by Syed Abdul Ahad Waseem
After decades of partnership, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have officially signed a “strategic mutual defense agreement.” The joint statement, issued on September 17, identified “shared strategic interests,” among other factors, as providing the impetus for the agreement, which aims to develop “aspects of defense cooperation” between the two countries and “strengthen joint deterrence” against “any” aggression. Crucially, the agreement envisions collective defense, stating that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.”
Pakistan has had mutual defense treaties in the past, such as with the United States during the Cold War. But since their dissolution in the 1970s, the country has had no formal mutual defense pact with any nation—not even China. That makes this agreement with its long-term ally truly historic.
Beyond the aforementioned statement, however, little information is available on what the agreement actually entails, opening the floodgates of speculation and anxiety among experts and the public alike. This piece attempts to place the pact within a broader geopolitical, historical, and doctrinal context and argues that while the collective-defense language is symbolically significant, its practical effect—including a possible nuclear commitment on the part of Pakistan—is likely to be constrained by both Islamabad and Riyadh’s respective strategic calculations and by the historical weakness of such agreements.
The India Factor
That Pakistan and Saudi Arabia share a strategic interest in deterring any perceived Israeli threat to their security is clear: the recent Israeli strikes on the Qatari capital have exacerbated Riyadh’s anxieties and compelled it to take steps to reinforce deterrence. Pakistan, for its part, fears the growing defense partnership between New Delhi and Jerusalem, most recently embodied by India’s extensive use of Israeli-origin weapon systems against it in the recent four-day conflict in May 2025. Yet given its thriving ties with New Delhi in recent years, Riyadh’s declaration that it “shares” Pakistan’s strategic interests—which, in the defense realm, are chiefly about deterring Indian aggression—is less straightforward. If the agreement fulfills its stated purpose—i.e., collective defense, including through the employment of all “military means,” as one Saudi official has put it—a South Asian crisis could draw Riyadh into the fray. Many Indian observers are already feeling perturbed by the pact, especially with its collective-defense provision and Riyadh’s apparent disregard for India’s strategic sensitivities.
“While the collective-defense language is symbolically significant, its practical effect—including a possible nuclear commitment on the part of Pakistan—is likely to be constrained by both Islamabad and Riyadh’s respective strategic calculations and by the historical weakness of such agreements.”
However, if the pact leads anyone in Pakistan to imagine a joint Saudi-Pakistani force taking on India in the next subcontinental crisis, caution is very much in order. The agreement’s reference to collective defense could merely be a political gesture signaling mutual solidarity or aiming to introduce uncertainty for deterrence purposes rather than a Saudi pledge to send troops or launch sorties against India on Pakistan’s behalf. Historical precedent is instructive here: even the United States, despite being Pakistan’s treaty-bound defense partner at the time, did not militarily intervene during Pakistan’s wars with India in 1965 and 1971 because doing so did not fit its Cold War strategic calculus; among other factors discouraging intervention, avoiding a direct confrontation with Moscow—India’s close partner during those years—was a higher priority than defending Pakistan. Likewise, Saudi Arabia values its flourishing relationship with India and, unlike Pakistan, does not see it as an existential threat. By the same token, Pakistan is unlikely to launch nuclear-armed ballistic missiles on Israel or strike Iran if either were to attack Saudi Arabia, since doing so could jeopardize its own survival.
Empirical data also suggests that defense pacts are seldom upheld, especially in the post-World War II era. A study examining the decline in honored alliances post-1945 found that the rate at which states defend their allies in war dropped from 81 percent during 1816-1944 to 7 percent in 1945-2016. Another study found that offense pacts—such as the World War II alliance among the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom—are much more likely to be upheld (73.81 percent of cases) than defense pacts (41.18 percent of cases)—such as the U.S.-Pak agreements like CENTO, SEATO, and the 1954 bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. Strikingly, in the post-1945 period overall, the same study found that alliances of all types were honored only about 22 percent of the time.
While the past is not necessarily a prelude, and an unforeseen future development could give teeth to loosely-worded clauses, formal agreements can only go so far—and never far enough to compel a state to act against its own interests. Thus, with the pact’s terms being left ambiguous in the public sphere, India has little reason to feel deterred. Still, the agreement’s NATO-like language signals to New Delhi that Riyadh would stand by its agreement-bound ally in the event of conflict—if not militarily, then at least diplomatically and perhaps far more vocally than in past conflicts. The lack of any statement to the contrary by Saudi officials since the signing of the pact lends credence to this perception.
Whither Nuclear Weapons?
A sharper question, one yet to receive an official answer, is whether the agreement entails any Pakistani nuclear commitment. In theory, that seems highly unlikely; indeed, in an op-ed for Saudi state-linked outlet Arab News Pakistan, a media attaché at the Saudi Embassy in Islamabad listed “key elements” of the pact, none of which included any notion of extended deterrence through Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
However, Riyadh and Islamabad may choose to keep mum on whether nuclear weapons are part of the pact or issue deliberately vague statements to keep Israel guessing. For as Pakistan knows well, even strategic ambiguity on nuclear use can strengthen deterrence—one of the pact’s key objectives. In recent days, Pakistan’s defense minister has sent mixed messages on the nuclear question, first claiming that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were available to Saudi Arabia and later retracting the statement.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is among the most heavily scrutinized in the world, largely because of concerns about its security. Importantly, Islamabad has stressed for decades that its arsenal exists solely to deter India. Extending a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia would, therefore, mark a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s nuclear posture—a move highly improbable given the ramifications for a country that remains dependent on external assistance, militarily and otherwise. The Biden administration sanctioned Pakistani entities on seven occasions between 2021 and 2025 over alleged ballistic missile development; any move hinting at a nuclear dimension to its ostensibly greater Middle East role could invite even harsher consequences.
Realistically, Pakistan simply does not have the muscle to become a net security provider for others—a new role many Pakistani analysts have ascribed to the country since the pact’s signing. Its own house is only now beginning to achieve a semblance of economic order, and it remains enmeshed in security challenges on its eastern and western borders.
The ambiguity of messaging and the fact that the pact includes a collective defense obligation is bound to raise eyebrows in Western capitals, where many have long perceived Pakistan’s role as a de facto nuclear shield for the Kingdom. In the coming days, Pakistan might be compelled to bring out the devil from the details.
Saudi Motivations: Signaling Beyond Washington
The agreement could also bring Saudi Arabia a step closer to China, Pakistan’s main defense backer. Riyadh has long sought a formal defense pact with the United States, but amid protracted negotiations with the Biden administration, a frustrated Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman warned in a 2023 interview that Riyadh could shift “their armament from America to another place”—widely understood to mean China.
Saudi Arabia already maintains strong ties with Beijing—it is Riyadh’s largest trading partner—but becoming a pact-bound defense partner of China’s closest ally is a strong signal that Saudi Arabia is uneasy about betting its survival on informal U.S. security guarantees. After all, being the forward headquarters for the U.S. Central Command did not save Qatar’s capital from being blasted by Israeli bombs—of which the White House reportedly knew in advance.
It is not unimaginable then that, as the global order evolves, China could plausibly emerge as Asia’s chief security guarantor. This possibility, combined with Saudi Arabia’s anxiety over Israel’s ambitions and its waning trust in Washington’s ability to protect it, may push Riyadh to deepen ties with Beijing, whose military capabilities are becoming ever more sophisticated.
“Saudi Arabia already maintains strong ties with Beijing—it is Riyadh’s largest trading partner—but becoming a pact-bound defense partner of China’s closest ally is a strong signal that Saudi Arabia is uneasy about betting its survival on informal U.S. security guarantees.”
Such a shift also fits neatly within the Kingdom’s Vision 2030, which calls for developing indigenous defense industries and forging new defense partnerships. A partnership with Pakistan can expedite the process, and hints of a potential China-Pakistan-Saudi trilateral cooperation are already emerging.
Bottom Line
While not necessarily a pledge to fight each other’s wars, the Saudi-Pak mutual defense agreement reshapes perceptions of each state and their role in the region. It elevates Pakistan’s profile in the Gulf at a time when Islamabad seeks economic relief and regional relevance, while allowing Saudi Arabia to hedge against the uncertainty of U.S. protection and to court closer ties with China. Should Qatar or the United Arab Emirates decide to join, the arrangement could evolve into a broader Gulf-Pakistan security framework, amplifying Pakistan’s diplomatic weight even if its military obligations continue to remain ambiguous. For Washington, the agreement is a reminder that lapses in protecting its allies drive them to seek alternative patrons—a potentially unsettling prospect in an era of great-power competition, with China eager to fill any vacuum the United States leaves on the international stage.
In short, what Riyadh and Islamabad have signed is best understood as a recognition of their mutual concerns and willingness to support each other, while it introduces ambiguity into the strategic calculus of regional players to strengthen deterrence. Its real significance lies not in whether Saudi pilots will ever fly combat missions for Pakistan, or vice versa, but in how it reflects the anxieties of regional powers and their efforts to address them amid the fading reliability of traditional security guarantors such as the United States. The implications of the pact will ultimately be determined by how New Delhi, Jerusalem, Washington, and Beijing choose to respond.
The article appeared in southasianvoices
