Addressing the terrorist threat should not justify dismantling the governance architecture the AU has painstakingly built over two decades.
Responding to growing terror threats and prioritising the restoration of constitutional order are often competing imperatives in countries going through transitions. African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf raised this point at a 30 September Peace and Security Council (PSC) ministerial meeting on the Sahel.
But in addressing these issues, he noted, the AU must not fall into the trap of sacrificing long-term goals to the pressures of short-term urgency – a risk the AU and its regional economic communities (RECs) face.
As terrorism spreads across the Sahel, numerous West African voices are calling for more AU ‘pragmatism’, rather than its strict suspension regime. A recent technical consultation hosted by Ghana that included the AU Commission and Alliance of Sahel States (AES) representatives even recommended reinstating suspended countries into the AU Committee of Permanent Representatives – allowing them to participate again in AU decision-making.
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It also proposed recognising the AES as a regional mechanism eligible for AU Peace Fund support.
These ideas are legitimate and help explore avenues of dialogue between the AU and AES countries. But prioritising urgency over principle, and expediency over norms, is a trap.
‘Pragmatism’ advocates say the AU must adapt to new realities and engage post-coup military regimes to contain terrorism. But this perpetuates the illusion of security through coups, concealing these regimes’ track record. Military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger were all justified as necessary in the fight against terrorism. In practice, though, these juntas haven’t been able to contain terrorism.
Militant attacks have increased in frequency and lethality, civilian deaths have multiplied, and state control over vast territories has receded. Far from improving security, militarising governance has done the opposite. Once armed forces are drawn into day-to-day management of state affairs, their operational capacity on the battlefield often diminishes. The security situation in all three AES countries confirms this paradox.
Despite this evidence, the juntas’ rhetoric on sovereignty and anti-imperialism earns them growing sympathy across Africa. Even some of the continent’s strongest democracies have succumbed to the temptation of complacent solidarity, arguing that military regimes are necessary given the scale of the terror threat.
But this undermines the AU’s normative foundations – particularly the Lomé Declaration and African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which together affirm that political power should be accessed and exercised through constitutional and democratic means.
Abandoning those principles in the name of security pragmatism would mean the AU legitimises military regimes that struggle to deliver on security. This would also normalise some of their arbitrary practices regarding fundamental rights, press restrictions, and the closing of political space.
Beyond this crisis of norms lies a more structural weakness of the AU post-coup suspension regime: the absence of a formal, institutionalised mechanism for political dialogue between the AU Commission and suspended states. Without this, the AU has relied on a case-by-case approach often characterised by inconsistency and short-term calculations.
Following a decision by the Assembly of Heads of State in February 2025, the AU undertook a review of its peace and security framework. The high-level panel appointed for the task should consider such a structured mechanism for dialogue. International financial institutions could even support this framework to create credible incentives for restoring constitutional order.
The model could draw inspiration from the political dialogue frameworks of the Lomé Convention and Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African States, which demonstrated that engagement and accountability can coexist.
Such a dialogue would need commitment from both the AU and suspended countries to engage. The AU Commission’s new leadership has shown its willingness to bridge the gap with AES countries; these states should also signal their openness to negotiation and to concessions on accountable governance.
For the AU, conceding to suspended states’ demands without reciprocal commitments equates to ignoring the root causes of the Sahel’s instability. It also underestimates the AU’s leverage.
Its institutional legitimacy, normative authority, and ability to mobilise international financial support provide it with significant bargaining power. The AU and other regional actors should insist that any reintegration or financial help for AES countries be tied to verifiable commitments towards a return to constitutional order.
The need to contain terrorism cannot exempt the AU from its primary obligation: to uphold and implement its founding principles, such as the Lomé Declaration. Trading off the long-term integrity of the continental order for short-term urgency would lead into the very trap Youssouf warned against.
The AU recently made a painful exception to its own norms. In 2021, the PSC chose not to suspend Chad after an unconstitutional military transition following the death of President Idriss Déby. The decision was justified as a pragmatic measure to preserve stability in a fragile sub-region. But it breached the AU principle of zero tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government. The Chadian example became how military juntas justified their grip on power.
Using terrorism to justify such exceptions risks dismantling the very governance architecture the AU has painstakingly built over two decades. The irony would be that in trying to contain insecurity, the organisation could end up eroding the norms that constitute the backbone of African multilateralism.
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And the greatest paradox of all is that this erosion could come not from authoritarian outliers – but from some of Africa’s most democratic states; those now advocating to accommodate military juntas in the name of pragmatism.
The Sahel crisis is becoming a defining moment for the AU’s credibility. Through careful and considerate management, the organisation should acknowledge that accountable governance is necessary for lasting peace and security.
When principles are traded for short-term expediency, both are lost. The AU’s founding values were conceived precisely to ensure that the continent would never again justify repression or illegality in the name of stability.
The situation in the Sahel is complex and requires innovative solutions. AES governments face a daunting challenge and should be supported. The AU has a role to play – and has a fantastic opportunity to project its vision of a rules-based continental order while laying the grounds for sustainable stability.
Paul-Simon Handy, Regional Director East Africa and Representative to the African Union, ISS Addis Ababa
