India’s latest Agni-5 missile test signals a sharp escalation in its nuclear modernization drive, aimed squarely at narrowing the strategic gap with China.
This month, the Indo-Pacific Defense Forum reported that India successfully conducted a test of its longest-range ballistic missile, the Agni-5, in August from a launch site in Odisha, according to India’s Strategic Forces Command.
Developed by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the three-stage intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range that exceeds 5,000 kilometers. It’s capable of carrying a nuclear payload to targets in China and Pakistan, amid ongoing border disputes.
Following a 2024 trial of a variant with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), which lets a single missile carry multiple warheads, the test showcased a standard configuration. However, analysts believe it also demonstrated that the technology is ready for future submarine-launched capabilities.
Experts cited India’s strategic need for long-range deterrence, particularly against China, which possesses a significantly larger nuclear arsenal—estimated at 600 warheads compared to India’s 180. The DRDO is reportedly working on an upgraded version of the Agni-5, which is expected to have a range of 7,500 kilometers.
India’s test launch came before Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, highlighting the country’s push to strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Defense analysts see the launch as part of India’s broader effort to upgrade its strategic arsenal in response to China’s growing military capabilities.
India’s Agni-5 test and pursuit of MIRV capability highlight how its nuclear modernization seeks to close deterrence gaps with China, yet in doing so raises doctrinal, strategic, and regional stability questions that intertwine with China’s missile defense buildup and perceptions of India as a complicating—though not existential—nuclear actor.
The Agni-5 represents a significant improvement in India’s land-based nuclear arsenal, bridging a critical deterrence gap with China. Christopher Clary mentions in an October 2023 Arms Control Association article that while India can credibly threaten all of Pakistan with nuclear weapons, its coverage of China’s eastern seaboard remains limited.
Clary points out that India’s steady nuclear modernization, with newer variants of the Kalam submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and the Agni IRBM, should close that gap by the end of the decade.
Furthermore, Hans Kristensen and colleagues note in a September 2024 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists report that the missile’s MIRV capability marks one of the most significant shifts in India’s arsenal. However, they say that loading multiple warheads may reduce range.
The same report cautions that MIRV development raises doctrinal questions, since the technology is designed to strike more targets and overwhelm defenses. It suggests India’s deployment could signal intent to attack multiple sites simultaneously, thereby pressuring it to expand its arsenal.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data reflect a modest increase in India’s arsenal, from 172 warheads in 2024 to 180 in 2025. Pakistan, by contrast, has remained at roughly 170 during the same period.
The US Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 2024 China Military Power Report warns that China could expand to 1,000 warheads by 2030, in what may be the fastest contemporary nuclear buildup.
However, Kristensen and others say the growth of India’s nuclear arsenal in turn could spur Pakistan and China to expand theirs. They argue that unless China has developed an effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) system against IRBMs, there seems to be little need for India to develop MIRV-capable missiles.
The 2024 US DoD CMPR also highlights China’s expanding BMD program, centered on the HQ-19 interceptor system capable of midcourse engagement. The report cites multiple successful exo-atmospheric tests and parallel investments in phased-array radars and early-warning satellites.
Yet the report stresses that this network remains limited, designed mainly to shield strategic sites and leadership, with its effectiveness against advanced threats still uncertain.
Kristensen and others further observe that Pakistan and China’s fielding of MIRV-capable missiles—the Ababeel IRBM, DF-5 and DF-41—likely spurred India to pursue the technology to avoid falling behind.
For Pakistan, India’s MIRV pursuit complicates its deterrence logic, as it relies on deterrence rather than BMD systems. Pakistan’s arsenal has remained relatively stable, but China’s more ambitious expansion poses the greater long-term concern for India.
Discussing India’s perceptions of China’s nuclear buildup, Rajeswari Rajagopalan mentions in a January 2025 report for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) that while China maintains a no-first-use (NFU) policy, Indian sources note that China can be flexible with this model, potentially allowing a launch-under-attack or launch-on-warning posture without changing its NFU model.
Rajagopalan highlights that Indian sources are divided on how to respond to China’s nuclear buildup, with opinions ranging from qualitative improvements to expanding India’s nuclear arsenal.
While his sources put the ideal number of Indian nuclear warheads at around 250, there is debate on whether to enhance land-based missile range and accuracy, further develop nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), or maintain a nuclear triad.
Yet the introduction of MIRVs risks blurring the line between a declaratory NFU posture and a broader strategy, forcing India to reconcile its political framing with increasingly complex capabilities.
While MIRVs enable multiple targeting and can penetrate missile defenses, MIRV-armed missiles are an attractive target, as their pre-emptive destruction would eliminate a significant part of an adversary’s nuclear arsenal, thereby encouraging a use-it-or-lose-it mentality.
Despite these differences in views, Rajagopalan says India views its nuclear arsenal primarily as a political tool rather than a weapon.
Delving into China’s view of India’s nuclear arsenal, Lyle Morris and Rakesh Sood mention in a September 2024 Asia Society report that China doesn’t view India’s nuclear arsenal as an existential threat but rather as a regional factor that complicates its security calculus.
According to Morris and Sood, Chinese analysts note that both sides have historically emphasized credible minimum deterrence and NFU policies, which have kept nuclear rhetoric muted even during border crises.
At the same time, they say China perceives India’s modernization—especially MIRV development and longer-range Agni missiles—as potentially destabilizing because they raise questions about India’s doctrine and could spur arms competition.
They say that, overall, China views India as a capable obstacle to its regional ambitions, rather than a peer nuclear rival on par with the US or Russia.
India’s Agni-5 launch sharpens its hand in the nuclear game but also tightens the spiral of competition with China. In a contest where missiles multiply faster than trust, India’s new missile sharpens deterrence but deepens the shadow of a looming nuclear arms race in Asia.
