An unauthorized drone buzzing near an Indonesian Army training exercise set off a confrontation in Ketapang, West Kalimantan, on December 14, drawing troops into a restricted gold mining zone and ending in violence.
Four soldiers sent to investigate found several Chinese nationals operating the drone in a restricted zone. As the soldiers sought clarification, more foreign workers arrived and the confrontation escalated.
According to the military, the attackers used machetes, an airsoft gun and an electric shock device. Outnumbered and facing an immediate threat, the soldiers withdrew to prevent further escalation and reported the incident through formal command channels.
No troops were injured but company vehicles were damaged. In the days that followed, Indonesia’s Tanjungpura Military Command opened an investigation, and immigration authorities detained 29 Chinese nationals connected to the site.
Subsequent checks revealed immigration violations, including overstayed permits and discrepancies between registered sponsorships and actual activities.
The immediate temptation is to read Ketapang as a diplomatic or sovereignty crisis. But doing so obscures the real issue. This was not a failure of China-Indonesia relations at the state-to-state level. It was a failure of Indonesian governance — one with clear bilateral consequences.
Over the past decade, Indonesia has made China a central partner in its economic transformation. Chinese investment has flowed into mining, smelting and infrastructure projects that Jakarta views as essential to moving up global value chains.
The partnership has delivered jobs, export revenue and geopolitical leverage. Yet Ketapang exposes a persistent weakness beneath that success: Indonesia has struggled to govern foreign labor associated with Chinese investment consistently and credibly.
The legal framework is not ambiguous. Foreign workers in Indonesia must hold valid permits, operate within approved roles and comply with national law. Immigration authorities are empowered to detain and deport foreign nationals who overstay visas or threaten public order.
Employers bear responsibility for supervising foreign workers and ensuring compliance. In Ketapang, these safeguards failed long before a drone appeared in restricted airspace.
When enforcement gaps persist, minor violations accumulate into serious risks. Unauthorized activities go unchecked. Permit irregularities are tolerated. Oversight becomes reactive rather than routine.
By the time the state intervenes, the issue has already escalated into a security incident — one that invites nationalist sentiment and geopolitical interpretation.
This dynamic carries costs for China-Indonesia relations. Weak enforcement fuels public suspicion that Chinese workers or companies receive preferential treatment.
Regulatory failures are reframed as bilateral problems, even when their origins lie in domestic administrative neglect. Over time, this erodes public confidence in Indonesia’s China policy and complicates an otherwise pragmatic partnership.
Crucially, this is not a problem Beijing can resolve. China does not issue Indonesian work permits, oversee immigration sponsorships or enforce labor compliance. These are sovereign responsibilities. When foreign nationals are found to have overstayed permits or operated outside approved roles, the credibility at stake is Indonesia’s own.
The legal response to the violence in Ketapang should be firm and transparent, following established criminal and immigration procedures. Doing so would not undermine China-Indonesia relations.
On the contrary, it would clarify the rules under which Chinese investment operates in Indonesia. Strategic partnerships depend less on diplomatic assurances than on predictable governance.
Ketapang also reflects a broader pattern in Indonesia’s management of foreign labor linked to Chinese investment. Inspections intensify after incidents occur, not as part of routine oversight. Legal status is scrutinized only after conflict erupts. This reactive approach leaves room for misunderstanding, escalation and avoidable confrontation.
Stronger labor and immigration governance would not deter responsible investors. Clear rules, consistently enforced, reduce risk, protect compliant firms and reassure local communities that the state remains in control. Governance, not permissiveness, is what sustains long-term industrial development.
China-Indonesia relations have matured beyond symbolic projects and headline announcements. Their durability now depends on everyday administration—on whether Indonesia can govern foreign economic presence with confidence and consistency.
Ketapang should be read as a warning: when governance lags behind investment, even a small regulatory lapse can spiral into a crisis.
Whether similar incidents recur will depend less on diplomacy than on enforcement. Indonesia’s partnership with China will be strongest not when rules are relaxed, but when they are applied and consistently enforced.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is director of the China-Indonesia Desk at the Jakarta-based Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) independent research institute. Yeta Purnama is a researcher at CELIOS.
