furious at the old order and skeptical of imposed influence. Shibir’s electoral sweep reflects students’ rejection of abusive and corrupt student organizations tied to Hasina’s authoritarian regime, with Shibir’s disciplined, moralist platform resonating as a fresh alternative. Their message of principled governance and resistance to external intellectual hegemony, widely seen as a reference to India’s perceived backing of Hasina’s government, resonated with students looking for self-reliant leadership.
The winning candidates at Dhaka University sidestepped hardline Islamist rhetoric and formed diverse coalitions, including featuring a Buddhist Chakma student from the Chittagong Hill Tracts minority, a region often perceived as “the other” in Bangladesh’s Muslim-majority context. This inclusion of a non-Muslim from an ethnic minority, alongside a non-hijab-wearing woman and a non-partisan student injured in protests, underscores a pragmatic campaign uniting varied groups around shared frustrations rather than rigid Islamist ideology.
This is a familiar playbook. When authoritarian regimes falter, parties with Islamist roots often adapt, softening their rhetoric and broadening their appeal to capture protest votes. The Muslim Brotherhood’s success in Egypt’s post-revolution elections, Ennahda’s pluralities in Tunisia’s early transition, and Turkiye’s AKP’s rebranding as a conservative democratic force in the 2000s all followed similar arcs. These trajectories are neither linear nor guaranteed, but they underscore a truth: Bangladesh’s student victories are the triumph of a pragmatic coalition broadening the tent and seeking change, not an ideological mandate.
Risks of Co-option
However, this does not rule out the possibility of a strategic instrumentalization of the Shibir victory by its more conservative parent organization, the Jamaat-e-Islami. Although it has recently focused more on anti-corruption and good governance rhetoric, Jamaat is a traditional Islamist organization rooted in Syed Abul A’la Maududi’s quest for a Shariah-ruled moral state run by the pious and it has not yet clarified what its envisioned Islamization would look like if it were to assume power—a more hardline, conservative approach or a hybrid, moderate form. Thus, if these student polls are a sign that the Jamaat could be an influential player in Bangladeshi politics or even a potential winner in next year’s national elections, domestic and international observers should pay attention.
For one, Jamaat’s party charter still envisions replacing Bangladesh’s constitutional order with Shariah rule. Also, several of its senior leaders carry 1971 war crimes convictions, which the party has failed to legally refute even after last year’s regime turnover. Thirdly and most concerningly, some Jamaat leaders have made contradictory statements about their aspirations for the remit of Islamic law in the country, generating concerns about the future of inclusive and pluralistic democracy in Bangladesh.
Western and Regional Calculus
For the West, Bangladesh should not be a peripheral concern. An overwhelmingly Muslim majority state with a population of 175 million, 28 percent of which is between the ages of 10 and 25, it sits at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal, bridging India and Southeast Asia while navigating Chinese investment and influence. It anchors global garment supply chains, faces acute climate risks, and hosts nearly a million Rohingya refugees amid Myanmar’s escalating civil war. Thus, if the West’s interest in Bangladesh is to preserve a plural, democratic, open, and globally connected state in a volatile region, it needs to think seriously about engaging whatever political dispensation is in power in the country.
Elsewhere in the region, the calculus may be different. India, which shares an over 4,000 kilometer (2,500 mile) border and roughly USD $13 billion in annual trade with Bangladesh, may feel drawn to its long-time partner, the Awami League. That instinct would be counter-productive. Many Bangladeshis already view New Delhi as the Awami League’s external patron, sheltering Hasina—who is now wanted by a Dhaka court on charges of ordering the violent crackdown on protestors last August. A public pledge of non-interference—paired with quiet, even-handed engagement across Bangladesh’s political spectrum—would do far more to secure India’s interest in a stable, plural, and economically integrated neighbor. Russia’s decision this month to welcome Syria’s new interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa while still hosting the ousted Bashar al-Assad offers a template: hedge relationships without appearing to dictate outcomes. Lowering the temperature in Dhaka likewise demands that New Delhi privilege pragmatism over partisanship.
Myanmar’s civil war, particularly in Rakhine, adds urgency. The conflict is driving refugees and illicit flows toward Bangladesh and India’s Northeast. Dhaka, New Delhi, and Western partners need to collaborate on border management, humanitarian planning, and countering gray-zone threats that empower militias because neglected camps are breeding grounds for recruiters and traffickers. Stabilizing Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char, where Rohingya refugees are concentrated, thus represents not just humanitarian but regional risk mitigation.
“The right approach for regional and global powers is to engage Bangladeshi political leaders pragmatically, incentivizing moderation and rewarding performance over ideological purity.”
This engagement with Bangladesh is especially critical because Beijing will likely court any government in Dhaka with infrastructure financing and port projects. In fact, after the July 2024 uprising, China invited all major political players in Bangladesh to visit CCP headquarters; they all accepted the offer without hesitation.
Securing a Hinge State
The core message from these polls then is that young Bangladeshis are striving for a chance to shape their own future. If the West or India act like partisans, they risk reinforcing narratives of a tilted playing field. If they act like stakeholders—prioritizing institutions, accountability, and economic integration—they can raise the rewards for moderation in whatever coalition emerges in 2026. The task is not to romanticize Bangladesh’s parties but to separate means from ends.
If the goal is to establish a balance of power in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific, the right approach for regional and global powers is to engage Bangladeshi political leaders pragmatically, incentivizing moderation and rewarding performance over ideological purity. International policymakers should tie support—whether for revenue digitization, port upgrades, or clean-energy projects—to transparent, measurable governance outcomes, verified by third-party audits. Humanitarian aid for the Rohingya should shift to multi-year commitments covering health, education, and camp security, paired with diplomatic pressure on Myanmar’s warring factions and their backers to enable voluntary repatriation. Cooperation on counterterrorism, trafficking, and coastal security should deepen, with clear consequences for incitement or vigilante violence.
The goal is not to pick winners but to make rules-based, competent governance more rewarding than divisive culture wars. If Jamaat-linked coalitions gain influence in 2026 elections, steady incentives and visible accountability will be critical. Inclusion of moderates occurs only when institutions and interests compel actors to maintain broad coalitions. The West can help by strengthening those institutions and aligning those shared interests. Especially because the lure of being co-opted by China, the West’s chief peer competitor, is likely strong for Jamaat. The entire top brass of Jamaat—including the president—embarked on a prolonged tour of China in July this year, meeting with CCP leaders for elaborate “workshops.” More broadly, providing Dhaka credible options to China would mean ensuring predictable customs standards at land ports, moving economic agreements to firm timetables, and coordinating project finance with partners like Japan to position the West and India as reliable allies, not intermittent critics.
These student-union results should not be mistaken for an imminent Islamist takeover. They are likely not a precursor to the February parliamentary elections, nor do they signal that Bangladeshi society has turned toward religious rule. Rather, they reveal a Bangladeshi desire for fairness and autonomy after years of repression. By meeting the country’s youth where they are, external powers can help channel this democratic opening toward competence and inclusion, not the morality plays that have derailed too many transitions before.
The article was published in the southasianvoices
