Jaffer A Mirza
After flags associated with the Bajrang Dal militant group were raised in a Muslim-majority area of Leicester last month, Rajiv Sinha of Hindus for Human Rights UK said the rally likely aimed to intimidate Muslims.
Though some linked it to a Hindu festival, the symbolism and timing – coming around the third anniversary of the 2022 unrest in Leicester – pointed to the presence of Hindutva ideology.
And yet, Britain’s right-wing media and think tanks downplayed the incident, blaming Muslims or depicting it as generic “communal unrest”.
This was not unlike the framing that arose three years ago, after India defeated Pakistan in a cricket match in Dubai on 28 August 2022. These contests often extend beyond sport, fuelling nationalist rhetoric online.
In Leicester, one of England’s most multicultural cities, The Guardian reported that jubilant Indian fans shouted “Pakistan Murdabad” (“death to Pakistan”) on the streets, sparking tensions that escalated into widespread unrest.
Such tensions were not new; disputes over cultural practices and religious events had previously caused friction. Hindu festivals involving loud music during processions, for example, have sometimes clashed with the sensibilities of “
Another flashpoint was the 2018 rejection of a proposal to convert a Leicester warehouse into a Muslim prayer room and education centre. The council cited noise, congestion and parking as central issues. However, the backlash revealed deeper hostilities: nearly 1,500 objections were submitted, many of which contained anti-Muslim rhetoric.
Petitioners argued that a Muslim centre should not be established in a Hindu-majority area, citing fears of “extremism”, threats to women’s safety and the proximity of temples.
Divisive narratives
A recent Community Policy Forum report identified Hindutva as a key driver of the 2022 unrest, combined with antisocial behaviour, divisive narratives and disinformation. It stressed that the tensions were not rooted in Leicester’s multicultural fabric, but in external influences and extremist ideologies.
While some have accused recent migrants of importing Hindutva ideas, this obscures the role of larger local networks in promoting extremism.
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad, a group affiliated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – a Hindu-supremacist organisation – is notorious for its Hindu nationalist and anti-Muslim agenda. It has been linked to communal violence in India, including the 1992 demolition of the Babri Masjid.
Leicester must be understood not as an isolated clash, but as part of a transnational mobilisation of violent ideologies
Its UK branch, based in Leicester, venerates M S Golwalkar, an RSS ideologue and Hitler admirer who described Nazi Germany as “a good lesson for us”.
The Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh, founded in 1966, is also widely regarded as an RSS offshoot. Although a formal inquiry found no direct organisational link, the charity admitted the two groups share “similar principles“. While the RSS is not proscribed in Britain, it is globally recognised as an extremist Hindutva organisation.
A Henry Jackson Society brief on the Leicester unrest argued that the events were “falsely narrated as involving organised extremist groups and RSS terrorists”, asserting that Hindu marchers did not “appear to show any clear or demonstrable links with known terrorist organisations”. Instead, it largely blamed Muslims for inciting violence against Hindus.
Some Muslim activists did play a role, using disinformation, provocative rhetoric and the mobilisation of religious identity to fuel tensions with Leicester’s Hindu community. But the conclusion that Hindu marchers had no formal links with the RSS or other Hindutva groups does not tell the whole story; what matters is whether individuals embody the ideologies and behaviours of such movements.
Transnational dimension
During the 2022 unrest in Leicester, some marchers displayed clear Hindutva symbols, including the saffron flag, which is also revered by the RSS. The chant “Jai Shri Ram” – a devotional greeting – has in recent years become a “murder cry” associated with anti-Muslim lynchings in India and was shouted in Muslim-majority areas during the riots.
Such symbols and slogans are not isolated expressions of faith; they are closely tied to Hindutva ideology. This association was recently underscored by a leaked Home Office report, which found that “Hindu nationalist extremism” played a role in the 2022 riots.
The transnational dimension of the Leicester unrest cannot be ignored. BBC Monitoring analysed 200,000 posts on X about the events and found that more than half originated in India, highlighting the role of disinformation networks in amplifying tensions.
These ties reflect a broader pattern. In recent years, Hindu ultra-nationalists have expanded their presence in Europe and the US, aligning with Zionist and white-supremacist groups around a shared hostility towards Muslims. Journalist Azad Essa has documented the collaboration between Hindutva and Zionist groups in the US.
Similarly, in Britain, a leaked police intelligence report recently warned that “British Hindu extremists” were aligning with European far-right groups. It referenced the potential dangers of Hindutva activists aligning with neo-Nazis, pointing to the case of Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian terrorist who killed 77 people in 2011 and praised Hindutva in his manifesto.
Though some Hindu groups rejected the report, such fears are reinforced by the active involvement of Tommy Robinson, founder of the English Defence League, with right-wing Hindu activists. During the 2022 unrest, Robinson blamed Muslims and offered to bring “hundreds of men”.
This collaboration predates Leicester. In 2016, he was invited to speak at a Southall temple, and more recently, Robinson and other far-right figures amplified Hindu-nationalist disinformation about Bangladesh after leader Sheikh Hasina’s removal in 2024.
The UK is thus mirroring a global trend: far-right movements, including Hindu ultra-nationalists, are converging in shared campaigns of anti-Muslim hatred. Leicester must be understood not as an isolated clash but as part of a transnational mobilisation of violent ideologies. By turning a blind eye to Hindutva, Britain risks strengthening violent transnational Islamophobia.
The article appeared in middleeasteye
