Prabowo Subianto has entered his first year in office with China at the center of his foreign and economic policy. Like his predecessor Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, Prabowo views Beijing as essential to Indonesia’s development.
But while Jokowi treated the partnership mainly as an economic necessity, Prabowo has elevated it into a defining pillar of his early presidency — one that combines investment diplomacy with overt strategic signaling.
Soon after taking office in late 2024, Prabowo made Beijing his first foreign stop. He called China “a civilization that seeks harmony and common good” and signed a joint maritime statement mentioning “joint development in overlapping areas.”
The phrase alarmed some Indonesian lawyers, who saw it as inconsistent with Jakarta’s rejection of China’s “nine-dash line” claim, which encompasses most of the South China Sea. Jokowi had kept economic cooperation separate from sovereignty issues; Prabowo has overtly blurred that line.
He then visited Washington, repeating Indonesia’s stance that it “will cooperate with all, but defend our sovereignty.” The message was familiar, though his tone was more forceful.
In Beijing, Prabowo secured investment pledges worth over US$10 billion for industrial zones, infrastructure and education. China also agreed to support his free-meal and public-housing programs, tying its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-related financing to Indonesia’s domestic welfare goals.
In January 2025, Indonesia joined BRICS, signaling Jakarta’s comfort with China’s multipolar agenda and its desire for a greater voice in the Global South. Two months later, in March, Indonesia joined the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB), gaining access to alternative funding channels.
Western capitals read both moves as signs of Jakarta seeking more autonomy within the international system–not necessarily as a tilt away from the West, but as a recalibration of Indonesia’s geostrategic options.
On sensitive issues such as Xinjiang and Taiwan, nothing has changed in Jakarta. Like Jokowi, Prabowo avoids public comment and sticks to noninterference. Prabowo’s Indonesia continues to separate economic cooperation from political criticism.
Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Jakarta in May brought more deals on energy transition and logistics. Under Jokowi, Chinese engagement focused on infrastructure and downstream industry; under Prabowo, it has become central to his welfare-based development drive.
In September, Prabowo attended China’s “Victory Day” military parade, marking the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II–the first Indonesian leader to do so. The move was largely about optics: he wanted to be seen standing beside Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, projecting Indonesia as part of a rising Global South bloc.
It also underlined how crucial China has become for Prabowo’s vision of Indonesia’s future. His decision to attend Xi’s gala parade, despite a domestic emergency at the time, drew criticism at home, with some seeing it as poor judgment.
A few months earlier, while G7 leaders met in Canada in June, Prabowo was in St Petersburg with Putin, praising China and Russia for “not having double standards.” The contrast with Jokowi’s quieter neutrality was clear, even if their underlying strategy was similar: balancing major powers while maintaining Indonesia’s autonomy.
By October, cooperation with Beijing had deepened further. After the US imposed a new 19% tariff on Indonesian exports, after earlier threatening a 32% levy, reputedly in exchange for a vow to buy billions worth of US energy, agricultural products and Boeing-made jets, China presented itself as a steadier partner.
Indonesia recently finalized a US$9 billion purchase of Chengdu J-10C fighter jets, its largest defense deal ever with China and a clear diversification away from reliance on Western arms. The country has also reopened talks to expand the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed railway, a multi-billion-dollar BRI-backed project Prabowo inherited from Jokowi.
The costs are also visible. The financial collapse of Jiangsu Delong, parent of PT Gunbuster Nickel Industry, exposed how dependent Indonesia has become on Chinese capital. Environmental violations by Chinese-linked firms in Raja Ampat have drawn domestic anger.
Like Jokowi, Prabowo has avoided addressing labor and environmental problems in China-backed projects, choosing to stress their contribution to economic growth instead. Weak enforcement of such standards has held over in the transition from Jokowi to Prabowo.
The same habits appear in diplomacy. In October, Prabowo appointed Irene, a physician and Gerindra Party politician from Papua, as Indonesia’s first vice ambassador to China–a post created because of the embassy’s heavy workload.
The role made sense; the choice did not. Irene has no China background or clear diplomatic experience. The move reflects a broader trend: loyalty and symbolism still outweigh expertise, even in Jakarta’s most demanding foreign posting.
Critics say Prabowo’s warmer approach risks drawing Indonesia deeper into Beijing’s orbit. Supporters, however, see realist continuity. Both Jokowi and Prabowo have dealt with the same reality–namely, China is Indonesia’s most crucial economic partner–while the West remains engaged to a lesser degree through investment, trade and strategic dialogue.
The difference is in style: Jokowi preferred quiet deals; Prabowo prefers visibility. China, for its part, adapts easily to the tone of its partners. Warmth brings goodwill but not necessarily leverage. As before, Indonesia’s strength lies in clear negotiation and consistent policy.
Chinese-backed projects give Prabowo quick wins on jobs and welfare. Yet his reluctance to enforce labor or environmental standards in Chinese-funded projects–and his reliance on political appointees rather than diplomatic professionals–could erode some of those gains in the public eye.
Indeed, without stronger oversight and real China literacy inside government, Indonesia risks trading short-term progress for long-term dependency.
After one year, Prabowo’s China policy is more expansion than shift. He has taken Jokowi’s pragmatic model and wrapped it in stronger rhetoric. Joining BRICS and the NDB, attending Beijing’s military parade and naming a vice ambassador to Beijing all show the ex-soldier’s ambition to raise Indonesia’s global standing.
The challenge now is to keep that ambition grounded. Engagement with China is necessary, but it must serve Indonesia’s priorities, not Beijing’s. Independence has long been the core of Indonesian diplomacy–a balance Prabowo will need to strike if he wants his China policy to boost, not undermine, his leadership legacy.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is director of the China-Indonesia Desk at the Jakarta-based Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) independent research institute. Yeta Purnama is a researcher at CELIOS.
