On Sunday December 28, Myanmar goes to the polls for the first phase of its first general election since the military coup of February 1, 2021.
After several extensions, the State Administration Council, controlled by the military (Tatmadaw), lifted the state of emergency on July 31, creating a State Security and Peace Commission and a caretaker cabinet led by Prime Minister Nyo Saw, a military-aligned figure, while Senior General Min Aung Hlaing remains the commander-in-chief and acting president.
On the same day, the Union Election Commission — provisioned under 2008 Constitution and set up under UEC Law of 2010 — was reconstituted to set this election process in motion. The plan now is to complete general elections by January 25, 2026, to form a civilian government before completing four years of military rule and, once again, start Myanmar’s piecemeal process of democratization.
But, given that ASEAN has refused to send observers for these elections, their credibility already stands undermined. By official admission, these elections will not take place in 15% of constituencies. Indeed, most of the known political parties stand dissolved or disqualified. The military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party — created by military in April 2010, ahead of Myanmar’s first post-military rule general elections, from their 1993 Union Solidarity and Development Association — is the only party visible but it was rejected in both 2015 and 2020 elections when the National League for Democracy (NLD) won more than 80% of the seats to form the government.
Coup, civil war and exclusions
The 2025 election has its roots in the 2021 coup that deposed the NLD government of Aung San Suu Kyi. The NLD’s growing popularity had threatened the military with being sidelined by Myanmar’s civilian leaders. But the military’s coup and later dissolution of NLD has since triggered massive anti-military protests and violence nationwide. The military has failed to demonstrate its full control so far.
The attempt to hold elections comes in the midst of a multi-front civil war involving the military, newly formed People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). The violence has continued with heavy fighting in Sagaing, Chin, Kachin and Rakhine states, with large swathes of territory effectively outside junta control. The military cannot hide its inability to secure a nationwide vote.
A notable emblem of this conflict’s humanitarian toll was the airstrike on Mrauk-U hospital in Rakhine State on December 10, 2025, which killed 33 or 34 civilians and injured about 70 to 80 others – underscoring how the civil war context overlaps with the election hubbub. Myanmar has more than 34 million eligible voters, based on the 2024 provisional census but by no means are all of them eligible or able to cast their votes.
The Election Commission last week announced voter lists,which have faced popular distrust.
In 2020, even amid the Covid-19 pandemic, voter turnout was over 71%, reflecting transformative public engagement with politics. By contrast, early signs for 2025 suggest significantly diminished interest in elections due to insecurity, boycotts and intimidation, although exact figures will only be known after elections.
Meanwhile, millions of politically active individuals, including opposition figures and civil society activists, have been detained since 2021. The United Nations reports estimate that over 30,000 political detainees, including members of civil society, ethnic minorities and community organizers.
Political parties that can (not) participate
The 2025 election’s competitiveness is also sharply restricted by legal and administrative barriers. Under the 2023 Political Party Registration Law, parties must meet onerous membership, infrastructure, financial and “loyalty” criteria to register, effectively excluding dissident and pro-democracy formations.
Most prominently, Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD was dissolved in 2023 after it refused to re-register under the revised law, automatically disenfranchising one of Myanmar’s most popular parties. Multiple other ethnic and opposition parties have been deregistered or have refused to register – leaving only a handful, such as the military-backed USDP and a few minor scattered groups, that are allowed to run nationwide.
Reports indicate that as few as nine out of 61 registered parties will contest in elections. Those that will contest include legacy military-aligned parties USDP, National Unity Party (NUP) and others, which are led by retired generals. A single non-military entity permitted is the People’s Party, led by activist Ko Ko Gyi, though its independence remains contested. This highly gated party landscape ensures that election outcome will overwhelmingly favor pro-military forces, precluding meaningful oppositional balance in the future national assembly.
To further insulate the election process from dissidents, the junta has enacted the Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections, which criminalizes virtually all criticism of the election process. Penalties include three years to life imprisonment and, in cases of violence against election workers or disruption of polling, even the death penalty. Amnesty International reports that, in the run-up to this first phase, at least 229 people were already charged under this law for allegedly sabotaging electoral processes, including artists and social media users.
Meanwhile, the military recently released over 3,000 political prisoners and dropped charges against several thousand more in a pre-election amnesty framed as promoting voter participation. However, the fate of such a high-profile detainee as Suu Kyi remains uncertain. Her son recently raised concerns that he had not heard from her in years and feared for her safety, despite junta claims that she is in “good health.”
International and regional dynamics
International responses are sharply divided. Western democracies, human rights organizations and civil society networks have widely condemned the election as an undemocratic tool to legitimize military rule. In October 2025, more than 300 civil society and labor unions called on ASEAN and other governments to reject the poll entirely. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) denounced it as a “charade” warning that holding elections under current conditions could exacerbate divisions and deepen repression.
As for ASEAN, it has stressed that “no substantial progress” has been made on its Five-Point Consensus of 2021 — which calls for end to violence, allowing humanitarian aid, inclusive dialogue, a special envoy and visits with all parties — and urged that elections must be fair, credible, transparent and inclusive. ASEAN has not agreed to send observers weakening any claim to legitimacy in regional eyes.
China, on the other hand, has emerged as the sole supporter for publicly backing the military-run elections, arguing that truces negotiated with rebels have strengthened conditions for voting and that this aligns with Beijing’s strategic aim of ensuring stability on its frontiers. China reportedly has been helping the junta in its airstrikes on rebels as well. This support highlights how geopolitical fault lines are shaping Myanmar’s political trajectories.
Legitimacy and future governance
Starting on Sunday, Myanmar elections will unfold one of the most politically contested exercises in this region. Restoring electoral politics after five years of military rule, the election’s geographic exclusions, party de-registrations, legal repression, and civil war backdrop – all these factors cast deep doubts on the polls’ democratic credentials.
With key opposition voices absent, large portions of the population under conflict, and legal instruments weaponised to silent dissent, this polls are all about manufacturing legitimacy for the junta through an electoral theatre.
In principle this vote may mark a return to electoral politics but in practice it exemplifies the junta’s bid to reinforce its continued grip on power through a carefully scripted political facade under conditions that most experts regard as incompatible with minimal democratic standards.
These elections can be no measure of popular will other than providing a litmus test of how enduring the junta’s hold on Myanmar has become.
Swaran Singh is a professor of international relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University.
