Adding to the score of destroying three narco fast boats, the US military has destroyed what appears to be a semi-submersible, probably striking it with two Hellfire missiles.
What options does the US now have in trying to stop drug trafficking?
The Trump administration has released a video of the target’s destruction, but has not revealed what was used to take it out or the platform from which the two missiles were fired – or, for that matter, who fired them.
Nonetheless, most experts who have viewed the video are pretty sure it was done with a drone.
Hellfire missiles also are carried on helicopters, but helicopters have limited range and take time to reach their targets. A loitering drone, or drones (deployed in sectors), can, when shuttled in and out, stay in the target area for hours at a time.
Additionally, drones are far cheaper to operate than helicopters and require less frequent and less costly maintenance.
US drones that could knock out the Narco vessel include the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-1C Gray Eagle, and General Atomics’ newer Mojave. The MQ-1 Predator can carry six Hellfire missiles, the MQ-9 Reaper can carry up to eight, and the MQ-1C Gray Eagle can be armed with them for anti-armor and counter-drone missions.
My speculation is based on the current operations of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
Camp Santiago, Puerto Rico. Photo: US Marine Corps / Lance Cpl. Kyle Baskin
The 22nd MEU is operating in the Caribbean as part of the US military buildup in the region. The 22nd is part of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and consists of 2,200 Marines including a battalion landing team, aircraft squadron and logistics element.
In addition, the Marines have deployed three amphibious ships: USS Iwo Jima (amphibious assault ship), USS San Antonio (amphibious transport dock), and USS Fort Lauderdale (amphibious transport dock). Training is taking place in Puerto Rico and the Marines’ operations are managed under US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) out of Doral, Florida.
The 22nd MEU has integrated MQ-9A Reaper drones into its operations, which are designed for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. These drones are part of the Marine Corps’s efforts to develop more lethal and expeditionary capabilities. At least two of these armed drones have been deployed to Rafael Hernandez Airport in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, where they can conduct both surveillance and potential strike operations.
US Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Colton Brownlee
The Reaper detachment is supported by other surveillance assets, most notably by the P-8 Poseidon. The P-8 is the successor to the venerable P-3 and its surveillance role focuses on anti-submarine tracking and warfare. The P-3 was a modified Lockheed turboprop based on the L-188 Electra commercial airliner. The P-8 is jet powered and shares 88% commonality with the Boeing 737-800 airliner. Because it can fly low and slow over the water, the P-8 and its two CFM56-7B engines have been fully marinized. The P-8 has onboard weapons such as the anti-ship Harpoon missile, but it does not carry Hellfire.
Narco runners operate roughly three types of sea platforms, all of which are manufactured clandestinely in workshops in remote jungle areas of South America. The majority are built in Colombia, but facilities have also been discovered in neighboring countries. These are narco go-fast boats, semi-submersibles and home-built submarines.
Go-fast boats are modeled on panga or yola fishing boat hulls. They are typically made of fiberglass, Kevlar and carbon fiber and are designed to carry large loads, such as illegal drugs, at speeds over 80 knots (150 km/h). Typically two or three outboard engines are used, generating up to 1,000 HP (750 KW) or one or two inboard engines.
The US Coast Guard Cutter Midgett seen with a low-profile go-fast vessel interdicted in international waters of the Eastern Pacific Ocean, July 26, 2019. US Coast Guard
The actual number of go-fast boats produced for running narcotics is not known, but it likely thousands have been produced.
The next most popular narcotics delivery vessel is the semi-submersible. There are a number of different models. Typically these are made of fiberglass, and also feature the use of wood. They have a crew of three or four persons. The semi-submersible operates with only a small part of the vessel above the surface and is designed to avoid detection. Newer semi-submersible platform route exhaust gasses through pipes in the water to cool the exhaust, reducing the IR signature of the semi-submersible. Because of their construction, sophisticated sensors are needed to locate them. Semi-submersibles are used in the Caribbean and in the Pacific to feed drug operators in the US. Reportedly some semi-submersibles have made deliveries to Europe.
Authorities estimate that hundreds of narco-submarines (the term often is used to include both semi-submersibles and low-profile vessels) have been seized or destroyed across the Americas. From 1993 to May 2023, the Colombian Navy had intercepted and seized 228 illegal semi-submersible and submersible devices.
A low profile go-fast captured by the Colombian Navy.
As far back as 2009, an estimated 70 low-profile boats were believed to be constructed in Colombia each year. US authorities estimated in 2009 that they were only able to stop about 14% of the shipments using this mode of transport. Other reports suggest that only 10% to 25% of these low-profile vessels are intercepted, meaning the majority successfully complete their missions.
The Trump strategy
As dramatic as the destruction of go-fasts and the latest strike on a semi-submersible have been, what the Trump administration has dealt with, factoring in the recent intercepts by the Coast Guard in Pacific waters, is still just the tip of the narco transport iceberg. Even with intensified air strikes on transits, attempting to heavily impact the lucrative drug trade by intercepting drug runners is unlikely to make a dent in the racket.
Trump also faces criticism from some – for example, Republican Rand Paul – who consider the intercepts illegal, as they take place on the high seas in international waters. The administration may face legal challenges, although the president has considerable latitude when it comes to national security-related decisions.
The various national players include Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador and Mexico, with large swaths of some of them, particularly in Colombia and Mexico, under the physical control of powerful drug cartels.
It is reasonable to take note that the cartels and others in the drug trade, awash in cash, can buy out law enforcement and bribe public officials. While some object, often they are murdered – as many mayors and other Mexican officials would testify if they could speak from beyond the grave.
Knocking off narco vessels, either by seizure or with more dramatic Hellfire attacks, is probably still considered by the cartels as a cost of doing business and probably does not impact the drug-running business enough to force any reduction of effort. In fact, restricting drug supplies tends to run up the street cost of drugs, increases cartel profits, and acts as advertising and promotion for this illegal trade.
The US itself is also vulnerable to cartel money and influence, especially bribery of law enforcement that’s aimed at protecting the drug trade. Here are just a few recent examples:
Former Border Patrol Agent Sentenced: In June 2025, a former Border Patrol agent was sentenced to 18 years in prison for smuggling drugs, including fentanyl and heroin, into the US and accepting bribes. The case involved multiple individuals who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery and alien smuggling.
CBP Officer Imprisoned for Smuggling: In February 2025, a US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer was sentenced to prison for receiving bribes to allow drug-laden vehicles into the country. The investigation revealed that the officer accepted tens of thousands of dollars per vehicle to allow cartel shipments to pass through his lane.
Indictment of Sinaloa Cartel Leader: In September 2025, a leader of a Sinaloa Cartel faction was indicted in Chicago for drug trafficking and terrorism. This case, part of “Operation Take Back America,” showcases how cartels operate across the border and infiltrate communities through corruption.
Along with bribes and corruption, law enforcement officers and public officials have been threatened and intimidated. The lack of cyber security has exposed law enforcement by releasing names and family and friend connections that the cartels can use for intelligence collection and mob enforcement.
Cartels increasingly use advanced cyber tactics, often hiring skilled specialists or leveraging “cybercrime-as-a-service” to expand and protect their operations. These capabilities allow criminal organizations to conduct surveillance, intimidate opponents, target law enforcement, and launder illicit funds with greater speed and anonymity.
Consider the Mexican election cycle of 2023-2024:
- Time period: Campaign cycle leading up to the June 2, 2024, general election.
- Candidates killed (high estimate): At least 37 candidates (or people seeking office) murdered.
- Political figures killed (total): Up to 63 assassinations of political figures (including candidates, officials, and former officials) reported between June 2023 and June 2024.
- Historical context: The 2024 election cycle considered the deadliest in modern Mexican history for political violence.
- Target focus: Local political figures (mayors and municipal candidates) the primary targets, as organized crime seeks to control local territories and illicit economies.
Looked at objectively, the right targets are the cartels and their political backers. A key question is whether the Trump administration’s focus on Venezuela is likely to impact drug operations significantly.
The view of the administration is that the Venezuelan government and the Venezuelan military are facilitating and getting rich on drug trafficking.
Most of the well-known cartels run their operations from Colombia and Mexico. The US runs up against heavy pushback from these countries, both of them with governments hostile to the United States.
President Trump has called the Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, an “illegal drug dealer” and Trump has cut off foreign assistance to Colombia. The Mexican President, Claudia Sheinbaum, has vehemently spoken out against President Trump’s idea to send U.S. troops into Mexico to fight drug cartels.
Whether intentional or not, the actions of both the Colombian and Mexican leaders have encouraged the cartels, which sense they are being protected against US military intervention.
Venezuela, on the other hand, with a leader who falsified his election, is an easier target since that country’s support is confined mainly to Russia and China, neither of which is likely to lend a hand if the US takes military action.
By the same token, while the regime could probably be overthrown, it would be another matter to clean out the military and law enforcement, the courts and the administrative organs. It would be a major challenge that could compel Washington to not engage, or to confine itself to threats and pressure.
The bottom line is that a military solution vis a vis Venezuela is not a slam dunk, and it would increase animosity in neighboring countries who would seek to elicit domestic support in the United States.
The following are suggestions on effective measures to break the cartels.
1. Targeted disruption of production and export infrastructure
The military focus should pivot from open-ocean patrol to source-point eradication. This requires leveraging US Special Operations Forces (SOF) or other specialized counter-narcotics units (e.g., DEA/CIA-led teams) to conduct low-visibility, high-impact raids on remote clandestine labs, semi-submersible construction sites, and key transshipment hubs located in weakly governed, isolated territories.
Furthermore, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets should be utilized to provide precision targeting data for air-delivered kinetic destruction of key infrastructure (e.g., vessel components, precursor chemical stockpiles) in unpopulated zones. This strategy is designed to impose untenable logistical and construction costs on the cartels, making their production base a prohibitively high-risk operational zone.
A lot can be achieved by cutting off critical supplies to the cartels, making it difficult if not impossible for them to construct Narco delivery platforms.
A key resource is a supply of outboard engines, which are critical for go-fasts and also are used in semi-submersibles (but not always). Most outboard engines are produced in the United States and Japan. The larger engines, over 150 hp, are made by Yamaha, Mercury, Suzuki, Honda and Tohatsu.
Currently there are no export controls on these engines and no system for following their sales. Either these engines are sold through distributors or by direct sales (increasingly) from the manufacturers. It is noteworthy that despite the critical nature of outboard engine supplies, the US has taken no action to track down and control the sales of the engines, nor has Japan tried to curtail the trade.
A key recommendation is for the US Treasury Department to impose special controls and for the State Department and FBI to open urgent negotiations with Japan to institute an export management system to deny cartels access to large outboard power plants.
Similar controls also can be put on marine engines of the type most likely to be fitted to narco boats.
2. Controlled economic strangulation via financial decapitation
Financial warfare must be executed as a surgical strike, guided by operational intelligence. The strategy must combine data gathered from physical raids and cyber intrusions with US intelligence assets to rapidly identify and sanction the cartels’ top financial and logistical controllers. This involves the simultaneous imposition of devastating, permanent sanctions (such as Kingpin Act designations) against the top fifty network figures.
Concurrently, specialized offensive cyber and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations must prioritize massive intelligence collection on high-value targets, immediately triggering the seizure of global assets and unsealing indictments in friendly jurisdictions. The goal is to sever the cartels’ leadership from their cash flow and logistical support in a rapid, decisive action that prevents them from reconstituting their command structure.
3. The Governance warfare doctrine
To dismantle the political shield, the US must employ a doctrine of governance warfare. This involves two prongs:
First, dedicate an insulated US task force to prioritizing the extraterritorial prosecution of any major foreign government, military or security officials who provide direct protection or intelligence to the cartels. This relies on the robust capabilities of the US Justice Department to pursue foreign nationals involved in drug trafficking aimed at the US.
Second, this effort must be paired with aggressive targeted information operations, utilizing verifiable, legally obtained evidence to conduct covert influence campaigns designed to expose and politically destroy the corruption of high-ranking officials in key countries. This strategy aims to destroy the cartels’ political credibility and security shield, forcing host nations to either comply or face debilitating internal political collapse.
